A CRITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES'

DIPLOMATIC FOOTPRINT

by

ANNA W. MOORE

A DISSERTATION

Presented to the Department of Geography
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

December 2016

DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE

Student: Anna W. Moore

Title: A Critical Geography of the United States' Diplomatic Footprint

This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Geography by:

Alexander B. Murphy	Chairperson
Shaul Cohen	Core Member
Katie Meehan	Core Member
Mark Gillem	Institutional Representative

and

Scott L. Pratt	Dean of the Graduate School

Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School.

Degree awarded December 2016.

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Anna W. Moore

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Geography

December 2016

Title: A Critical Geography of the United States' Diplomatic Footprint

The practice of diplomacy has changed dramatically in recent decades as a result of technological advancements and shifting geopolitical concerns. No longer confined to the cloaked and closed-door practices of elite state institutions, the diplomatic landscape has broadened, and been made visible, across space and scale. Amidst this rapidly changing environment, it is imperative to understand how states are adjusting their material diplomatic infrastructure and what that means for everyday diplomatic practices. While many countries have adjusted to twenty-first century diplomatic realities by adapting to a more mobile, maneuverable diplomatic corps and fewer facilities, the United States remains committed to a widespread diplomatic network, the largest in the world. This diplomatic footprint is the hallmark of universality, a sustained effort over time to acquire near total diplomatic coverage by dotting the world with embassies and consulates designed to look, work, and behave in a similar, if not, ageographic, manner. Attending to this understudied phenomenon means studying the historical and geographic conditions out of which this relatively even and uniform diplomatic apparatus materialized. It further means analyzing the contemporary pattern of U.S. diplomatic infrastructure against the shifting terrain of diplomatic norms and space.

Drawing empirically on interviews with elite diplomatic practitioners, substantial archival material, and the researcher's own experience working within the U.S. diplomatic assemblage, this study has sought to examine *why* the United States remains committed to universality and what embassies and consulates actually *do* to secure U.S. foreign policy goals. Specifically, the study—presented in this dissertation as three discrete original research articles—is framed by the following research questions:

(1) What ideas and policies shaped the geographical footprint of U.S. diplomatic infrastructure over the course of the twentieth century?

(2) How does the globe-girdling U.S. diplomatic assemblage reflect and influence geopolitical ideas and practices?

(3) How does the grouping of diplomatic missions along regional lines reflect and influence U.S. foreign policy?

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME OF AUTHOR: Anna W. Moore

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

University of Oregon, Eugene
The George Washington University, District of Columbia
University of California at Davis, Davis

DEGREES AWARDED:

Doctor of Philosophy, Geography, 2016, University of Oregon
Masters of Arts, Latin American and Hemispheric Studies, 2010, The George Washington University
Bachelors of Arts, International Relations and Spanish, 2007, University of California at Davis

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

Political geography
Diplomatic studies

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Analyst, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 2016-Present

Operations Specialist, U.S. Department of State, 2010-2016

GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS:

Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant, A Critical Geography of the United States' Diplomatic Footprint, National Science Foundation, 2015

Honorable Mention for Best Paper, Downspout politics, upstream conflict: formalizing rainwater harvesting in the United States, International Water Resources Association, 2014

President's Award for Best PhD Paper, "We're looking for Mass. Ave.": Site selection for U.S. diplomatic infrastructure in the Design Excellence era, Association of Pacific Coast Geographers Annual Meeting, 2013

PUBLICATIONS:

Moore, A.W. and Perdue, N. 2014. Imagining a critical geopolitical cartography. *Geography Compass* 8(2): 892-901.

Meehan, K. and Moore, A.W. Downspout politics, upstream conflict: formalizing rainwater harvesting in the United States. *Water International* 39(4): 417-430.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The study was made possible by a Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant, Award Number 1536308, from the National Science Foundation. Additional funding was received from the University of Oregon's Department of Geography and the Association of Pacific Coast Geographers. I am tremendously grateful for the support.

***

There are a number of individuals I wish to thank personally for their unwavering commitment to this project. Alec's enthusiasm for the topic, thoughtful critiques, and valuable time were essential in seeing the dissertation through to completion. Shaul was a much-needed soundboard and always steered me towards the bigger picture. Katie encouraged me to dig deeper and be more critical, often over a beer. Mark's own dissertation work provided inspiration for this project and his ideas were helpful during the early phases. Thank you all for your generous time, support, and flexibility.

The entire geography community at the University of Oregon urged me along and picked me up when I faltered. Thank you to the faculty for imparting your wisdom and the office staff for helping me navigate graduate school. I'd like to extend a special 'shout out' to Christine (cohort 2011-2012!), Nick, and M for their friendship and advice. Leslie, Denielle, Meche, Zack, Dylan, Belen, Helen, Emma, Cassie, Tyler, James, Sonja, Didi, and Tom all helped in their own way. I wish Doug were around to see the finished product.

My research assistant, Melody Charles, was wonderfully efficient in gathering and organizing a huge amount of data. Thank you. I am grateful for the patience and curiosity of the staff at the National Archives annex in College Park. Aletta Biersack's

2015-2016 dissertation writing group helped me hone my ideas as I put pen to paper, even if we spent much of our time together laughing. I appreciated the ideas and encouragement from other diplomacy scholars over the years, particularly Jason Dittmer, Iver Neumann, Veit Bachmann, Fiona McConnell, Alun Jones, and Julian Clark. Lastly, I am indebted to my managers, friends, and colleagues at State who listened to my ideas—often in the middle of the night—and provided crucial feedback.

To the Ladies (and Gents) of Riverview, Angie, Molly, Mindy, Dana, Ellen, Shannon, Kristin, Corina, Randy, and Dr. Yak: thank you for your unconditional support and the steady stream of affirming texts. I am additionally grateful to Sam, Megan, and Katie; we were often on opposite sides of the country but the flood of early morning texts was the perfect wake up call and just what I needed to see this thing through to the end. And I would be in a sorry state without my Oregon ski pals: Jon (RTS!), Kory, M, and Nick (how many laps did we ski on Northwest Express that one time?).

I am grateful to Ryan, who had the sense to stop asking me how my dissertation was progressing. That meant more than you know.

Finally, I am tremendously appreciative of the motivation, love, and support from my entire family throughout these past five years, but especially Dad, Mom, Tay, and Nick. It's been a long road and I would not have been able to navigate it without you all by my side. Thank you for the hugs, calls, selfies, walks, hikes, Starbucks, comfort food, Truckee, outdoor bed, hot tub, comfortable couches, United miles, and Maeve. And Dad, as always, thanks for teaching me how to ski.

This dissertation is dedicated to the memories of Troyce and Joanne Wiley.
I hope this would have made them proud.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

Chapter Page

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Such is the strangely compelling aura of the embassy. – Zadie Smith (2013)

On July 1, 2012, a 14-minute trailer for an obscure, amateur film produced in southern California—*The Innocence of Muslims*—was uploaded to the video-file-sharing site *YouTube.* The English-language clip received only limited attention in Egyptian media outlets until a version was uploaded onto the same site dubbed in Arabic on September 8 (*al Jazeera* 2012). Days later, beginning Tuesday, September 11, mass demonstrations against the film and its extremist portrayal of the Prophet Mohammed lit up the Muslim world, targeting U.S. and Western diplomatic installations in twenty cities across the Middle East, Africa, and South-Central Asia (Kirkpatrick & Santora 2012).

In Cairo, some 2,000 protesters breached the wall of the U.S. Embassy and tore down the flag, replacing it with the black Salafist flag (Sydow 2012). In Khartoum, two individuals were killed when 5,000 demonstrators marched on the U.S. embassy (Kirkpatrick & Santora 2012, *BBC* 2012a). In Tunis, four died after protesters lit vehicles and trees on fire and burned the flag inside the embassy compound before looting and setting fire to the American school in the city (*BBC* 2012a). In Pakistan, 19 were killed as demonstrators clashed with police in front of the U.S. consulates in Karachi and Peshawar (*BBC* 2012b). Further protests were held in Yemen, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Iraq, Indonesia, Kuwait, Turkey, Morocco, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Lebanon, and Germany (*al Jazeera* 2012; *BBC* 2012a, 2012b). Amidst the confusion, anger, and chaos in the early hours of protests, the U.S. Special Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi, Libya, was the target of a heinous—and seemingly unrelated—attack on U.S.

diplomatic personnel, resulting in the death of four Americans, including U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens. By Saturday, September 15, the U.S. Department of State had ordered a 'draw-down' (i.e. personnel withdrawal) of Department facilities in Tunisia and Sudan, mandating that all non-essential personnel leave the countries (Spencer 2012).

The events of September 2012 were tragic and sobering. They spoke to how quickly social media platforms can at once bring people together but can also disseminate hate, incite violence, and pit peoples against one another. In the aftermath of the riots and violence, many questions went unanswered and the Benghazi attack became the subject of widespread conspiracy theories and a particularly ugly political smear campaign. This dissertation, however, is not about *The Innocence of Muslims* or Benghazi. In the context of this study, the events of September 2012 signal the emergence of an idea that is at the heart of this dissertation. At the time I was a Civil Service employee in the U.S. Department of State's Operations Center, the Department's 24/7-staffed office charged with monitoring and providing up-to-the-minute reporting on fast-breaking events, including, political upheaval, natural disasters, market conditions, sudden policy shifts, terrorist attacks, and flare-ups in violence. While on shift during the tumultuous week of September 11, 2012, I began to notice a particular way U.S. embassy and consulate facilities were framed in news media and among my Foreign Service colleagues, many of who had served in those facilities during previous tours. In reading through news coverage of the demonstration in Khartoum, Abdelaziz (2012) wrote, "Police fought demonstrators for more than an hour in front of the heavily fortified U.S. embassy outside Khartoum […], a vast compound comprising several buildings and tiers of fences." And from Cairo: "The U.S. Embassy is built like a fortress, with a wall several yards high" (*CBS News* 2012). On Tunis: "Unlike the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, the embassy in Tunis is a fully fortified Inman building that has security features in place to prevent protesters from entering" (*STRATFOR* 2012). On Sana'a: "Young protesters… smashed windows of the security offices outside the embassy with stones and burned at least five cars as they broke through the main gate of the heavily fortified compound in eastern Sanaa [sic]" (Ghobari 2012, Figure 1).

As evidenced by the above quotations, contemporary American diplomatic installations, and not just those in instability-ridden regions, are marked by an overwhelming concern for security. High-profile attacks on U.S. embassies in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983 and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, in 1998 prompted a broad restructuring of the Department and mandated radical changes to the ways in which officials designed embassy and consulate compounds, complete with large perimeter walls; narrow, bullet-proof windows; and slick façades to discourage wall-scaling to name a few. The descriptors in the above quotations—"heavily fortified," "fully fortified," "compounds," "fortress"—are now used frequently to refer to all U.S. diplomatic facilities, contributing to what many commentators refer to globally as "Fortress America." Further, a security-driven directive specifying that compounds be built on 10-acre sites (a setback buffer to prevent damage in the event of a bombing at the perimeter) led to the selection of new sites well outside traditional diplomatic neighborhoods, and even outside city limits in some cases, as evidenced the by the above quoted references to "outside Khartoum" and "in eastern [Sana'a]."

The generation of what is perceived to be out-of-the-way, hyper-secure, bleak, and unwelcoming embassies and consulates has been widely criticized. Commentators decry the bleak and imposing nature of the structures (see, e.g., Crittenden 1981, Loeffler 1998b, Langewiesche 2007, Ouroussoff 2010). Thomas Friedman of *The New York Times* wrote of the American Consulate in Istanbul, "It looks just like Fort Knox—without the charm" (Friedman 2003). Urban scholars Jon Coaffee (2010) and Stephen Graham (2010) have examined the security cordons surrounding U.S. embassy facilities to illustrate to ways in which state security apparatuses are transforming the urban landscape and inspiring a culture of fear. In 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives held a hearing titled "Fortress America" to study "the ramifications of the new type of embassies that U.S. taxpayers are currently funding" (U.S. House 2008). And the State Department's Inspector General documented low morale in Zagreb, Croatia, a newer embassy site located well outside the urban core (OIG 2009).

In the post-Benghazi era, the Department's security-driven directives have been closely monitored by the news media, as detailed in reporting on the unprecedented closure of 22 embassies over a weekend in August 2013 and the suspension of operations at facilities in Damascus, Syria (2011); Tripoli, Libya (2014); Erbil and Baghdad, Iraq (2014); and Sana'a, Yemen (2015). Adding to the debate, many commentators have suggested America's bunker-like diplomatic posture is more a problem than a solution (Applebaum 2012, Grabar 2012, Worth 2012). As foreign policy analyst Stephen Walt commented, "[W]e have to build embassies that resemble fortresses, and that convey an image of America that is at odds with our interests and our own self-image…" (Walt 2010).

Research Problem

In spite of continued threats on U.S. diplomatic installations which regularly lead to the suspension of operations at facilities (what appears to be the new normal), and the types of attacks that mandated this hyper-secure operating environment in the first place, the costly security features at massive new embassy compounds demonstrate the United States' deep and continued commitment to a widespread diplomatic posture. Indeed, today the United States maintains 285 embassies and consulates: in total some 19,000 structures, in 169 countries (Kennedy 2011, Benen 2014).[1] By way of comparison, Germany has 227 facilities (Federal Foreign Office 2014) and Russia 226 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia 2015). This extensive diplomatic footprint is the hallmark of universality, or the universality principle: a powerful and longstanding dogma that suggests the United States ought to maintain as widespread and as deeply rooted a diplomatic footprint as possible around the world. In practice, universality has come to represent a sustained effort on the part of the U.S. Department of State over time to acquire near total diplomatic coverage, embassies in as many capital cities (with some geopolitical exceptions) and consulates in as many strategic and highly populated urban centers as possible.

At a finer scale, universality also implies a large degree of homogeneity across this vast U.S. diplomatic network; each constituent embassy and consulate is designed to

[1] A word on terminology: a *diplomatic mission* refers to a state's official representation to another state or an international organization. It includes an *embassy*, typically in a capital city, which houses the offices of the ambassador or chief of mission as well as other offices depending on its size. The mission may also include any number of *consulates*, typically in larger urban areas, that provide consular services to citizens and local nationals, including passport, visa, and welfare and whereabouts requests.

look, work, and behave in a similar, indeed ageographic, manner. Rarely do key decisionmakers question what exactly the United States and the host country *need* from a particular facility, or whether a facility is necessary at all. Relatively little work has been done that helps us understand why the United States continues to value universality when the terrain of diplomacy has shifted so visibly in recent decades. Against that backdrop, this study aims to uncover, analyze, and critique the priorities and discourse that drive these very entrenched ideas about material diplomatic infrastructure.

In examining the discourse surrounding the U.S. diplomatic network, it is easy to point out the trap of universality, and not just in Department policies and official press releases. Even Walt's previously mentioned critique of Fortress America fails to call attention to the powerful pull of universality. Notice that his quotation, illustrative of other critiques of the U.S. diplomatic apparatus over the years, is premised on and assumes the endurance of universality and its two central tenets: a worldwide network and singular embassy platform (i.e. same types of offices, similar design, uniform security features). The trap of universality contributes to the failure of policymakers and commentators to think innovatively and consider alternative diplomatic postures. For example, officials might consider the smaller, more maneuverable diplomatic corps as deployed by many European countries—several of which have closed less strategic posts and co-located missions within larger facilities with ambassadors-at-large accredited to multiple, nearby states (Avery et al. 2007). Oliver (2016) reports that half the OECD states have reduced their diplomatic footprints in the last decade. The UK closed almost 30 traditional facilities between 2009 and 2015 and expanded an innovative science and technology network from 24 to 28 states in the same time period (ibid).

The point is that, at the end of the day, we rarely think to question the sites and spaces through which formal state diplomacy operates. The United States thus remains wholly committed to universality, and the logistical challenges and costs of suspending and later resuming operations are understood as mundane processes necessary to the pursuit of a unique, widespread diplomatic posture: American-style global diplomacy. Just as this network is spread widely, its nodes are also relatively homogenous. Most embassy facilities, as with most consulates, are composed of the same types of offices and personnel. They further maintain similar hierarchical management structures and operate using the same tried-and-true practices. The only seemingly unique large-scale adjustments to the facilities themselves are made to architectural design (notably the façade), the size of the facility, and its location relative to other fixtures in the urban environment. Indeed, the Department continues to function under the assumption that a permanent diplomatic mission, as well as a particular type of facility, is essential in every state to maintain the United States' primacy in global politics, a narrative of universality that has been constructed and reinforced by policymakers over time and that remains the primary driving force in crafting foreign policy, requisitioning funds, and (re)designing facilities. My key goal is to understand why.

Toward that end, this dissertation examines the United States' diplomatic network, a seemingly uniform and universal patchwork of embassies and consulates. The present study considers the value of diplomatic infrastructure—through the prism of the United States' longstanding emphasis on universality—against the rapidly changing environment in which contemporary diplomacy operates. At a wider scale and on a more practical level, this dissertation is about how to best leverage diplomatic assets, resources, and tools in an increasingly complex, multifaceted, and instability-ridden world. In exploring these themes, this research contributes theoretically to the body of literature concerned with the material dimensions of bureaucratic institutions and the myriad geographies of diplomacy.

The following three research questions serve to guide this study:

(1) What ideas and policies shaped the geographical footprint of U.S. diplomatic infrastructure over the course of the twentieth century?

(2) How does the globe-girdling U.S. diplomatic assemblage reflect and influence geopolitical ideas and practices?

(3) How does the grouping of diplomatic missions along regional lines reflect and influence U.S. foreign policy?

These questions aim at uncovering what diplomatic facilities represent, and, perhaps more importantly, what they do for U.S. interests. I derived my questions from a singular overarching concern for understanding what makes a U.S. embassy powerful, so powerful in fact that neither targeted attacks nor technological breakthroughs have turned policymakers away from maintaining broad-based diplomatic coverage. In unpacking these and other underlying questions throughout the course of this project, I have sought to open up the U.S. diplomatic apparatus to critique. This critique is grounded in an effort to understand the *networks of power* that have rendered the U.S. footprint nearly universal as well as the direct *consequences* of this very singular emphasis on universality for U.S. foreign policy goals.

Literature Review

Changing Diplomatic Practices

The subdiscipline of political science known as diplomatic studies was originally conceived to support practitioners. As such, its foundational canon reflects an emphasis on practice and behavior at the scale of the state (see, e.g., the classic "how to" guides: Satow 1917, Nicolson 1954, Berridge 1995). In recent decades, however, these 'prescriptive' (Neumann 2012) accounts have fallen out of favor, replaced by a vast literature theorizing diplomacy beyond its traditional, state-centric conceptualization. An 'innovative school' (Murray 2008) of diplomacy scholars has broadly redefined diplomacy as a humanistic endeavor: a set of mediating practices "that develop into a dominant discourse for dealing with the other" (Constantinou 1996: 110).

Recent work on constituent diplomacy (Kincaid 2002), multi-layered diplomacy (Hocking 1993), sub-state diplomacy (Cornago 2010), informal diplomacies (McConnell *et al.* 2012), and paradiplomacy (Duchacek 1990, Lecours 2002) all stem from this relational and inclusive effort to document the multiplicity of diplomacies that exist independent from or at least alongside the state. Yet the emphasis on innovative trends in diplomacy has distanced diplomacy scholars from the arena of practitioners. This distancing is reflected both in the dearth of work on everyday, embodied diplomatic behavior and scholars' own assertions that the field 'lags behind' contemporary diplomatic practice (Murray *et al.* 2011). Moreover, while there is a productive group of scholars asking questions about military processes and landscapes (e.g. Woodward 2005, Gregory 2010, with a few even making productive headway towards an understanding of adaptations to U.S. military infrastructure (Gillem 2007, Davis 2011), geographic analyses of diplomacy are harder to locate.

Simultaneously, scholars are acknowledging that diplomatic processes are changing more rapidly than ever before (Murray *et al.* 2011). The emergence of a vast, globe-girdling telecommunications infrastructure has enabled diplomats to be in near constant communication with decision makers at home, quickening the pace of diplomatic negotiations. Secure video, telephone, cellular, and internet capabilities have transformed how diplomats report sensitive information and meet for bilateral exchanges. In November 2013, the prime ministers of Finland and Estonia, at their respective desks in Helsinki and Tallinn, used ID cards and a software program to sign the first digital international agreement (Friedman 2013). The increasing use and popularity of social media outlets too—the tools of public diplomacy—have allowed diplomats to gauge their state's reputation abroad; to communicate with the general public, particularly in places where governments inhibit the flow of information; and to collect on-the-ground, up-to-the-minute information during crises, as occurred during the so-called Arab Spring and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

The distribution of diplomatic information across this wide telecommunications network has also created vulnerabilities, many of which were exposed during the WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden scandals. The ensuing diplomatic spats and calls for transparency led governments to consider making their diplomatic practices and negotiating positions more visible. In July 2014, for example, the Kremlin released data on President Putin's official calls and meetings with world leaders since February to discuss the crisis in Ukraine (Karaian 2014). And in the wake of the Malaysian Airlines downing over Ukraine, many commentators were shocked when Malaysian Prime Minister Najib communicated directly with Ukrainian rebel leaders on his personal cell phone, successfully negotiated access to the plane's wreckage, and briefed media outlets on the content of the call (Bradsher *et al.* 2014).

Contemporary diplomacy has undergone a seismic shift in the way it is practiced and structured; as such, there is a compelling need for serious academic engagement to understand how the United States justifies its vast presence around the world. In this new diplomatic climate of transparency, maneuverability, and insecurity, it is further imperative to critique the even-ness of America's diplomatic network of tried-and-true embassy and consulate design.

Towards the More-Than-Human and More-Than-Representational

A range of geographic work in the past decade has demonstrated the centrality of material infrastructure to everyday life and the power relations inherent in all human interaction. These efforts are driven by a redirection of inquiry towards non-human actors: animals, objects, and technological agents that shape our world and ways of knowing (see, e.g., Bakker 2005, Whatmore 2006, McFarlane 2011, Shaw & Meehan 2013). This so-called material turn has been aided by efforts to look beyond the longstanding 'landscape-as-text' approach to cultural geography and instead privilege the more-than-representational quality of space and place (Lorimer 2005, Cadman 2009). Nigel Thrift's non-representational theory is marked by an analytical shift from discourse to practice in an effort to shed light on how human and non-human processes are formed and performed, rather than being simply produced (Thrift 2000). These points of departure have widely influenced how political geographers make sense of the state as a collection of social practices that simultaneously coerce and build consensus to reify power arrangements (Mitchell 1991, Painter 1995, Mountz 2003).

Similarly, diplomacy and its variegated actors, objects, processes, and practices can be examined through this framework. The norms that I seek to study—those assumptions that drive U.S. foreign policy and diplomatic behavior—distill down to a set of concrete ideas surrounding the placement, structure, and, more broadly, value of material diplomatic infrastructure. Previously, scholars have looked at these facilities with a view toward commenting on their monumental characteristics, their appeal as "that most emblematic of emblematic architectures" (Boddy 2008: 282). But embassies and consulates are not merely *representative* of power and the reach of the state; they *do work* for the state by existing as nodes for consular operations, information gathering, and bilateral negotiation and communication. The proposed research examines the material and more-than-representational characteristics of U.S. diplomatic infrastructure to understand how its constitutive elements work to sustain the very particular worldview that drives American foreign policy.

Bureaucracies, Networked Infrastructure, and Path Dependency

Organizations fundamentally shape and are shaped by global politics, whether in the form of government bureaucracies, think tanks, multi- and supra-national institutions, or social movements (Müller 2012, Monstadt 2009). Recent analyses of these bureaucratic organizations themselves, what Dale (2005: 671) calls a "material reconstruction of the workplace," expose the myriad connections linking networked infrastructure, in this case the physical components of diplomacy, to broader political processes. While conventional studies of political processes reduce the importance of infrastructure, recent work in economic and urban geography and in political ecology examines how infrastructure is integral to, and works in tandem with, state-making, city planning, and economic development processes (Graham & Marvin 2001, McFarlane 2008). Drawing on this work, the concept of path dependency is helpful in conceptualizing the vast U.S. diplomatic network. A path dependent network is one in which growth has followed a particular trajectory over time, predetermined and normalized due to certain driving characteristics (Batty 2007). The networked system is therefore locked onto a specific "growth path" (ibid: 29); where path dependent networks exist, radical innovation to that network is limited (Smith *et al.* 2005, Monstadt 2009).

The United States' established network of permanent diplomatic infrastructure has, for the most part, been in place for half a century, ahead of most of the development of the vast bureaucracy that oversees it in Washington. It is a network that is large, entrenched, unwieldy, and whose path is resistant to reform (Loeffler 1998a). Even in the aftermath of the catastrophic bombings in 1983 and 1998, a plan was in place almost immediately to rebuild the facilities, albeit with significantly enhanced security features (Loeffler 2005). There were never any indications that the United States would remove itself entirely from its diplomatic 'responsibilities' in Beirut, Dar es Salaam, and Nairobi. Whereas the U.S. Department of Defense has undergone comprehensive reviews of policy and resources in regular, four-year intervals since 1997 to adjust to a changing geopolitical climate, the State Department only began the 'quadrennial' review process in 2009. Further, the global pattern of U.S. military installations has been a topic of public debate for some time, notably evidenced in a February 2015 *New York Times* editorial:

"The Pentagon's excess space" (Editorial Board 2015). This research brings similar attention to U.S. diplomatic installations in an effort to explain how U.S. diplomacy has adapted in the absence of more comprehensive reform efforts, as well as to examine the interplay between the Department's networked infrastructure and contemporary diplomatic practices. Taking the U.S. diplomatic institution seriously as the sum of its parts, a multitude of actors, objects, material infrastructure, and the networks that bind them, this project sheds light on the organizational character of contemporary diplomacy, that which needs "to be coordinated and brought together to make an organization capable of acting" (Müller 2012: 379).

Explanation of the Dissertation Format

This dissertation is composed of a chapter on the methodology employed in the present study followed by three discrete chapters in article format. The first of these articles, titled "Towards a Historical Geography of the United States' Diplomatic Footprint," draws primarily on archival data to outline the ideas and motivations that have led U.S. policymakers to build the largest diplomatic apparatus in the world. In particular, the paper traces the emergence of the universality principle in line with shifting attitudes related to America's growing role in global affairs throughout the twentieth century. This paper ultimately addresses the first research question driving this dissertation research.

The second article is entitled, "Rethinking the U.S. diplomatic assemblage: Representation, institutional processes, and the impacts of universality." This piece examines how the universality principle facilitates the United States' role as a global power. The paper examines (1) why, according to policymakers, contemporary embassy and consulate installations exist, and (2) what work the facilities do to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives. Making use of interview data with high-level Department of State personnel, the paper identifies the primary drivers of continued U.S. diplomatic presence and considers these alongside a critique of the United States' global power ambitions and geostrategic objectives throughout the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This second article speaks primarily to the second research question of the study, highlighting the factors that contribute to the continued enhancement of the U.S. diplomatic apparatus.

The third and final article, "Regional Bureaus and the Privileging of the State in the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment," moves the lens away from U.S. diplomatic installations abroad to consider the ways in which diplomats and policymakers view, order, and understand the world from headquarters at 'Main State' in Washington, DC. This article focuses on often-unacknowledged geographical assumptions that work in tandem with the universality principle. I examine the hierarchical 'bureau system' schema in place at the Department of State, and, in particular, the political-geographic breakdown of the Department's regional bureaus. The paper thus calls attention to the ways in which Department operatives, whether knowingly or not, are forced to encounter a world obscured by deeply entrenched, yet arbitrary, operational divisions which both reveal and hide geographic phenomena in potentially problematic ways. The data for this paper is drawn primarily from my own experiences working at Main State and is complemented by archival data.

Key Findings

A more in-depth explanation of the present study, including methods employed, data analysis, specific empirical findings, theoretical contributions, and results, are presented in the following chapters. This final section of the introduction provides a summary of the primary broad conclusions and key themes that emerge from this project.

(1) The universality principle--the longstanding idea that U.S. diplomats and diplomatic facilities ought to be as widespread (i.e. nearly universal) and as entrenched in local society as possible—is a significant driving force in the continued maintenance of the U.S. diplomatic footprint, even though it is curiously absent from policy documentation, administrative records, historical accounts, and the academic literature. This "phantom" concept of universality is built into the very fabric of the U.S. diplomatic institution; high-level diplomats regularly speak to the need to be "everywhere at once" to promote U.S. values and America's vision for the world.

(2) Attention to diplomatic representation is critical to understanding the United States' ambitions in the global arena. As sites through which diplomats collect information and seek to exert influence over peoples and places around the world, embassy and consulate facilities are active, material participants in rendering the globe legible for key decision makers in Washington. Contributing here to the theoretical literature on diplomatic representation, this study illustrates why it is important to consider diplomatic installations for their material properties, the "work" they do, and their representational characteristics to understand how such sites and spaces shape, and are shaped by, foreign policy aims.

(3) Scholars and practitioners should pay more attention to the conduits that exist to bridge formal and informal diplomatic practices, actors, and spaces. Over the course of this project, I found that while globalizing forces and technological advancements have radically changed how contemporary formal diplomatic arrangements operate around the world, it is exceedingly hard and time consuming to reform large and unwieldy state diplomatic institutions. As such, formal diplomatic practitioners often operate in outdated spaces employing outdated tools and ideas. It is important both to consider the ways in which diplomats have created innovative solutions to solve some of these problems and encourage more cross-fertilization of ideas between the Academy and practitioners to instill innovation and creating problem-solving.

The goal of this dissertation is to open up thinking about the geographical expression of the U.S. diplomatic network. Using the framework provided by the research questions, the value of this study lies in assessing:

(1) The genealogy, to use Foucault's term, it provides of the universality concept;
(2) The ways in which the material expression of the universality concept reflects and influences diplomatic practice; and
(3) The impacts the functional (and metageographical) parsing of that diplomatic network (into regions) has on diplomatic practice (i.e. privileging certain ideas and issues over others).

The keys findings of this study coalesce around a broader critique of the U.S. diplomatic network and its guiding universality principle. Data and findings suggest U.S. foreign policy directives are intrinsically linked to and, in many cases, primarily motivated by the presence of U.S. official government operatives in nearly every state. The failure of U.S. policymakers to reconsider broad-based diplomatic coverage thus implies a broader lack of imagination in designing foreign policy. In the concluding chapter I lay out the dangers policymakers face in neglecting to consider alternative diplomatic postures, particularly in the case of anti-American sentiments abroad, and present and alternative path forward.

FIGURE 1. Protesters scale the wall of the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen, on September 13, 2012 (Ybarra 2015).

FIGURE 2. The new normal. Construction on the new U.S. embassy in Yaoundé, Cameroon, in a sparsely populated new diplomatic enclave. Note the large lot and setback space; perimeter walls with flood lights; and fortress-like structure with narrow, likely bullet-proof windows (Caddell Construction ND).

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

This project draws on institutional ethnographic techniques to examine the U.S. diplomatic network. Ethnography has emerged as a useful tool for addressing themes in contemporary political geography, including attention to the everyday, previously marginalized voices, and small-scale phenomena at finer scales. As a methodological approach, institutional ethnographies focus on linking lower-order daily lived experiences to national and global institutional processes, highlighting the role institutions play in shaping human processes across space and scale (Del Casino *et al*. 2000, Taber 2010). This methodology is appropriate for the proposed study, particularly as recent work in political geography has sought to uncover how "infrastructure *itself* plays a role in cultivating or delimiting state power" (Meehan 2013: 215, emphasis in original; see also Müller 2012, 2015).

Political geographer Alison Mountz contends that institutional ethnography "offers a more nuanced rendition of state practices by seeking to understand and locate the operation of power in the daily work done by civil servants" (2004: 326). It is productive to extend this epistemology to address how diplomatic infrastructure works to reinforce the institutions of American foreign policy at the national and global scales, even as it influences the work and daily lives of American diplomats living around the world. Though the aim of many past analyses of foreign policy institutions has been to study the institution from *above* (Allison 1971, Heyman & Smart 1999) or *below* (Brower & Abolafia 1997), this research project placed me *inside* the diplomatic establishment to flesh out more fully its complex materialities and linkages across space and scale, imitating Merje Kuus' (2013) "studying up" approach (though she explicitly avoids referring to her work as an ethnography) and Iver Neumann's work aimed at uncovering, "what diplomats actually do, and how they think about what they're doing" (2012: 3).[2] Further, this project incorporated elite policymakers in heeding Criekemans' (2011: 718) call for "[m]ore integrated research designs […] to better capture how both foreign policy and diplomatic elites work together."

Over the course of several years, and through a mix of humanistic methods, I sought to uncover the significance of diplomatic installations for members of America's diplomatic corps, the practices and material things that constitute contemporary diplomatic processes, and the spaces that house and support these myriad people, things, and flows. The purpose of this chapter is to detail the research design of the present study. I first detail the research procedures employed in the present study of the United States' diplomatic network. I outline each method and comment on the types of data collected as well as the analytical tools employed during the study. Three primary methods were utilized to collect data, which were then triangulated and analyzed collectively to address the three driving research questions. These methods are: (1) informal anecdotes, memories, and commentary from my own experiences working within and contributing to the diplomatic network; (2) interview data from high-level U.S. diplomatic practitioners; and (3) extensive archival records on the expansion of the U.S. diplomatic footprint largely over the course of the twentieth century. I finish this chapter with a commentary on my positionality and the challenges and ethical

[2] Kuus (2013) contends a rigorous and robust ethnography of foreign policy institutions is not possible unless the researcher is able to work from within and claim herself as an "insider". She cites the work of Iver Neumann (2012) whose research project placed him as a paid speechwriter within the Norwegian foreign ministry as a successful example.

considerations of studying the U.S. diplomatic establishment from within. The subsequent articles-as-chapters present the methods in more detail.

Methodological Framework

Between June 2013 and December 2015, I spent over nine months in Washington, DC, working to understand the contours of the U.S. diplomatic establishment and its complicated geography around the world. Two trips, in summer 2013 and fall 2014, were preliminary in nature; I returned to the employ of the State Department to work in the Operations Center while refining the research questions and parameters of my dissertation study. These three-month-long stints provided me with an opportunity to reflect on my positionality as a researcher-*cum*-civil servant and my own role contributing to the maintenance of the U.S. diplomatic footprint, to discuss my project informally with colleagues, and to assess the feasibility of certain methods. A three-month stay in the District over summer 2015 represented the primary data collection period. Fieldwork included substantial archival research as well as interviews with high-level Department personnel. This primary data was necessarily supported by a large amount of secondary material. Sources included a plethora of academic work from across the social sciences, notably geography and diplomacy studies, as well as Department reports, newspaper articles (including a catalog of all *New York Times* and *Washington Post* articles that mention attacks on U.S. diplomatic installations from a previous research project), think tank publications, and even fiction (Giles Foden's (2002) *Zanzibar*, Zadie Smith's (2013) *The Embassy of Cambodia*). Lastly, as a geographer generally interested in exploring the world around me as well as an avid "urban hiker," I took every opportunity to wander and observe the everyday, often overlooked diplomatic landscapes of Washington (Figure 3). As is the case in many urban environments, diplomatic facilities are spread widely but unevenly across the city's northwest neighborhoods, with some facilities more prominent than others. Walking past the rundown Bolivian embassy, for example, and noting the "#MAR PARA BOLIVIA" installation (Figure 4), helped me understand the ways in which the material, urban, and banal diplomatic landscape is intimately and intrinsically connected to wider geopolitical processes.

The primary methods utilized in this study are discussed below and in more detail in the following articles. First, however, recall the research questions that have driven the present study and informed its methodology: (1) How have policies on U.S. diplomatic infrastructure developed over the course of the twentieth century? (2) What factors influence decision making surrounding U.S. embassy and consulate placement? (3) In what ways does the universal character of each facility prove alternately productive and counterproductive for U.S. foreign policy aims?

Archival Research

Contrary to the original research design, which stressed interviews as the principal method of this study, archival material has come to represent the bulk of my primary data and therefore the most significant evidentiary foundation for this project. This historical material, collected over summer 2015, has been used to construct a genealogy of the U.S. diplomatic footprint (research question 1), with an emphasis on the emergence of the discourse of universality at the turn of the twentieth century and the continued growth of the diplomatic network throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries (research questions 2 and 3). State Department records are stored at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration's (NARA) massive and highly secure Annex II facility in College Park, Maryland. Throughout the summer I thumbed through and tracked the documents stored in 82 boxes of material related to embassy and consulate facilities from 1910 through 1963 of the State Department Central Files (RG-59, Figure 5).

A historical geographic approach was critical to this research "to re-evaluate taken-for-granted concepts and to develop a comparative perspective so that as geographers we might more fully appreciate what is distinctive about today's world and how we understand it in disciplinary terms" (Roche 2010: 175; Mayhew 2003). Following standards in historiography, I was mindful to evaluate all archival documents for their authenticity, accuracy, and purpose, as well as the underlying motivation, background, and ideology of the person(s) who constructed them and the context within which the documents were created and archived (Baker 1997, Black 2006). All archival materials were collated, organized, and entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, which served as a database and reference guide for data analysis purposes. Data were coded within the database (see Data Analysis below). In addition, I maintained field notes related to "source criticism"—the process of 'interrogating' primary archival data—and took photographs of most records of interest. Drawing on the guidance of Professor Marsha Weisiger (undated) of the University of Oregon's Department of History and her "How to Analyze a Primary Source" guidelines, I remained wary of accepting a document at face value. Instead, I carefully noted the reasons the sourced documents were drafted as well as the potential positionality of the drafter(s). The following questions from Dr. Weisiger served as a helpful guide: "Why would this document lie to me? Is it an original document? How did this document originate? Was it required or coerced? Was it created at the moment of the event, or produced shortly thereafter, or later from memory? What was the author's motivation for producing the source? Can that person be trusted?"

While the empirical data collected through archival means was rich in content related to this project, this method was certainly not without its limitations. First, I greatly underestimated the amount of time and energy if would take to get into the archives, identify, and "pull" the records I needed. The NARA facility staff pull documents on the hour, and not every hour. Further, the material I needed was not organized neatly and separately. RG-59 is catalogued predominantly by country, meaning that it is organized into categories that represent the U.S. bilateral relationship to X country, Y country, and Z country respectively. As such, documents related to individual missions and their maintenance were scattered across the Central Files. It was impossible to pull each and every record related to individual U.S. diplomatic properties; instead, and per the advice of several archivists, I focused on the Department's broader policies towards embassies and consulates that were easier to locate among the slough of records. Among the data I collected were records on legislation and Congressional reports related to facilities; policies on U.S. diplomatic representation by region, particularly in times/zones of conflict or during budgetary crises; documents by Department officials justifying facilities in particular sites; documents showing changes in status (i.e. raising the status of a legation to an embassy); and information on other states' diplomatic postures. See Figure 6 for a sample document. Lastly, as a result of the time-intensive cataloging process at government agencies prior to sending records to NARA, the records I had access to were limited to 1963 and before. The interview data served to fill that post-1963 hole in the data set.

Elite Interviews

When beginning this research project, I was under the assumption that the interview method would elicit a robust and rich data set that would allow me to address the stated research objectives and to assess specifically why the United States continues to value an exceedingly widespread and deeply rooted diplomatic footprint. It was my understanding that interviews with a wide range of diplomatic practitioners at the highest echelons of the Department would yield a diversity of opinions regarding the appropriateness of this diplomatic posture. In reality, I had conducted only a few interviews before realizing that each participant was telling me the same thing, a variation of, "Of course we should have as many embassies and consulates as possible, we're the United States of America!" At the same time, it became clear during the principal data collection period that the historical record was yielding far 'meatier' data from a variety of sources, time periods, and voices than the interviews. Nevertheless, these interviews with elite diplomatic practitioners proved instrumental in identifying several factors that have led high-level policymakers to maintain the United States' widespread diplomatic posture as well as to understand better the mindset of the Foreign Service. As a result, this data helped address all three research questions.

All interviews were conducted between May and September 2015. In keeping with the original design of this research study, I initially sought to interview four types of diplomatic subjects while in Washington—retired senior-level Foreign Service Officers (FSOs); entry- and mid-level FSOs; elite, senior policymakers; and foreign diplomats posted in Washington—but I only ended up meeting with a mixture of the first and third classes I had identified. Participants had on average three decades of experience working in the Department as career FSOs. One participant was a political appointee. All, save the appointee, had moved up the ranks to at least one ambassadorial role during their tenure, and most had served multiple ambassadorships (Table 1). Many of the participants had served in further high-level roles at Main State, including Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Director General for Human Resources, and Assistant Secretary. I further made sure that I had participants who served ambassadorships and principal officer assignments at embassies and consulates in all of the Department's geographic regions—Western Hemisphere, Africa, Europe, Near East Asia and Northern Africa, South-Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific—including in U.S. missions to international organizations. Table 2 lists all those countries as well as other high-level positions.

I began each interview with a brief yet comprehensive explanation of the research study as well as an overview of my own positionality as a Department employee. Following in-depth, informal interview techniques, the questions asked, as well as their wording and sequence, were not established prior to the interviews to encourage a conversational and flexible tone. Aberbach and Rockman (2002) found that this open-ended interviewing format allows participants to better "organize their answers within their own frameworks" and is well suited for elite interview subjects (Ibid: 674). I developed a unique checklist of topics at the outset of each interview, customizing topics for each individual depending on that person's position, experiences, and expertise. This flexibility allowed me to interact more fully with interviewees, put them at ease, and respond to promising leads and unanticipated topics as they arose.

The following themes and questions were used to guide the direction of each semi-structured conversation:

- *The future of U.S. diplomacy*: How do you see U.S. diplomatic practice changing and/or evolving in the short and long term? Has 21st century diplomacy moved beyond the need for a robust, universal presence?
- *Remote facilities*: Could a bilateral relationship survive the withdrawal of a diplomatic mission? What might a laptop embassy look like in the case of the United States? Is it possible to pursue this direction? Does it have to have a flag? Does it have to be permanent? What does it mean to be present and what would happen if the U.S. left?
- *Universality/presence*: What is the value of U.S. diplomatic presence? How is that calculated? What role does symbolism alone play? Why is 'continuity of presence' so important?
- *Constituent posts*: How are constituent posts different from embassies with respect to their perceived value by policymakers?
- *Facility size/security features*: Do embassies need to be that big? How do restrictions on movement of U.S. personnel beyond the embassy compound change day-to-day practices?

Recognizing that interviews are at least partially "structured by the spatial context in which they are conducted" (Sin 2003: 306, see also Elwood & Martin 2000), I 'placed' them, as much as possible, outside the confines of U.S. government and diplomatic facilities to promote candor, participant anonymity, and authenticity. Only one interview took place at the Department of State; that was with an individual who was still serving in the Department. All other interviews were conducted in the DC metropolitan area: Arlington, Virginia; Capitol Hill and downtown and northwest Washington, DC; and Bethesda, Maryland. I allowed each respondent to choose a convenient location for the interview. In most cases this meant coffee shops, however I met with a few participants in their offices (lobbying firms, law offices, think tanks) and with one at his home. In one instance, a particularly animated participant asked that I meet her for breakfast at the members-only Army/Navy Club in downtown Washington. Given the elegant setting of the meeting—white tablecloths, fine china—I did not attempt to record the interview and instead treated it as an informal conversation (particularly since she insisted on buying me breakfast!).

I further made every effort during the conversations to avoid exhibiting any personal bias, whether that be my thoughts regarding the extent of the U.S. diplomatic network or any feelings regarding particular Department policies. I did, however, find myself in several instances trying to ingratiate myself to a participant so as to establish more trust and elicit a more candid and conversational tone. I did not, to my knowledge, encounter any other ethical dilemmas. Despite the fact that ethical issues are more starkly apparent in methodological approaches that require the investigator to interact at length with members of a community, in this case, the power imbalance between the researcher and researched overwhelmingly favored the participants.

Interviews typically lasted between one and two hours and all but one were recorded (with the oral or written consent of participants). In addition, I took comprehensive notes during each interview to capture tone, visual cues, expressiveness, and other items of note that would not be translated through the interview transcripts. Paying attention to Glaser and Strauss' (1967) recommendation that fieldwork, transcription, and preliminary coding be performed as close together as possible, I made every effort to transcribe as much as possible in the field and was able to finish transcribing in fall 2015. In line with standard practice, I decided not to reveal names or any identifying information (even when respondents were perfectly comfortable with my using their names). (In reflection, this has been more difficult than I anticipated given the small world of the Foreign Service; should I discuss an interviewee who served in a high-level capacity at a particular embassy, it would be fairly simple to identify three or four people who might meet that description.) The shortest interviews were transcribed word-for-word, and I chose to selectively transcribe the longer conversations by removing filler words, ignoring the exchange of pleasantries at the beginning and end, and choosing not to transcribe certain long-winded anecdotes and diatribes that veered off course. Each transcription included at the beginning a detailed write-up of the notes I jotted down during the interview, including background information; notes on the participant's behavior, tone, and congeniality; and noteworthy words, sentences, or stories that I wanted to highlight for later use.

Geodatabase

The lack of publicly available data surrounding U.S. diplomatic infrastructure presented a methodological challenge at the onset of this research project. I initially sought to understand more about the location of U.S. diplomatic facilities relative to host government buildings and diplomatic missions of third-party states at a fine urban scale. The lack of data surrounding the exact coordinates of U.S. facilities, while understandable considering security concerns, made that analysis challenging. As a result, and even as the project changed course towards understanding more about the institutional development of the U.S. diplomatic network at a larger scale, I sought to create a publicly available geodatabase. This data set represents the only quantitative data collected during the study. It was compiled with the help of Research Assistant Melody Charles from existing open source information, in most cases the addresses of U.S. embassies and consulates pulled from their public websites. The database catalogs the location, year of establishment, and type of compound for all U.S. diplomatic structures. No information on security features and/or personnel was included among the variables to ensure the protection of sensitive information related to U.S. diplomatic infrastructure, particularly in the wake of the 2012 attack in Benghazi. Currently no database of this nature exists outside the Department, though the information is readily available in various open-source fora.

It is my hope that this geodatabase will be of use to other researchers, especially for cartographic purposes. Maps are "a primary part of the geographer's technology, methodology and language" (Bradshaw & Williams 1999: 250), yet have been relatively ignored within critical political geographic scholarship, which uses maps, if at all, in efforts simply to situate rather than to examine geopolitical phenomena (Moore and Perdue 2014). As interest in diplomatic themes grows among geographers, I anticipate this product will serve to engender more enthusiasm for cartographic analysis of U.S. diplomatic sites, spaces, and practices from different perspectives and at smaller scales. See Appendix A for this data.

Data analysis

Upon my return to Oregon in fall 2015, and following the self-transcription of all interview data, I commenced the data analysis phase of this research project. In order to pull away as much as possible from the preconceptions my positionality imposed (see below, Robinson 2014), I employed a 'grounded theory' approach to the data analysis phase of the research. Following the guidance of grounded theory, I allowed themes and concepts related to my research questions and objectives to emerge from data and inform theoretical hypotheses (Charmaz 2008, Cope 2010). Further, I examined all the empirical data collected—interviews, archives, newspaper articles, secondary textual material, supplemented by field notes and preliminary research—in concert to better inform generated hypotheses. Triangulation has been documented as a rigorous approach to multi-methods qualitative analysis, allowing the researcher to test the credibility of the data (Baxter & Eyles 1997). Data were coded according to four broad code families as anticipated in my research design: *functionality,* data shedding light on the myriad roles embassies and consulates serve according to different actors and foreign policy priorities; *symbolism,* data restricting these facilities to their representational potential as symbols of U.S. power abroad; *operational ability,* the day-to-day practices and human, material, and economic costs of sustaining the facilities and the network writ large; and *adaptation,* the centripetal forces working to keep the network together coupled with the centrifugal forces challenging the stability and integrity of the network. Table 3 identifies all the coding variables used for data analysis.

Positionality

In the spirit of academic rigor and reflexivity, I have made every effort over the course of conducting this research to call attention to the wide range of entities, factors, and subjectivities that contribute to my research design, data, and findings (Crang 2005). As such, it is important to reflect on my positionality as a scholar-civil servant and the role my background has played in facilitating and influencing this project. I have worked for the U.S. Department of State on and off since late 2007, when I began as a college intern; I later returned from 2007-2010 in a full-time capacity while concurrently pursuing my Master's degree. During that time, I worked in the Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs on the consular portfolio. In August 2010, I transitioned to the Operations Center, the command-and-control arm of the Department. I left the Department in summer 2011 to move to Oregon, but I have since returned to 'Ops' annually for a few weeks or months while enrolled in the University of Oregon's geography doctoral program. These professional experiences led to and informed the direction of this study. They also have allowed me to pursue this research from a particularly unique position within the diplomatic establishment.

As my initial anecdote in the introduction chapter details, a particularly eventful and tragic week in September 2012 was the catalyst that propelled me to study the ‘siting’ of U.S. diplomatic infrastructure. As the seeds of this initial idea were sown in my brain, I leaned heavily on colleagues, managers, and my own experiences to draw out the nuances of diplomatic infrastructure and refine the parameters of the study. In fact, I could not have conceived of this research without the intimate knowledge of the Department I gleaned over the past decade as an “insider” (Dwyer & Buckle 2009). My knowledge of the inner-workings of the Department shaped my questions, informed my findings, and, I believe, was critical to the overall success of this project. I have an extensive network of contacts, in the form of FSO colleagues, managers, acquaintances, and friends, and the network gave me access to a set of knowledgeable people with whom I could discuss aspects of this project.

What is more, my in-depth knowledge of the Department personnel and ‘corridor politics,’ so-to-speak, allowed me to develop an easy rapport with all of my interview participants. By way of example, most of my conversations contained some form of the following quotations:

- “I should start, *and it should be no surprise to you*, that I believe it is important to have a strong, well-formed, well-educated, well-led, well-resourced U.S. Foreign Service” (Interview O, emphasis added).
- “We saw ourselves, *as you know from having been in the Ops Center at that time*, we had all those meetings to put on—Istanbul, Bonn and Chicago, Tokyo” (Interview L, emphasis added).
- “The amount of information in the State Department is overwhelming. I mean, people don’t read cables anymore, they probably told you, right?” (Interview H).
- “You know we don’t give out the numbers, as you know” (Interview H).

I therefore see my positionality as a strength; however, I simultaneously have understood the myriad ways it could prove a liability. For instance, I have been aware throughout the course of this project how my background and experience within the Department could potentially alter my analysis of the primary and secondary data and/or the critique I set forth regarding the U.S. footprint. After all, I am as much product of the system as my interview participants. In an effort to avoid this pitfall, I have made a conscious effort to routinely step back from my personal relationship to the Department of State and consider how the data informs my hypotheses. Furthermore, I have tremendous respect for my colleagues and the work they do every day to advance U.S. interests abroad. That respect has driven me to pursue this research project honestly, openly, and with great care. I will continue to safeguard the anonymity of human subjects and the classification of government information, preserve the integrity of primary materials, question the power relations inherent in all data, acknowledge the uncertainties of my data and analysis, and distribute my findings in as transparent and inclusive a manner as possible. In turn, I have made every effort to call attention to my positionality as a "boundary dweller" in research findings and publications (Mountz 2002, Butz 2010).

In conclusion, I believe the ethnographic approach adopted over the course of the study was useful in illuminating the origins of the universality principle and its continued traction in the Department of State today. Given more time and/or resources, however, I might have approached this project differently. Over the course of this research, I looked almost exclusively at elite policymakers through interviews and in archival material. These data were critical to understand the historical trajectory of universality and the diplomatic network. However, more attention to mid- and low-level diplomats might have shed light on the future of the U.S. diplomatic landscape and the enduring legacy of universality. It would have been further helpful to introduce comparative studies in the form of other states' diplomatic networks, although that direction would have required much more time and substantial resources. Lastly, I also made difficult choices regarding what would and would not appear in this dissertation. I amassed a significant amount of data, particularly archival material, that did not make it into the manuscript. I hope to draw on these data for additional publications in this research direction in the future.

FIGURE 3. Washington's banal diplomatic landscape. An empty lot, "Property of the Embassy of the Republic of Benin," and the mailbox of a Kazakhstan embassy property, likely the Ambassador's residence. *Source: Author.*

FIGURE 4. Embassy of the Plurinational State of Bolivia and its #Mar Para Bolivia (Sea for Bolivia) display. *Source: Author.*

FIGURE 5. Boxes of archival records at NARA II. *Source: Author.*

.

FIGURE 6. Sample document from the State Department Central Files. *Source: Author.*



REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND949656

RM/R Files

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

JUN 9 1959

TO : New Post Committee

FROM : AF - James K. Penfield JKP

SUBJECT : Request for Authority to Open New Posts in Africa in FY 1961

Following the approval of the New Post Committee and the appropriation of funds by the Congress, the Bureau of African Affairs has opened, since January 1, 1959, six new posts in Africa. Thus, a total of ten new posts have been opened in Africa in the past two years. Eight of these posts are in countries which are either completely independent or autonomous republics, or are in countries which are definitely scheduled for independence in 1960. The pace of events in Africa has been matched by these post openings.

It is the judgment of observers of the African political scene that there will be no slackening in the steady assumption by the African peoples of the responsibilities of self-government. Indeed, considering the number of countries on the verge of independence and the interest of the major European powers in assisting other countries to prepare themselves for self-government, this process may well be accelerated within the next few years.

There is little evidence to indicate that the highly volatile situation now prevailing in Africa is likely to harden into a climate which would be conducive to accurate budget planning. Under the present circumstances it is impossible to predict budgets with exactitude for periods of one and two years in advance. Thus, in the future as in the past, approval for new post openings will enable us to keep abreast of the history-making changes in Africa.

For example, we were able to meet the rapid developments in the Republic of Guinea by utilizing funds which had been requested and approved for opening a post at Marrakech. We were able to utilize funds originally earmarked for Lusaka to open a consulate at Lome, Togo, in preparation for the Embassy which may be established there next year.

The Bureau of African Affairs has requested approval to open a total of nine new posts in FY 1961. In its preliminary hearing, the New Post Committee agreed to study detailed justifications for five of these posts. Of the four which have been disapproved, I strongly urge that the Committee reconsider its decision relating to opening a consulate at Blantyre. At the height of last winter's violence in Nyasaland, the Department's efforts to assist the Americans resident in the territory were seriously hampered by

the lack

120.270/6-959

HARGEISA, Br. Som.

EM/R 16

CONFIDENTIAL

XA 13

JUN 26 1961

FILED

TABLE 1. List of interviews (18) conducted over spring/summer/fall 2015.

ID	Sex	Current affiliation	Years (no. of posts*)	No. of PO+ posts**	Recorded?
A	M	Academia	32 (9)	1	Y
B	M	Semi-retired/State	33+ (11)	3	Y
C	M	Think tank	30 (8)	2	Y (phone)
D	M	Think tank	37 (10)	6	Y (phone)
E	F	Private sector	25 (7)	2	N
F	M	Think tank	35 (8)	4	Y
G	M	Think tank	31 (5)	4	Y
H	F	Consulting	31 (6)	2	Y
I	M	Academia	38 (11)	6	Y
J	M	Academia	37 (8)	3	Y
K	M	Think tank	26 (5)	3	Y
L	M	Private sector	36 (3)	7	Y
M	F	Private sector	35 (8)	6	Y
N	M	Private sector	~40 (7)	8	Y
O	M	Academia	36 (6)	5	Y
P	M	Ambassador	36+ (6)	5	Y
Q	F	Retired	38 (6)	3	Y
R	M	Think tank/academia	25+ (5)	4	Y
S	M	Think tank	Non-FSO (3)	2	Y (phone)

*Represents the number of discrete embassy and/or consulate posts each individual served at during their careers overseas. Does not include assignments in Washington which typically occur every third tour, nor does it count repeat tours. A typical Foreign Service tour lasts three years.
**Represents the number of high-level positions held, by which I mean the head of a facility (i.e. Principal Officer, PO) or higher in the Department's hierarchy (Long-term Chargé, Ambassador, (Principal) Deputy Assistant Secretary, Assistant Secretary, or Under Secretary).

TABLE 2. Identifying where each interview participant served as Principal Officer: Ambassador, Chargé d'Affaires, or Consul General.

BILATERAL MISSIONS	Africa	Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea*, Gabon, The Gambia*, Guinea, Mauritania, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe*, Senegal
	Europe	Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, Switzerland, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom
	Latin America	El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru
	Middle East	Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
	South-Central Asia	Afghanistan, India, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
	East Asia	Palau*, The Philippines, Thailand
CONSULATES		Jerusalem, Melbourne, Tabriz**, Rio de Janeiro
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS		U.S. Mission to the United Nations: New York, Geneva, Vienna
OTHER HIGH-RANKING DEPARTMENT POSITIONS		Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Director General for Human Resources, Executive Secretary, Assistant Secretaries, Special Representatives

*Ambassadors are dual-accredited to these states from nearby missions; the United States did not mission an embassy in country when the interviewee served as Ambassador-at-large.
**The United States maintained a consulate in Tabriz, Iran, through much of the twentieth century until the 1979 hostage crisis.

TABLE 3. Code families and sub-family code variables, many of which fall under more than one code families as the chart details.

Meta data codes for archival material and photographs: Year, date, Posts and types of facilities mentioned (or from which record originated), type of record (i.e. letter, dispatch, instruction, telegram, Congressional report, image, maps)	FUNCTIONALITY *Roles facilities serve*	SYMBOLISM *Representing U.S. power*	OPERATIONS *Day-to-day practices/costs*	ADAPTATION *Forces at work on the network*
Persuasion/Influence: diplomats as agents of influence				
Diplomatic presence/justifying representation				
U.S. as global power/American exceptionalism/ ‘the waved flag’				
Information-gathering: political and economic reporting				
Consular operations and processes				
Size of presence (locally)				
‘Right-sizing’/technological advancements				
Congressional legislation				
Security features				
Property acquisition, closures/openings of facilities				
Raising status of facilities (i.e. legations to embassies)				
Professionalization of the diplomatic corps				
Other states’ representation				

CHAPTER III

TOWARDS A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES' DIPLOMATIC FOOTPRINT

Introduction

> The only real sign that the embassy is an embassy at all is the little brass plaque on the door (which reads, "THE EMBASSY OF CAMBODIA") and the national flag of Cambodia (we assume that's what it is—what else could it be?) flying from the red tiled roof (Smith 2013).

In her *The Embassy of Cambodia*, Zadie Smith uses the mysteriousness of the walled Cambodian Embassy compound as a theme to explore class, ethnicity and othering in London's northwest suburbs. Smith's titular embassy draws out, on the one hand, the seemingly mundane ways diplomatic properties blend into urban landscapes, often going unnoticed by passersby. On the other hand, Smith's protagonist is preoccupied by the out-of-place-ness of the embassy in London's middle class suburbs, which she finds mimics her own foreign-ness as a recent emigrant. Although the story is not about the embassy *per se*, Smith's writing is indicative of how many of us understand diplomatic facilities—as essential to the everyday conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy—without full knowledge of what exactly *happens* on the inside of these compounds day in and day out or how their placement in the urban landscape *reflects* and *makes possible* myriad geopolitical and geo-economic processes. Embassies, consulates and other diplomatic properties are just buildings, after all. But they also stand separate and apart, as profound, meaningful structures that knit the world closer together. Embassies are both imagined and real spaces that at once represent the power and reach of state territory while also doing work to build and maintain diplomatic relationships through the reproduction of seemingly banal everyday diplomatic practices (i.e. conducting visa interviews, attending staff meetings, drafting cables and press releases).

The embassies, consulates, and exceptional diplomatic facilities that constitute the United States' diplomatic network are illustrative of this litany of everyday processes as well as the symbolic reach of the state. Architectural historian Jane Loeffler (1998: 3) writes,

> Embassies are symbolically charged buildings uniquely defined by domestic politics, foreign affairs, and a complex set of representational requirements. As office buildings, they differ from ordinary projects not only in terms of their unusual programs and locations, but also in terms of their clients; they have not one, as is usual, but many.

American embassies have long been prominent symbols in foreign capitals. Loeffler's (1998) seminal text on U.S. embassy and consulate design traces the history of the State Department's building program, and particularly the "confident years following World War II" (p. 3) which saw prominent architects—among them Eero Saarinen, Wallace K. Harrison, I.M. Pei, Walter Gropius, Marcel Breuer, and Paul Rudolph—commissioned to build modernist, grandiose structures in line with "America's larger effort to define its world role" (ibid).

Regardless of whether diplomatic structures are hidden among middle class neighborhoods as in Smith's novella or stand apart as imposing manifestations of state power as is most often the case with U.S. facilities, what remains little studied are our assumptions regarding the presence of embassies and consulates in the contemporary urban landscape. It is easy, for example, to grow accustomed to the fact that a U.S. embassy is present in (nearly) every capital city. The U.S. diplomatic network, when compared to other states, is unusually universal. This assumption is rarely given much thought by practitioners, scholars, and the public at large, despite the fact that diplomacy operates very differently in the twenty-first century than it did in the past where logistical and communication challenges made diplomatic envoys to host states an essential component of international relations. In fact, today, the U.S. Department of State prioritizes the maintenance of the largest diplomatic network in the world, and there is little evidence to suggest policymakers have seriously considered what a different diplomatic posture could look like or could do for America's relationship to the wider world.

Against that backdrop, this article seeks to understand *why* diplomatic sites continue to be seen as essential components of the urban fabric. This paper takes as its case study the U.S. diplomatic establishment's embrace of the concept of universality—that is, the long running narrative that the United States ought to have a widespread, robust diplomatic presence in the form of permanent embassy and constituent facilities in as many states as possible. The origin of universality is challenging to pinpoint, as it is difficult to trace it to a particular individual, committee meeting, policy document, or even moment in time. In fact, to my knowledge, the term "universality," in the sense used here, does not appear in print or in the State Department's archival records. The concept may be discussed informally in conversation among policymakers and high-level diplomats, but there is little overt consideration of it. The concept is, however, manifested in the diplomatic landscape. Universality is a powerful set of ideas, a dogma that has led to the endurance of an entrenched U.S. diplomatic network. As I demonstrate in this article, there was no clear-cut policy shift that paved the way for universality; instead there was a gradual embrace of the concept over the last 100 years in line with emerging geo-political and -economic scenarios that shifted U.S. interests and priorities towards a more expansive, if not obligatory, role in world affairs. In studying this previously unexamined concept, I highlight how the material diplomatic network both reflects and continues to shape powerful geopolitical ideas. Further, I detail the continued pull of universality; that is, I consider why it would be exceedingly difficult to dismantle this robust, decades-long diplomatic apparatus.

For the purposes of tracing the universality principle, this article pieces together a historical geography of U.S. diplomatic presence. The following sections divide the last 250 years into four distinct, albeit somewhat arbitrary and fuzzy, eras defined by the principal narratives driving embassy and consulate placement. The first, from 1780 when the first American facility was established through the first decade of the twentieth century, documents the spread of small consulates around the world. These early years saw a push for U.S. representatives in as many cities as possible, largely to provide consular and commercial assistance as the new state sought access to global markets. The second period, from 1911 through the World War II era, highlights the changing role of embassy and consulate properties as symbolic of the United States' growing role in global affairs in tandem with the emergence of a professional Foreign Service. As the United States grew into a more formidable diplomatic actor in the early to mid-twentieth century, policymakers recognized the importance of large, symbolic embassy structures and began the work of establishing facilities in capital cities. The third era, from 1945 through 1992, chronicles the geopolitical drivers that gave rise to near-universal coverage. The year 1992 marks the installation of several new posts following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Lastly, the period from 1993 through to the present marks a changed world order and the increasing security concerns that have come to dominate internal and public debates over diplomatic representation and the safety of American personnel abroad. This last era calls into question the continued pull of universality. Twenty-first century diplomatic practices are marked by new technologies, increased travel by high-level officials, and a globe-girdling telecommunications infrastructure that have closed the distance between Washington and capital cities on the other side of the world. Despite this radically different operating environment, the legacy of universality looms large and remains a guiding principle for U.S. policymakers.

On Diplomacy and Representation

Diplomatic processes are inherently geographical. Modern diplomatic engagement is premised upon a long-normative tradition of sending envoys abroad to represent the interests of the state. Longstanding diplomatic processes are therefore typically considered the terrain of a small group of elite, privileged practitioners working within an institution charged with the nonviolent conduct of external relations (van der Wusten & Mamadouh 2010). Yet contemporary diplomatic activities include a wide range of processes across space, place, and scale that blur the lines between formality and informality. In the social media era, diplomacy is no longer confined to shadowy embassy conference rooms or cloaked foreign ministry negotiating tables. The language of statist diplomacy no longer privileges exclusivity. Indeed, to the 'old-school' vocabulary—"cable," "chargé d'affaires," "démarche," "*persona non grata*," "chancery"—one might add "tweet," "*YouTube*," "meme," and "*Facebook*." Post-structuralist critiques of the statist approach have urged a more inclusive conceptualization of diplomacy to incorporate the myriad ways formal diplomatic avenues are representative of broader humanistic processes of mediation and engagement. At its most broad, diplomacy becomes "any channel of contact" between two parties (Gilboa 2002: 83, McConnell et al. 2012: 804). Theorists in this vein see diplomacy as "an ensemble of practices, power struggles, and truth contestations that develop into a dominant discourse for dealing with the other" (Constantinou 1996: 110) and, as suggested by Sharp (1999: 81), a set of liminal practices, with diplomats "between worlds" and "belonging to one place but located in another." Hoffman even proposes that diplomacy, "functions much more fully and consistently in a stateless context than in a state centered one" (p. 525). Diplomacy could therefore be considered a set of institutions, practices, and forces that *decenter* and *unhinge* politics and territoriality; whereas politics defines boundaries, administers a population, and centers power relations, diplomacy negotiates and mediates estrangement, alienation, and otherness (Der Derian 1987, Sofer 1997, Sharp 1999).

In the context of this reorientation, contemporary scholarship on diplomacy and diplomatic representation generally emphasizes praxis and process and, to a far lesser degree, the spatial parameters of these phenomena (for recent examples see Marsden et al. 2016, Pouliot 2016, Trager 2016). Diplomatic representation refers broadly to a set of practices and processes that construct and reinforce a relationship between state and non-state actors, whereas states send envoys to host governments to represent their interests (Rijks & Whitman 2007: 35). Indeed, very little time and attention has been devoted to uncovering the myriad ways space, place, site, and scale give shape to and materialize diplomatic representation, despite the definitions above that account for "otherness" and "place" and "worlds." Neumayer (2008) provides perhaps the best synthesis of this literature, noting that "anecdotal" analysis of diplomatic representation has left large gaps in our understanding of "why states choose to set up diplomatic representation in some states, and not in others" (pp. 2-3, see e.g. Vogeler 1995 and Xierali & Liu 2006). Taking a holistic approach to the problem, Neumayer (2008) attributes states' diplomatic footprints to a simple cost-benefit analysis. In weighing the benefits of representation (stronger relations, reciprocal representation, path-dependency (McRae 1989)) to the obstacles (lack of political will, cost), he finds that governments are more likely to place an embassy in states with close geographic proximity and like-minded political and economic ideologies (Neumayer 2008).

While Neumayer's piece also finds that power plays a large role in dictating diplomatic representation, what is less understood is how the physical sites themselves—the networked architecture that connects embassy and consulate sites to the state's broader diplomatic assemblage—render diplomatic representation possible. Representation cannot exist independently of the spatial conditions through which it is constructed. By way of example, contemporary statist diplomacy and its constituent processes operate radically differently in the context of a consulate than an embassy, or in the context of an embassy versus a roving ambassador with roots to one site but who is accredited to multiple states.

At the other end of the spectrum, work posited towards understanding more about the *sites* and *spaces* of geography often neglects the powerful role representation plays in everyday diplomatic processes. Work in this vein, typically from architects and architectural historians, draws on diplomatic representation primarily to qualify the symbolism rife in embassy and consulate facilities (Gournay & Loeffler 2002, Isenstadt 1997). The way scholarship surrounding diplomatic representation is divided is perfectly illustrated in the University of Oregon's library system, where books and other resources related to diplomatic representation broadly are located in the main Knight Library whereas material on diplomatic sites and spaces is housed in the separate Architecture and Allied Arts Library. This paper seeks a marriage of the two research trajectories in line with Shimazu's (2012: 335) call to "[re-contextualize] the 'diplomatic stage' from the abstract sphere of high politics to the concrete sphere of the local milieu in which the performance takes place." The explicit 'localization' of diplomacy by privileging the place where diplomacy physically takes place allows insight into the different layers of meanings that would otherwise elude traditional approaches to the study of diplomacy (ibid).

Towards that end, this article is part of a wider study into the myriad geographies of diplomatic representation through an examination of the sites and spaces that make up the U.S. diplomatic network. This paper specifically seeks to understand the linkages between the expansion of the U.S. diplomatic network and the emergence of the United States as a world power. By my estimation, the United States maintains the largest diplomatic apparatus of any state, between 285 and 294 facilities at any one time.[3] This network is unusually universal, and attention to its emergence, as well as the patterns and ideas that have led to its expansion, can contribute to a more robust understanding of

[3] I use this range (285-294) to account for the number of facilities at any time that are temporarily "off line" (i.e. closed or evacuated with suspended operations or a ghost facility, e.g., Damascus, Beirut, Mogadishu) as well as geopolitically sensitive facilities (the former mission in Benghazi) and 'one-man' American Presence Post operations. By way of comparison, China has 228 missions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China ND), Germany has 227 facilities (Federal Foreign Office 2014), and Russia 226 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia 2015).

shifting attitudes towards diplomatic representation as well as, at a finer scale, how policymakers have envisioned the role of the United States in the world over time. The morphology of the diplomatic network, to borrow a phrase from van der Wusten and Mamadouh (2016), includes a patchwork of nodal embassies, consulates, and exceptional diplomatic facilities.[4] These are knit together and further connected to host government foreign ministries and other government entities, “Main State” headquarters and other government facilities in Washington, international organizations and third-country diplomatic installations, as well as chambers of commerce, local businesses, and individuals seeking access to consular services (ibid). The constitutive elements of these apparatuses are well known to scholars, yet little studied in academia despite the fact that the diplomatic network is instrumental to the majority of processes that fall under the umbrella of “diplomatic representation.”

Methodology

Empirical data for this project were collected primarily through extensive archival research at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration’s annex in College Park, Maryland, which houses the State Department’s Central Files. Over summer 2015, I catalogued and analyzed 82 boxes of Departmental records related to Post management, budgetary concerns, legislation, Department operations, and personnel files. The focus of the archival data collection period was to uncover the “nuts and bolts” of the U.S.

[4] These include missions to international organizations, as in the U.S. Mission to NATO or the U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States; geopolitically sensitive facilities as in the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem (which reports to State Department headquarters instead of the embassy in Tel Aviv), the American Institute in Taipei, what was called the Special Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi, or, prior to the re-establishment of ties, the U.S. Interests Section in Havana; and American Presence Posts (lower order consulate facilities).

diplomatic footprint—that is, the everyday, seemingly banal administrative processes that allowed for the maintenance and further expansion of the U.S. network. Material from the mid-century "Committee on New Foreign Service Posts" was particularly insightful towards this end.

Given that Post management records were limited to 1963 and earlier,[5] this research has additionally benefitted from substantial secondary material in the form of Department reports and press statements, literature on Department history, as well as the author's experience working within the Department in various capacities between 2007 and 2015. Archival data were further supplemented with unstructured interviews with retired, high-level diplomats and policymakers, many with over four decades of service as Foreign Service Officers at U.S. posts abroad. Interview participants were approached through snowball sampling, initially drawing on the author's network at the State Department. Participants then provided contact information for additional individuals who they thought would be eager to contribute to this project.

A Historical Geography of the United States' Diplomatic Footprint

Despite what it looks like on a map—that the United States simply has a diplomatic facility in every significant urban center—the contemporary U.S. diplomatic footprint is the product of a precise and deliberate geographical strategy. The universality principle, its emergence and adoption over time, is the key to understanding this network and its unusually widespread pattern of embassies and consulates around the

[5] Records were limited past 1963 as a result of the Department's classification and NARA archival procedures. Following the compulsory 25-year (in most cases) classification period, records undergo a declassification review and then are transferred to NARA archivists who catalog and prepare the materials before they are made available to public researchers.

world. And this dogma reflects a U.S. foreign policy establishment driven by concrete objectives and global power ambitions. This thesis draws on the conceptual framework Neil Smith (2003, 2004) employs in his work on the American empire. In particular, he calls attention to the false presumption of the American Century as that which overcame the bounds of geography ("beyond geography," 2004: xviii). Documenting the declining significance of geographical inquiry in the twentieth century, Smith argues the political and economic processes borne from the so-called American century were inherently geographical and propelled forward with an imperialistic agenda. This intervention commands us to consider the agency and to critique the motivations of U.S. policymakers in constructing global structures that served and continue to serve American geopolitical ambitions and economic interests.

The U.S. diplomatic network is a byproduct of these neo-imperial ambitions and decisions made by policymakers over time to render the entire globe legible in conjunction with specific—and inherently geographical—political and economic processes. In order to explore these themes in more detail, I have identified four broad, temporally uneven periods highlight distinct patterns related to Post operations and the expanding presence and role of U.S. diplomats in the world. These periods lend support to what Smith (2003) identifies as the three defining moments of U.S. global ambition—1919, 1945, and the present—as the number of U.S. facilities jumps dramatically following the World Wars and is unusually widespread at present. I draw on empirical data to reflect further on how U.S. policymakers imagined, installed, and managed Department facilities since the State Department's founding through to the present. While the following discussions reflect back on the United States' earliest diplomatic efforts, empirical data largely focuses on the twentieth century, the American Century, and the burgeoning of the contemporary diplomatic footprint as the United States sought to remake the global political order.

Ministers, lone consuls, and U.S. commercial interests, 1780-1910

The period between 1780, which marks the founding of the Department of State, and 1910 covers 130 raucous years. This huge span saw the emergent United States send its first envoys abroad—to France and Spain in 1779, Great Britain in 1785, Portugal in 1791, and the Netherlands in 1792—and build a seemingly robust organization in Washington to manage foreign affairs (Loeffler 1998: 13, Office of the Historian ND). For the purposes of this paper, however, this period of time is the least relevant for understanding the contemporary diplomatic footprint because the United States did not seek to engage broadly in diplomatic activities between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries. Commercial interests and economic opportunities rather than political embroilments led the first U.S. envoys abroad. Recall George Washington's famous words of caution in his farewell address:

> The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connexion [sic] as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop (Washington 1796).

In realizing those instructions, Thomas Jefferson, the first Secretary of State, intentionally sent diplomats at the "lowest grades admissible" abroad so as to lower the financial burden for the fledgling republic. These envoys lived off a small salary and housing allowance, and some individuals who were offered positions refused to serve given the financial strains of the placement (Loeffler 1998). Further, the founding fathers eschewed the aristocratic-sounding title of 'ambassador' in favor of the more appropriate title of 'minister.' Ministers were lower-ranking and served in facilities called legations. Indeed, the United States did not maintain proper embassies (to which an ambassador would be accredited) until the late nineteenth century. And the United States did not own diplomatic property abroad until the Sultan of Morocco gifted the country with its first facility in 1821 (ibid).

Despite this modest beginning, the number of American diplomats sent abroad grew steadily throughout the nineteenth century—largely in line with the emergent political map of independent states. Between 1797 and 1840, envoys had been dispatched to a patchwork of political entities around the world including, in approximate chronological order: Prussia, Russia, Sweden, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Mexico, Peru, the combined organization of Central American States, the two Sicilies, Belgium, Austria, Turkey, and even the independent state of Texas in 1837. The officials sent to these (often faraway) places were expected to have the means (i.e. independent incomes) to rent a modest residence and pay for entertainment, travel, and other expenses out of pocket (Loeffler, pp. 13-15).

It is important to note here that diplomats and consuls (as well as their respective facilities) at the time, and up until 1924, rarely interacted with one another. Diplomats, of which there were few, were occupied with representational concerns while consuls handled passports, visas, and commercial matters. By 1840, 20 diplomatic posts and 145 consular posts were in operation, whereas by 1860 those numbers had climbed disproportionally to 33 and 275 respectively (Office of the Historian ND).[6] Consular activities were largely led by lone, enterprising American businessmen, often in ports

[6] Some cities had both a diplomatic facility (i.e. legation) and consulate.

cities, to take advantage of commercial opportunities (Loeffler 1998).[7] It is therefore important to bear in mind that the consular network at the time, while robust and far flung, was much more of a haphazard collection of one-man, independent operations than the connected and ordered network that would be put in place in the next century. Contrary to the present diplomatic footprint with large, fortified facilities rife with symbolism, during this period the individual who served as consul *was* the consulate. And they were everywhere! Figure 7 compares the extent of U.S. consulate operations in Central America, by way of example, in the early twentieth century and at present. The region today is covered by seven embassy facilities, one in each state, whereas in 1911 only three legations provided diplomatic coverage and nine additional consulates existed to aid American commercial activities. Only the former consulate in Belmopan, Belize (formerly British Honduras), still exists (now as an embassy) today.

By the late nineteenth century Washington's farewell address and his preference for a neutral, if not quite isolationist, stance no longer held sway in the burgeoning U.S. foreign policy establishment. As the country itself was expanding through land acquisitions, so too were the scope of policymakers' interests abroad, beginning with the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 and America's commitment to an "independent" Latin America. Diplomatic activities began to mimic the United States' nascent involvement in global politics. William Robertson's (1915) extensive history of the establishment of American legations in Latin America is telling of this trend. He makes clear that President Monroe and his Secretary of State John Quincy Adams worked to establish U.S. legations in the five newly independent states of South American almost

[7] Men occupied all official diplomatic posts until 1922 when the Foreign Service began admitting female applicants. The first female chief of mission was named to Denmark and Iceland in 1933 and the first female ambassador was appointed, also to Denmark, in 1949 (Resource Management Bureau 2006).

immediately after the countries were officially recognized by Congress. As Robertson notes, "[t]he recognition of the independence of the other nations of Spanish America was consummated by the appointment of envoys to those countries" (p. 193).

The first U.S. Ambassador was named, appropriately, to Great Britain in 1893, which made London the site of the first U.S. Embassy. Later that year, embassies were "stood up" in Paris, Berlin, and Rome, though the accredited ambassadors were still expected to rent or buy premises for their homes and offices. This meant, of course, that only the rich and independently wealthy could afford to participate in the diplomatic corps (Loeffler, pp. 14-15).

The Professional Foreign Service, 1911-1944

> The policy of this Government has been to establish diplomatic representation in foreign countries commensurate with the needs of international intercourse and promotion and protection of American interest. The growth of diplomatic representation throughout the world is largely due to the closer relations among nations (Johnson 1928).

The second decade of the twentieth century serves as a critical turning point in U.S. diplomatic history. The above quotation is representative of the general eagerness during these first decades of the century to broaden and deepen the reach of America's diplomats. The 1890s saw the emergence of a vigorous debate between the Executive branch and Congress over the revitalization of the country's diplomatic presence. Many within the Department had lobbied hard for a professional foreign service and for U.S. representatives abroad to be housed in adequate facilities; many were wondering why only the wealthiest could pursue a career in the diplomatic corps. The minister of the American Legation in Teheran pleaded with the Secretary in a 1912 letter illustrative of these wider calls for change:

> The rest of the world will continue to fight us in foreign capitals with an expert force of chief and subordinate diplomatic agencies… In any event, the improvement of our foreign service is a question that cannot well be ignored by any administration, now that we have more numerous and very important points of contact with ambitious and enterprising foreign powers, and have no longer a sparsely settled country crying out for hands to develop it (Russell 1912).

Despite the United States' rapidly expanding commercial interests and the needs of American businessmen abroad, by 1910 the country only owned diplomatic property in four cities: Constantinople, Peking, Tokyo, and Bangkok (Loeffler, p. 16). Beginning in 1911 with the Lowden Act, officially the Embassy and Legation Building Bill, the U.S. government worked to build facilities appropriate to the growing influence and weight of the United States in the global arena. Following the passage of the act, a diplomat posted to the legation in La Paz urged the Department to consider a pre-fabricated legation design—built from American manufactured products, of course—in an effort to install as many new facilities as economically and efficiently as possible in spaces where renting suitable facilities had proven difficult, namely Latin America (Krowley 1911). The building legislation was accompanied by the 1924 Hill-Rogers Act, which began the work of instituting a professionalization of the country's diplomatic corps, a venerable institution known as the Foreign Service (Loeffler 1998).

By the numbers alone, this period saw a sea change in the makeup and size of the diplomatic network. In 1924, at the time when the Rogers' bill was under consideration, the United States maintained embassies primarily in Europe and South America; the rest of the world was represented through legation facilities and consulates (Office of the Secretary 1924). By 1925, a letter by an assistant secretary noted, "[p]laced at strategic places throughout the world are roughly 300 Consulates General or Consulates, 15 Vice

Consulates, and 90 Consular Agencies, or a total of more than 400 offices" (Carr 1925). That same record indicated the Foreign Service had only 54 principal officers posted in capitals abroad, which implies most of the 400 offices were small consular platforms. However, by 1939 according to a letter from a Division of Foreign Service Administration official, the United States maintained 57 diplomatic missions globally, "comprising of 18 embassies (of which 5 perform consular as well as diplomatic duties) and 39 legations (of which 21 perform consular as well as diplomatic duties)" (Davis 1939). This trend highlights the primary shift that took place inside the U.S. foreign policy establishment during this period—a shift away from the informal diplomacy favored by the founding fathers and towards modern, formal diplomatic relationships and more engagement generally in global affairs.

This shift was accompanied by a new emphasis on larger, more prominent legation and embassy structures and away from the informal consulate landscape that marked nineteenth century diplomatic efforts. Budgetary constraints in the early 1930s played a role in this transition, with decreasing appropriations placing stress on far-flung consulate operations. A late 1932 memorandum from the Consul General (CG) in Berlin lays out an argument in support of "combining the establishments of the Department, the Chancery[8] and the Consulate, in capitals, both administratively and physically," what he refers to as the "unification of government establishments in capitals" as a way to decrease expenditures. He further comments on the direction other states are moving and on the trials of moving a government bureaucracy in a new direction:

> This consolidation of the establishments of the State Department in capitals is a measure which all thinking persons interested in our foreign relations approve… The delay [in moving in this direction] has largely

[8] The building that houses the offices of the embassy.

> been due to the traditional slowness to change anything which affects our foreign practice, but it is a step which some of the smaller and larger countries have already taken and find in every way satisfactory and a great improvement (Messersmith 1932, passage highlighted in the archival record, see Figure 8).

This memo is particularly telling of emergent early-to-mid-century narratives regarding diplomatic representation. The CG is careful to note the Department's practice, "to maintain in practically every capital both a diplomatic and a consular establishment…" (ibid). This prevailing attitude was evident in the collective imagination of the diplomatic establishment as early as World War I, as belligerent powers entrusted the United States to protect their diplomatic interests during the conflict. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, in a 1914 letter to the chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, wrote a compelling case for increased appropriations by noting, "Great and increasing *responsibilities* have devolved upon the representatives of the United States abroad…" (Bryan 1914, emphasis added). This discourse of duty towards the world justified a broad push to raise the status of many of the country's diplomatic posts, in effect a move to professionalize the missions themselves. By way of example, a 1943 telegram was issued from Department headquarters at the President's request to U.S facilities in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. The note requested the chiefs of mission present a *demarche,* a formal request on behalf of the U.S. government, to their host governments to reciprocally raise the status of the respective diplomatic missions from legations to embassies (Hull 1943).

Early twentieth-century efforts led not to a widening but rather a deepening of the U.S. diplomatic network footprint; one-person operations gave way to fixed, permanent facilities imbued with the kind of prominent symbolism designed to capture the United

States' emergent role as a global power. American Foreign Service Officers played more high-profile roles in diplomatic circles, and the narrative of responsibility served to strengthen the claim that U.S. diplomats needed stronger institutions to support their work abroad. The passage of key legislation during this period institutionalized the parameters of a near-universal (i.e. representation in every state) diplomatic footprint. It became clear that, in spite of the budget shortfalls of the day, the Department was loath to pull back from this diplomatic posture. To this end a 1932 press release noted:

> [T]he Department has made no list of the diplomatic missions or consulates which might be dispensed with in the event that the suggestions, *which were very reluctantly made by the Secretary*, should have to be carried out through lack of appropriations (Office of the Secretary 1932, emphasis added).

(Near-) universal representation, 1945-1992

Two important patterns appear in the archival records in the second half of the twentieth century that further empowered the diplomatic apparatus. First, from the immediate post-WWII era through the early years of the Cold War, policymakers expressed an eagerness to broaden the footprint and build more facilities around the world. This goal was institutionalized through the creation of the "Committee on New Foreign Service Posts" in 1957 (Campbell 1958). The Committee worked to streamline the process through which the Department's regional bureaus requested new posts. As to the second trend, beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, and largely as a result of budgetary crises, Department operatives faced the tough decision of justifying post placement and offering up facilities (mostly consulates) for closure. As such, the second half of the twentieth century—the Cold War era—saw forces both encouraging and limiting the enlargement of the diplomatic network. Against this pressure, policymakers redefined what was considered to be the appropriate extent of the U.S. diplomatic network. The Department moved away from supporting small consulate operations, and even sought to expand the role of existing consulates, towards the centralization of U.S. diplomatic interests in larger embassy compounds. Such facilities in capital cities would be commensurate with reciprocity and the needs of the bilateral relationship—with constituent posts as warranted only in major populations centers. This is documented through various attempts by Department offices and bureaus beginning in the 1960s to classify, rank, and order posts according to their contribution(s) to U.S. geostrategic goals.

The Second World War led many in the foreign policy establishment to consider anew the country's diplomatic posture and the ways it might be perceived abroad. When Secretary of State Stettinius returned from the peacebuilding conferences at Yalta and Mexico City, "he expressed great interest in effecting an improvement in the physical appearance of our Foreign Service establishments" (Office of the Secretary 1945). The 1945 memorandum continued, "He commented particularly on the poor impression made on visitors by the reception facilities of some of our offices and the low standard of neatness and order observed in general" (ibid). Long gone were the days of one-man consular posts and small legations of economy and efficiency; grandiosity became the order of the day as policymakers considered not just placing a diplomatic facility but what that facility needed to symbolize and how it might bolster America's appeal abroad (see generally Loeffler 1998). Against that backdrop, in Europe and Asia the Department sought to catalog and rebuild war weary posts. One report lists 47 Department properties slated for refurbishment in East Asia. The properties were catalogued under the following groups: "(a) property totally destroyed, lost, or sold by the enemy; (b) property believed to be intact but condition assumed to be poor; or (c) no reliable information available" (Foreign Building Office 1945).

Around 1957, the Department established the Committee on New Foreign Service Posts to approve or deny recommendations by regional bureaus and/or "field posts" for new embassies, consulates, and consular agencies (lower order consulate platforms). By 1958, the Committee had prepared a detailed set of criteria in the form of a lengthy questionnaire to streamline the process for opening new posts. The 23-page questionnaire (see Appendix B for the questionnaire in full) included the following sections (U.S. Department of State 1958):

- I. Area vital statistics
- II. Precedents ("History of previous American establishments in area, including reasons for opening and closing" and "Representation maintained by other governments in the locality…")
- III. Consular needs
- IV. Political considerations
- V. Economic considerations
- VI. Assistance programs
- VII. Commercial interests
- VIII. Military considerations
- IX. Information and cultural exchange potential
- X. Other agency requirements
- XI. Personnel
- XII. Building needs
- XIII. Operating facilities
- XIV. Estimated financial plan

Note the interest in third party states' diplomatic missions (section II) and the need to provide political and economic justifications to support the application for presence (sections IV and V). To address each submission, the Committee used a checklist (Tab 3, see Appendix B) to rank each section as "pro," "con," or "not pertinent" before finalizing their approval or denial of the requested new post. The bottom of the checklist includes an area for the Committee to note, “Priority rating in relation to other proposals now before the committee” (ibid).

The committee sent its recommendations to the Under Secretary of State for Administration in batches for approval. Late 1957 and 1958 saw 15 new facilities approved in this way: in one batch, Tananarive, Madagascar; Freetown, Sierra Leone; Brazzaville, French Equatorial Africa; Adelaide and Brisbane, Australia; Cebu, Philippines; Kaduna, Nigeria; Cochabamba, Bolivia; Lusaka; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; Marrakech, Morocco; and Bratislava, Czechoslovakia; and in another batch, Peshawar, Pakistan; Poznan, Poland; Lomé, French Togoland; and Mandalay, Burma. The first batch, approved by deputy Under Secretary of State Loy Henderson, included the following stipulation in Henderson’s handwriting, “Provided funds and personnel slots available” (Committee on New Foreign Service Posts 1957, Dec. 2).

Curiously, the Department began to experience significant budgetary constraints well before this committee was established. In 1953, with Republicans in control of the Presidency as well as both houses of Congress, austerity loomed large across the federal government for the first time since the early 1930s. Resources were especially tight for the Department of State, already limping after having borne the brunt of McCarthy’s “countersubversive crusade” (Dean 1998: 33, Loeffler 1998). A 1953 memorandum lists facilities slated for potential closure as a result of impending budget cuts: six in Latin America, three in East Asia, at least ten in the Middle East (the Near East Bureau declined to list out its posts), and thirty-three in Europe and Canada (Nordbeck 1953). The consulates in Victoria and Hamilton, Canada; Bergen, Norway; Adelaide, Australia;

and Malaga, Spain, all closed in 1953 as a result (ibid, Committee on New Foreign Service Posts 1957, Mar. 27).

Further concerns related to appropriations mandated additional facility closures beginning in fiscal year 1957. Commenting on a request to open anew the consulate in Peshawar, Deputy Under Secretary Henderson approved with the comment, "Note – As it becomes apparent that Congress will sharply cut 1957 supplemental and our 1958 budget this matter should be reconsidered before we become involved in additional expenditures" (ibid). In response, the Department's regional bureaus were tasked with (a) "prepar[ing] a list of all the consular posts in its jurisdiction ranked in descending order of importance to the United States" and (b) "submit[ing] separate justifications for maintaining each of the consulates which appear as the last five posts on the list" (Gallman 1960). Table 4 presents the ranked list of posts from the East Asian bureau by way of example. As a brief aside, contrary to what was requested of them by the Department, the Bureau of European Affairs instead proposed a mathematical formula for representing post utility, beginning with a base assumption that, "In every country with which we have diplomatic relations there is a United States mission—for present purposes, at least, each as important as the other" (ibid). Appendix C details this experiment in full.

The emergence of the Committee on New Foreign Service Posts in tandem with significant budget constraints and, less than five years later, the mandate that bureaus must provide sound justification for all consulate posts in their regional-geographic jurisdictions provides strong evidence in support of the inertia of universality. Only consulates were considered for closure, despite the fact that the Department continued to open new chancery embassy facilities as new states emerged following decolonization. Diplomatic representation was seen as essential to the United States' "unipolar moment" and its continued and expanding weight in global affairs. The Committee in particular provides a concrete and material institutionalization of the dogma of universality. Despite coinciding with a time of significant austerity for the Department, the establishment of the Committee to streamline new post placement highlights the importance of diplomatic presence to policymakers in an era that saw the United States place embassies and consulates widely, lastly in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

Universality Revisited: 1992 and Beyond

Universality: noun, (1) the character or state of being universal; existence or prevalence everywhere. (2) relation, extension, or applicability to all. (3) universal character of range of knowledge, interests, etc. (dictionary.com).

As the previous sections detail, the United States' diplomatic footprint is the product of an amalgamation of ever-changing ideas and assumptions about the United States' role in global affairs. Taken together, the disparate consulates and embassies that dot the world produce a pattern that is at once material and representational. It is easy, for instance, to catalog the number of visas issued annually or press statements released from a particular facility to identify how each node both contributes to the wider network and enacts foreign policy at finer scales. However, just as each facility does *work* for the State Department, and by extension the U.S. government, this broader pattern also represents U.S. policymakers' longstanding commitment to a robust and far-flung foreign presence. After all, each facility is punctuated by a crisp, "waved" flag (Billig 1995). A careful reading of the history of this dynamic diplomatic landscape helps illuminate its significance to policymakers and the endurance of diplomatic landscapes in urban centers all around the world.

In weaving together archival material related to the placement of U.S. diplomatic facilities, this paper identifies a common theme in universality. The universality principle suggests the United States ought to have as widespread and robust a diplomatic posture as possible. Curiously, universality does not appear in any historical record nor any official policy pronouncement; rather, it identifies a longstanding mindset, collection of ideas and practices, dogma even surrounding how best the United States ought to position itself in the global arena. At the same time, universality also becomes a *product* of greater U.S. involvement in world affairs, with more and more facilities needed to support the country's emerging superpower status. This cyclical, self-perpetuating and reinforcing process, with universality both contributing to and emerging as a product of U.S. foreign policy practices, is powerful, and important to highlight. The cementing of universality in policymakers' minds has allowed its foundational ideas to become so ingrained in the foreign policy establishment that the placement or refurbishment of contemporary U.S. facilities is rarely questioned, even in the wake of large-scale attacks on diplomatic infrastructure as occurred in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, in 1998; and, most recently, Benghazi, Libya, in 2012.

Over the course of this study, many of those high-level U.S. diplomatic practitioners interviewed for this study found it odd to be asked about the value of embassies and consulates. To paraphrase a common sentiment: "Well, of course we should be everywhere; we're the United States of America." Indeed, most interview respondents were vehemently opposed to even the suggestion that the United States could pursue the same level of foreign policy engagement around the world with a smaller, perhaps more mobile and maneuverable, diplomatic footprint.

Most of those elite practitioners are familiar with the term universality, and presume the mindset to have developed in tandem with the United States' role in the post-war era, the *Pax Americana*. My research, however, suggests that the ideas of universality were planted much earlier in policymakers' minds. In fact, as the empirical data highlight, this geopolitical imagination accounts for the placement of facilities well before the middle of the twentieth century—setting in motion a way of thinking about the United States' diplomatic footprint that is still with us today. The universality principle came to be embedded in the practices, activities, and actions of elite diplomatic practitioners and foreign policy operatives. Traces of universality can be seen beginning with the first official U.S. diplomatic facilities at the tail end of the eighteenth century and later through efforts to dot the world with small and informal lone-man consulates—largely in port cities—to expand American access to global economic markets. As Figure 7 illustrates for just one geographic region, the United States had many more facilities spread around the world during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than at present. The number of these facilities ties hand-in-hand to the inroads the United States was making in the global arena at the time. During the second period, where I highlight the professionalization of the U.S. diplomatic corps, as the United States assumed a larger share of the peacemaking burden in the wake of the World Wars, this broad-scale universal diplomatic network shifted to favor a more 'high-brow' footprint, manifested in larger, more symbolic and architecturally profound embassy facilities located on prominent street corners close to host country foreign ministries and parliamentary buildings. By way of example, Eero Saarinen's famous London embassy building—opened in 1960 near Hyde Park—features a looming bald eagle atop the modernist structure (Figure 9). And despite the fact that the U.S. embassy in London is relocating to a (much) larger, more secure and removed, and "greener" facility in 2017, many are calling for the 1960 facility to remain as a historical marker ("Saarinen's Embassy Must Not Be Razed," Pearman 2008).

If the early twentieth century paved the way for more formalized embassy compounds (as opposed to legation facilities) to match the United States' commitment to the global arena, the second half of the century mechanized that shift. As further waves of decolonization led to new states in much of the developing world, the State Department placed embassies in emergent capital cities, often raising the status of a legation or consulate to an embassy on the date of independence. It was in this era that the Committee on New Foreign Service Posts streamlined the process whereby new facilities were proposed and realized. Even budgetary constraints in the 1960s favored universality as the Department's regional bureaus were tasked with closing consulates only, not embassies, to provide some budgetary flexibility. Faced with growing security concerns in the latter decades of the twentieth century, the Department chose not to step away from its commitment to universality but instead to alter individual features of the diplomatic footprint, notably enhancing security features at discrete facilities and ushering in a flurry of building activity criticized for introducing the world to the "fortress embassy."

Conclusion

Far from the immense coverage developed at the onset of the nineteenth century, with several hundred small, one-person consulates, the contemporary map is one that privileges U.S. diplomatic presence in capital cities and other powerful urban sites. The enduring legacy and continued relevance of universality is particularly noteworthy in the context of three dramatic shifts in diplomatic practice as the twentieth century gave way to the twenty-first. The first, as terrorist attacks on diplomatic facilities have tested the inviolability of embassy facilities, policymakers have been forced to adapt building requirements, security features, and personnel numbers to suit local needs at each discrete facility. Second, advancements in technology, especially telecommunications mechanisms, have closed the spatio-temporal gap between Washington and the wider world. One of the interviewees participated in regular secure video teleconferences from his office with the President and his national security team. Lastly, a spate of non-state actors have emerged as key players in global political currents in recent years, including terrorist actors like ISIS, al-Qaida, and al-Shahaab; informal networks of mass demonstrators connected through social media as in the so-called Arab Spring or Occupy Wall Street; aspiring states like Tibet or Palestine whose informal diplomatic practices have bled into the formal arena with recognition at multi-lateral institutions; and multi-national corporations that wield enormous influence over regional and global political processes. As these developments redefine the realm of international politics, many states, predominantly EU member states, are working to adjust, by shifting to smaller, more maneuverable and mobile diplomatic networks (van der Wusten & Mamadouh 2016). Several have even co-located embassy premises with other like-minded states in third country capitals, notably the Scandinavian states and those of the former British dominion. The United States, however, does not appear to be moving in this direction. The State Department is adapting policy and investing in personnel rather than its infrastructure which suggests, as my interviews confirmed, that the Department's current crop of policymakers are just as enamored and entranced, whether they know it or not, by universality as previous generations.

Following Smith again, universality is no one single thing, policy, or even idea. Rather, it encapsulates a particular neo-imperial *Weltanschauung* that has shifted over time as economic forces gave way to political ambitions further reinforcing its collective practices. This dogma mandates that the United States have as widespread and robust a permanent diplomatic presence as possible both *because* the United States is a world power and because it desires to *continue to be* a world power. The ideas and assumptions that contribute to this mindset have adapted and shifted as the global political arena has transformed over the last century.

In 1992, Secretary of State James Baker mandated the placement of an embassy in each of the newly established states of the former Soviet Union within a 90-day window. Several interviewees commented on how natural it was to "stand up" these facilities in accordance with the emergence of new states. What was remarkable in this mandate, however, was how quickly Baker wanted it accomplished (and it was). The exceedingly fast window to install embassy premises speaks to how valuable representation and presence was for policymakers in order to ensure the United States had access to emergent democratic systems and to the new markets of the former Socialist Republics. Universality remains today a powerful force in shaping how we think about diplomatic landscapes, particularly in the case of the United States. We rarely think to question the immensity of the U.S. diplomatic network, even as the world becomes more interconnected and diplomatic processes more virtual well into the twenty-first century. Yet, as this study finds, the universality principle and the network it created are built into the very fabric of the U.S. foreign policy establishment so much so that you cannot imagine one without the other. As the archival data illuminated, the American embassies and consulates that dot the global urban landscape are legacies of the United States' commitment to specific political and economic ideologies over the course of the last 100 years. It remains unclear what sort of developments would push U.S. policymakers to consider a departure from this longstanding universal footprint.

FIGURE 7. U.S. diplomatic facilities in Central America in 1911, 2016 with contemporary political boundaries for reference. Map by author (Kendall 1913).



FIGURE 8. 1932 Memorandum prepared by the American Consul General in Berlin, George Messersmith, for the attention of the Secretary of State (Messersmith 1932).



so many points that the needs of our Government and of the public are best met through one establishment rather than two in capitals.

This consolidation of the establishments of the State Department in capitals is a measure which all thinking persons interested in our foreign relations approve, and against which there can be no administrative objections but which for reasons difficult to explain, has been delayed. The delay has largely been due to the traditional slowness to change anything which affects our foreign practice, but it is a step which some of the smaller and larger countries have already taken and find in every way satisfactory and a great improvement. If there is any difficulty placed in the way of this improvement in our Service, it is due to the reactionary influence of a selfish, personal or snobbish character which cannot be permitted by us to stand in the way of progress and efficiency.

More effective coordination of the establishments in capitals of other Departments with that of the Department of State.

More important from the view of economy as well as of efficient administration, is the necessity for carefully examining into the establishments of the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, War, Navy and

FIGURE 9. The U.S. Embassy in London. Construction on a new facility is ongoing in a former industrial neighborhood across the Thames. The new embassy is slated to open in 2017 (Hipwell 2012).

TABLE 4. Ranking of all East Asian U.S. constituent posts (i.e. not embassies) in descending order of importance for austerity budgeting purposes, 1960. In addition to ranking their constituent facilities, each of the Department's geographic bureaus had to prepare a report to justify each of the posts that occupied the last five spots on the list, here outlined in black (Gallman 1960).

Rank	Post	Primary Function	Rank*	Post	Primary Function
1	Hong Kong	Consular/Political	12	Perth	Consular
2	Singapore	Political/Economic	13	Chienmai	Political
3	Kobe-Osaka	Consular/Economic	14	Penang	Political
4	Sydney	Consular/Economic	15	Auckland	Consular
5	Melbourne	Consular	16	Suva	Consular
6	Yokohama	Consular	17	Brisbane	Consular
7	Nagoya	Economic/Consular	18	Cebu	Political
8	Fukuoka	Consular	19	Hue	Political
9	Surabaya	Political/Consular	20	Adelaide	Consular
10	Medan	Consular	21	Mandalay	New post
11	Sapporo	Consular/Political			

CHAPTER IV

RETHINKING THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC ASSEMBLAGE: REPRESENTATION, INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES, AND THE IMPACTS OF UNIVERSALITY

Introduction

During the summer of 2015, I often walked past the Cuban Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzerland on my way to and from the apartment I was renting in northwest Washington's Mount Pleasant neighborhood.[9] As I went by the property in June and early July, it was easy to see that the facility was undergoing a 'makeover' in anticipation of the re-establishment of U.S.-Cuban diplomatic ties after a 54-year break. Gardeners were working on the grounds, security systems were being upgraded, and a fresh coat of paint was being applied to the façade. While walking by the facility a few days prior to the official restoration of diplomatic relations, I noticed a new flagpole, sans the flag (that would come later). I wandered by the facility again on the afternoon of July 20, on the heels of the high-level ceremony officially renewing the relationship. A crisp Cuban flag was now high atop the new flagpole (See Figure 1). News media trucks were parked haphazardly at the intersection of 16th and Fuller streets, their antennas extended for transmission. As I passed I heard a cameraman remark to a colleague: "It doesn't look like there are any Cubans here."

As part of the splashy coverage leading up to the restoration of bilateral ties, many commentators and media reports remarked on the "re-opening" and "re-

[9] The facility did not stand out much on 16th Street NW, a four-lane artery extending into Maryland. I was only aware of CUBINT, as the U.S. government refers to the property, through my work in the State Department's Office of Cuban Affairs, where I regularly visited the premises from 2008 through 2010 to exchange consular documents with Cuban officials. The consular section of the property is across the street from the former Interests Section in a run-down, single-story structure.

establishment" of the embassies in Havana and Washington. These vague narratives seem to imply these facilities had existed in some liminal or nonexistent space for fifty years. One journalist wrote of the flag-raising ceremony in Havana on August 14, "The crowd awaited entrance to the six-story modern building, designed… back in 1953, that will once again serve as the United States Embassy in Cuba." The piece continued, "Secretary of State John Kerry… spoke of the positive future the reestablishment of the old building would bring" (Contreras 2015). This and similar reports often failed to touch on a critical component of the story: leading up to the restoration of ties, and for decades prior, these facilities, operating as 'Interests Sections' of a third-party 'protecting power' (in this case Switzerland), were occupied by American and Cuban diplomats conducting essentially the same day-to-day activities as their colleagues in many other embassies and consulates around the world, albeit with certain restrictions. Contrary to what many in the public were led to assume, the buildings weren't vacant, shuttered properties waiting for the day when the diplomatic relationship would be repaired. And despite the pomp and circumstance of the respective flag-raising ceremonies in Washington on July 20 and Havana on August 14, the everyday operations of the facilities and the work conducted inside remains largely the same: reporting on political and economic trends, visa processing, services to American citizens, etc.

As this brief anecdote shows, we pay very little attention to the spaces in which diplomats operate and through which diplomatic processes are negotiated. This paper is part of a larger project that seeks to unmoor diplomatic studies from its emphasis on praxis and instead focus attention on grounded diplomatic infrastructure and material sites and spaces. Embassies, consulates, and special diplomatic missions are essential to a variety of functions that fall under the umbrella of 'twenty-first century diplomacy': citizen services, liaising with government and civil society contacts, reporting on state and civil society activities, and, increasingly, communicating broadly with the public through a variety of social media platforms—that is, public diplomacy.[10] While the role of diplomatic representation is often under-examined or misrepresented in the academic literature, I argue that an understanding of the *work* embassy and consulate facilities *do* is central to any study of diplomatic processes and relationships. Far from existing only as far-reaching symbols of state power—as they have been commonly theorized in the past—diplomatic facilities serve as critical nodes of a vast assemblage; embassies and consulates are "force-full" (Meehan 2013) spaces through which material things, officials, host country authorities, civil society representatives, third-party diplomats, citizens, and local nationals intersect and interact. Against that backdrop, this paper has two objectives: (1) to study why the United States maintains such a widespread diplomatic network, and (2) to document what work each discrete individual facility does to further the goals of the broader assemblage.

The U.S. diplomatic network is representative of one such assemblage. The State Department today manages a robust platform of 285 diplomatic facilities, inclusive of some 19,000 structures in 169 countries around the world (See Figure 2, Kennedy 2011, Benen 2014).[11] By way of comparison, according to the Lowy Institute's fantastic

[10] A note on terminology: All the diplomatic facilities that constitute a state's official representation to a country are referred to as the *diplomatic mission*. The mission typically includes an *embassy* in a capital city. The chancery building of the embassy houses the offices of the ambassador or chief of mission as well as other offices depending on its size. A *consulate* is typically attached to the chancery to provide consular services at the embassy site. The wider mission may also include any number of additional consulates, typically in larger urban areas, to provide services to citizens and local nationals, including passport, visa, and welfare and whereabouts requests.

[11] The exact number is, perhaps surprisingly, hard to pin down. At any one time, a number of U.S. facilities are drawn down (i.e. non-essential employees and family members removed) or fully shuttered as a result

Global Diplomacy Index, France maintains 267, China 258, Russia 243, and the UK 236 (Lowy Institute for International Policy 2016). The extraordinary expansion of the U.S. diplomatic network can be traced to a twentieth century emphasis on universality, in effect installing U.S. diplomats in nearly every independent state (Isenstadt 1997, Loeffler 1998, Robin 1992). [12] The universality principle, as Department insiders refer to it, led the United States to take renewed interest in previously marginalized peripheral regions in line with its growing economic and political role in global affairs (Moore forthcoming). Additional factors encouraged the expansion of America's diplomatic reach throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first: the emergence of newly independent states in the wake of decolonization, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, foreign policy priorities aimed at advancing neoliberal economic agendas, U.S.-led military incursions in Afghanistan and Iraq that required simultaneous surges of U.S. diplomatic personnel, and increasing numbers of American citizens traveling abroad who required consular services. Further, a second dimension of universality as I see it, all embassy facilities contain the same building blocks: front office; political and economic sections; defense attaché; public affairs/diplomacy officers; consulate; a large management, procurement, and accounting staff; cafeteria and post exchange; as well as a smattering of personnel from up to 27 other U.S. government agencies. As such, all U.S. diplomatic properties resemble each other both in layout and organizational process and hierarchy, rendering them easy to navigate for the roving diplomatic corps. The universal

of deteriorating security conditions, natural disasters, or, on rare occasions, a break in diplomatic ties. As of January 2016, the United States maintains but does not have official Chief-of-Mission personnel in Tripoli, Libya; Damascus, Syria; Sana'a, Yemen; and Bangui, Central African Republic. In addition, the United States does not maintain facilities in Iran or North Korea. Instead the Department relies on third-party protecting powers, Switzerland and Sweden notably, to manage American interests in both states.

[12] Every independent state within reason, that is. The United States, for example, does not maintain an embassy in every Pacific island state; rather, the Department operates five strategically placed missions throughout the Pacific with ambassadors accredited to multiple states in the region.

facility also makes for large staffs on site, often with hundreds of local nationals working on site to support twenty or thirty official American employees. Given these two dimensions of universality—both the network's widespread scope as well as its commitment to large facilities and staff—the United States' global diplomatic footprint is now by far the largest in the world.

This article draws predominantly on the lived experiences of U.S. diplomatic practitioners to explore, *empirically*, the discourse driving the maintenance of the U.S. network as well as, *theoretically*, the myriad ways diplomatic infrastructure contributes to a wider foreign policy assemblage. Data from interviews with high-level U.S. Department of State (hereinafter: 'State Department' or 'Department') personnel, many with over four decades of experience as Foreign Service Officers, helps to build a broader understanding for why policymakers value permanent diplomatic representation. Two key arguments emerge in this essay. First, as an overarching theme, diplomatic processes cannot be fully understood without attention to the sites and spaces through which they play out. Second, the United States' emphasis on a universal physical presence, by which I mean permanent, official diplomatic representation in as many states as possible, is an essential component of the uniquely American diplomatic assemblage. A key U.S. foreign policy goal has long been to have a hand in the outcome of political events across space and scale; as I demonstrate in another piece, that is a fundamental driver of universality (Moore forthcoming). Policymakers see diplomatic presence in country as the best possible manner in which to achieve desired foreign policy outcomes. But it is not enough merely to look to one or two nodes of the U.S. diplomatic network to see the endurance of this grounded, 'finger-in-every-pie' foreign policy. To really understand the United States' unflinching commitment to universality, it is necessary to examine how the network works together as a whole. The inertia of this wider assemblage demonstrates the continued pull and reinforcement of universality as well as the force-full characteristics of local diplomatic installations.

Assembling and Empowering a Network

A transition in the last several decades has seen work in political geography unmoored from traditional top-down, state-centric, and anthropocentric conceptual models as scholars have embraced more micro-scale, relational and more-than-human approaches to state power and its diffusion. This trajectory reflects an embrace by scholars interested in diplomacy and international relations of Deleuzean notions of "smooth space and de-territorialization" (Legg 2011: 128) and of a "world constantly becoming" (Dittmer 2013: 493) (see, e.g. Armstrong 1998, Acuto & Curtis 2014, Dittmer 2015, Page & Dittmer 2015). Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) concept of the assemblage has proven particularly influential. As Dittmer (2013: 495) writes:

> [E]ach participating body, object, and discourse enrolled in an assemblage simultaneously achiev[es] greater co-agency with all the other parts of the assemblage and also [is] being reworked by the affective experience of participation. Bodies, objects, and discourses can be embedded in several assemblages at once, and can themselves be the result of processes of assemblage themselves.

Whereas the maddeningly abstract concept of the "state" has proven problematic for scholars, assemblage thinking introduces a hybridity of components and emphasizes the, "creative capacities of matter and energy, and the processes that instantiate them in their great variety of forms…" (Acuto & Curtis, p. 2). Just as Deleuze's assemblage empowers objects and their more-than-representational characteristics, it recognizes that such things are part-and-parcel of a broader set of practices and ideas in constant motion. And if objects are capable of acting, facilities too are rendered “force-full” components of the assemblage (Meehan 2013).

To conceptualize the U.S. diplomatic network as an assemblage is to call attention to the infinity of constituent parts of the network that ‘do work’ for the whole in utterly unique and crucial capacities. Each component—from the visa stamp and the lawn of the embassy to the ambassador and the directive from Washington—is essential in crafting desired foreign policy outcomes and affecting institutional change. Further, diplomatic installations, a microcosm of bodies, objects, and discourses working in concert, are, crucially, examples of nested assemblages. The “organismal” subject-bodies are assemblages nested within the wider assemblage of the diplomatic facility, itself a node of a much wider assemblage charged with designing and implementing a foreign policy strategy: the entire diplomatic network--in the case of the United States, 285 linked installations (Whatmore 1997, Dittmer 2014).

Assemblage theory therefore lends itself well to an analysis of why diplomatic facilities exist and what exactly they *do* to further the state’s objectives and obligations in the global arena. That each constituent node of the network is constantly shaping and being shaped by elements within and outside its network is key to my conceptualization of the U.S. diplomatic footprint, where officers move around in three-to-four-year tours, rarely in the same region, and where on-goings at the U.S. Embassy in, for example, Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, have the potential to impact similar practices at the U.S. Consulate in Yekaterinburg, Russia.

Methods

This article is part of a broader research project examining the complex materialities of U.S. diplomatic infrastructure, the first, to my knowledge, to focus considerable attention on the universality principle. The study has sought to uncover and analyze the ideas and assumptions that have driven the placement of U.S. diplomatic facilities over the last century, as well as to examine the work the *facilities* do to address foreign policy goals. Towards that end, the project triangulates data from multiple qualitative methods, including an informal (auto)institutional ethnography drawing on the author's experiences working for the Department on and off from 2007 through December 2015. Extensive archival research was conducted over the summer of 2015 at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration's annex facility in College Park, Maryland, which houses the State Department's Central Files. The archival data serves to reconstruct the emergence of the U.S. diplomatic network and trace the discourse surrounding the universality principle.

This paper draws primarily from the third method utilized in the study: interviews with retired, high-level Department personnel. In an effort to cultivate a group of research participants who had both actively crafted and implemented broad policies but also managed everyday personnel and budgetary concerns, I parameterized this group as (1) career FSOs who (2) served in at least one ambassadorial position abroad or (3) at the level of Assistant Secretary or above within the Department.[13] I employed a snowball

[13] Assistant Secretaries manage the individual bureaus that make up the organizational structure of the Department. Bureaus are regional (e.g. Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs) or functional (e.g. Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation). Assistant Secretaries maintain regular contact with the six Under Secretaries of State as well as the Secretary of State and his/her deputies.

sampling approach with the intention of reaching individuals with broad regional and functional expertise. Drawing on Aberbach and Rockman's (2002) work studying bureaucratic elites, I opted for open-ended, unstructured interviews to allow respondents to better "organize their answers within their own frameworks" (p. 674). The themes and questions discussed were therefore unique to each interview. Many of resulting group of research participants served in multiple high-level positions throughout their careers and drew extensively on those experiences during interviews. Interviewees included former Ambassadors, Consuls General, and Principal Officers from 31 missions and three international organizations. Further, among those interviewed were personnel who formerly held high-ranking positions at the Department, including former Under Secretaries as well as former Assistant Secretaries and Special Representatives. Collectively the interviewees have served at U.S. facilities in over 50 states as well as myriad positions at Main State headquarters in Washington throughout their careers. Table 2 of the methodology chapter details the geographic extent of where participants served as the principal officer at 'post' (i.e. installation).

As much as I allowed each interview participant to steer the conversation, explore tangential themes, and offer anecdotes, the primary motivation for each meeting was to understand why U.S. policymakers have adopted and maintained a widespread, if not universal, diplomatic presence. Against that backdrop, the conversations I had with participants largely revolved around the meta-theme of presence. Interviewees on the whole unanimously favored maintaining a broad (i.e. widespread) and robust (i.e. well-staffed) U.S. diplomatic presence abroad. Further all participants were well versed in and supportive of the universality principle, though how a universal diplomatic presence ought to be manifested differed from participant to participant (e.g., "Do we really need to have embassies in Togo and Benin? They're 10 miles apart. You can see Accra from Lomé.").

Finally, every effort was made to safeguard the anonymity of interviewees. As such, I do not distinguish between interviewees who had served as ambassadors and those in high-level positions in Washington (though most served in both capacities). As a final note, any mention of states, positions, and/or international organizations in the following paragraphs is merely coincidental and does not necessarily reflect any individual's specific career trajectory.

The U.S. Diplomatic Network

The architecture of the vast, entrenched U.S. diplomatic apparatus includes embassies, consulates, American presence posts (APPs), virtual presence posts (VPPs), and special diplomatic missions encompassing over 58,000 human agents and countless more-than-human objects.[14] It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider each of these in turn; instead I focus on the role of embassies and consulates, as together these structures comprise the majority of U.S. diplomatic facilities. Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), Foreign Service Specialists, Locally Employed Nationals (LCNs), Eligible Family Members (EFMs), employees of other U.S. government (USG) agencies, and perhaps contractors constitute the typical workforce of a contemporary U.S. embassy. FSOs serve in five distinct capacities, or cones, as: political officers, economic officers, public diplomacy officers, management officers, and consular officers. Political

[14] This number includes some 13,000 Foreign Service Offices and over 45,000 locally employed nationals. In addition, 11,000 civil servants work in the United States to support the Department's mission (U.S. Department of State).

Specialists are just that, working as IT specialists, human resources specialists, office managers, and medical personnel, to name but a few. While LCNs serve in more administrative capacities, assisting FSOs and specialists—serving as accountants, administrative assistants, groundskeepers, and security personnel among others—they represent a hugely important component of the embassy ecosystem. LCNs' intimate knowledge of country politics and economic nuance is unrivaled and they maintain the institutional memory of the embassy as nearly everyone else transitions to onward assignments after a three- to four-year "tour." Finally, twenty-seven USG agencies are represented at U.S. diplomatic posts abroad, most often members of the intelligence community and Department of Defense. This last group also typically includes a small Marine guard detachment charged with safeguarding classified materials. Total employment, however, differs widely. At the high end, according to one of my interviews, the embassy in Kabul at the height of U.S. intervention efforts employed 1,245 people. On the lower end, a small Pacific island embassy might employ only twenty or thirty. A typical mid-size post might have forty official Americans (i.e. FSOs, Specialists, and non-State USG personnel), sixty LCNs, and perhaps a small contingent of EFMs.

Consulates are distinct from embassies in that they are primarily charged with consular processes and house consular officers as well as EFMs and LCNs to support heavy visa adjudication loads. A consulate is primarily responsible for providing services to Americans traveling and living abroad, whether that is assistance with lost or stolen passports, legal assistance, evacuation during crises, or repatriation of remains. The bulk of consular work, however, concerns the adjudication of immigrant and non-immigrant visas to travel, work, or otherwise migrate to the United States. Given the systematic nature of this work, consulates tend to exist in their own universe. In fact, the Department of State is only one of two USG agencies independently funded by passport and visa processing fees (the other is the Postal Service).

While every embassy chancery building has an accompanying consulate, many of the most vital consulates—in some of the most heavily populated and/or politically and economically significant urban systems around the world—are not in capital cities and thus stand alone (e.g. Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paolo, Mumbai, Shanghai, Sydney, Vancouver, Amsterdam, and St. Petersburg). Table 1 details the highest visa-processing consulates, a number of which are standalone facilities (Bureau of Consular Affairs 2016). These larger consulate facilities often play a key political role as well and therefore house a number of non-consular officers and other USG personnel. One of my interviewees reflected on serving in Rio de Janeiro during his career. He noted the facility had a large consular staff but also employed three public affairs officers (i.e. public diplomacy cone), one political officer, and a Department of Defense attaché, in addition to the Consul General and a deputy. This composition reflects the geographic situation of Rio de Janeiro as one of Brazil's political, cultural, and economic hubs, along with São Paolo. The interviewee noted that most Brazilian civil servants commuted from Rio to Brasilia for the workweek. As such, it was critical to maintain a non-consular presence to report on and meet with government and civil society leaders in Rio.

However critical consular work is to the Department's mission and operational capabilities, as well as for individuals in need of American visas and passports more generally, this paper tables a lengthier discussion of consular matters. Instead, I explore the more hidden but still tangible drivers—material and immaterial—of U.S. diplomatic representation as a way to measure the work embassy and consulate facilities do on behalf of the wider assemblage. While consulates are undisputedly necessary and will remain a mainstay of diplomatic practice as long as the modern state system exists, several of my respondents argued that consular priorities take a back seat to political concerns when considering the opening and closing of facilities. As one ambassador noted, "The consideration of where to put a consulate flows… from two considerations. The secondary one is consular services… [T]he main decision for putting a consulate or some other embassy office… is political or to provide a platform for other agencies."

The Drivers of Diplomatic Presence

Three key findings emerged from the interview data, shedding light on why U.S. diplomatic installations exist, all 285 of them, and what value policymakers see in the work they do. These three motivations are: information gathering; influence and persuasion; and commitment, reciprocity, and precedence. In describing each of these, I demonstrate how processes enabled through material diplomatic infrastructure contribute to the wider Department mandate and U.S. foreign policy broadly and thus mandate the continued maintenance of this vast networked assemblage. Firstly, embassies are used predominantly as sites through which FSOs as well as individuals from myriad USG agencies regularly collect, synthesize, and send information to Washington for the attention of key decision makers. Second, exerting influence over and persuading the "influencers" in societies around the world to act towards a particular outcome is a hugely important role for FSOs stationed abroad and necessitates a permanent diplomatic presence in country. Finally, embassy and consulate facilities serve as real and material symbols of the United States' commitment to states, governments, and peoples around the world. Many interviewees mentioned the importance of precedence and reciprocity and how difficult it would be to "draw back" (i.e. abandon) certain embassy and consulate facilities in favor of a smaller, perhaps more mobile diplomatic footprint. Once a facility is "stood up," it is very difficult to dismantle without doing significant damage to the bilateral relationship.

In practice it is difficult to distinguish between these discrete themes as I have identified them; instead they blur and overlap. When a political officer meets with a Foreign Ministry official, she is both presenting the United States' position and perhaps encouraging the host government to act in a particular way, but she is also receiving information on the host government's policy positions and the attitudes of its decision makers for transmission to Washington. However, drawing out each of these themes in turn can facilitate a better understanding of diplomatic representation from the mindset of U.S. policymakers more fully. As a final comment, for the purposes of streamlining the narrative as well as avoiding repetition, I refer to my interview subjects below alternately as *respondent*, *ambassador*, *interviewee*, and *participant*.

Information gathering

> You can say, 'Yeah but the intelligence community covers all that stuff and they have fifty analysts reading German political newspapers and following people…' And that's true but they have a hard time getting their information to the right people at the right time. Ambassadors are the fastest and most effective channel to get anything to the top levels of government. *An ambassador says, 'Houston, we have a problem,' everybody listens* (emphasis added).

A principal theme to emerge from the interviews is that diplomatic representation is necessary as a means to collect information across space and scale. I use the term 'information-gathering' here because 'information' was used regularly by respondents. The term also serves to differentiate what reporting officers do on a daily basis from the work of intelligence community partners at facilities abroad. Political and economic FSOs meet routinely in official fora with contacts and report on-goings in the form of cables back to Washington. Without large quantities of information flowing back and forth to provide a nuanced understanding of the world, policymakers in Washington are unable to critically evaluate the world around them. Diplomats are therefore used to cull data from their vast networks abroad and on-the-ground observations.

The collecting and synthesizing of information also signals the most tangible and realized driver for longstanding, permanent presence in country. The collection and dissemination of vast swaths of information is measurable whereas other themes I cite below (i.e. influence, reciprocity) are most decidedly not. For example, the WikiLeaks scandal in late 2010 dumped "A cache of a quarter-million confidential American diplomatic cables, most of them from the past three years," into the hands of journalists and the public for broad dissemination (Shane & Lehren 2010). A headache for the foreign policy establishment, the cables exposed the Department's internal information-gathering efforts. Barring exceptions, cables document most every meeting, even informal get-togethers, between U.S. Officers and host-country nationals or third party diplomats. Cable writing is a long-valued tradition within the Department, with officers receiving training on cable tradecraft and monetary awards for the best cables written within a given year. The millions of cables transmitted back and forth between Post and

Washington represent a critical component of the networked architecture of the U.S. diplomatic system.

Most of the interviewees spoke about the need for ‘ground-truthing,’ what one called “ferreting out a little bit more what’s really going on” in the context of information-gathering. While certainly in the Information Age it is possible to understand broad patterns of social, political, and economic change from afar, one respondent dryly noted that such a position would render diplomats “fundamentally ignorant.” Another put it more empirically: “It’s one thing to speculate what’s going on in Israel from Washington; it’s another thing to talk to Israelis, to walk around in Israel, to really know the key players and what the key players are thinking.” Further, there is an underlying concern for the context and nuanced insight that Washington craves. While diplomatic facilities cannot beat *CNN* and the *BBC* to breaking news, FSOs will quickly be able to write up the context surrounding the development as well as its implications for Washington. As one respondent said, the work of a diplomat is not to figure “why did this happen?” but to flesh out “what can we do about it?”

Influence and persuasion

An essential component of physical diplomatic representation, echoed by almost all participants, is the ability to influence events on the ground and around the world more generally. Inclusive of this goal are efforts to persuade host government officials, civil society leaders, and “ordinary people,”—as one ambassador put it, to act in particular ways. The only way to do this, many respondents argued, was through “contact work”—that is, putting in the time and energy to meet with contacts in government and civil society "on their turf" and even "mingle" with folks about town.[15] Many respondents referred to these contacts as the "influencers in society," those individuals in positions of power. In large part, this type of networking involves the tricky task of cultivating and nurturing a long-term relationship between the individual and the *Department* as diplomats come and go. One ambassador fancied himself particularly good at spotting "up-and-comers" in the political arena. He told a story of drafting a cable on Joachim Gauck at an economic conference early in his Foreign Service career, noting that Gauck was an individual the United States should pay attention to; he was going places. And he did, eventually becoming the President of Germany.

At a fine scale, influence and persuasion imply contact work and communication. Demarches—a routine diplomatic practice whereby embassy officials visit the Foreign Ministry to present an official position for the host government's consideration—are a common manifestation of grounded, material efforts to influence. But, in looking at the wider assemblage, the Department seeks to influence public opinion on U.S. foreign policy, persuading the public at large that the United States plays an important, if not vital, role in the world. One ambassador made reference to both of these multi-scalar manifestations in the same disquisition. He initially started at the broadest scope:

> I think if [presence is] ceremonial and symbolic, then why bother? It seems to me that post-9/11 not engaging in the world has fatal consequences. We have to be out telling a story. And we have to tell a story about our own country, our own values and not in any finger-wagging way, but people should have the opportunity to see and hear and know representatives of the United States of America. And we play a

[15] Today, most activities of this nature are chronicled over social media; every U.S. diplomatic post has a robust social media presence including You Tube content, a Twitter feed, and a Facebook page. I asked many respondents over the course of the research whether social media efforts could be practiced from Washington; most scoffed at that suggestion by way of response.

> huge role in this world, commercially, economically, politically, socially, culturally. I mean what's it for?

He then answered his own question by zeroing in on how to tell that story in practice on the ground:

> The unique value of the State Department is, if I send you to be the ambassador to France, what do I expect of you? I expect a lot of things from you, but what I really expect from you is when it comes times for us to have to persuade people in France to do it our way, I need you to have the contacts, the language, the social-cultural skills [to do that]. The thing that is unique about you is, 'I can do that because I know about this. I live here. I'm persuasive.'

For many, networking with influencers and relationship building tended to be thankless and dull, though utterly important. One respondent commented on having to attend myriad political functions as a member of the diplomatic corps, even heading to the airport at a moment's notice to greet a returning head of state. He noted dryly, "A lot of times you're the décor." Yet presence at such functions matters. He added, "I've been told several times in my career, 'We really appreciate you because you come.' And of course, over time if you develop a pattern of coming to things that [is] noticed." Another respondent was more cut-and-dry, noting, "This is the most important thing you do… Look, as an ambassador... it's a 100-hour workweek. How many goddamn people do you have to see in those 100 hours?" He then went down a list of officials and legislators, before continuing, "It's watering the grass, but it's important watering the grass." All respondents when prompted were quick to note the vital importance of maintaining positive relationships on behalf of the United States in order to call on those individuals to support a particular U.S. position when the time came.

Interestingly, most of this relationship building through contact meetings does not occur on embassy premises. According to participants there are several reasons for this state of affairs, not least the cumbersome security measures at U.S. facilities rendering host government officials uncomfortable or even indignant upon entering facilities. Respondents also said it was important to meet contacts on their turf, away from the imposing symbolism of U.S. diplomatic properties. This allows U.S. diplomats to get out and "poke around" while also building relationships with key informants as well as stumbling upon new contacts: "That's why you got guys out in the political section who are hanging around the parliament, or hanging around the parties, or hanging around the institutions." And "getting out" also implies leaving the capital city and other large population centers all together. Former U.S. Ambassador to Belgium Howard Gutman wrote about his efforts, particularly with frequent trips outside Brussels, to repair ordinary Belgians' mistrust of the United States and its policies in the Middle East. He learned French and Dutch, made an effort to engage with students, and visited every Belgian municipality during his four-year tenure, all 589 of them (Gutman 2015).

In my early conversations with ambassadors, I had trouble reconciling this emphasis on contact and influence with what I saw as a sizeable number of U.S. facilities in states hostile to the U.S. government and/or states with security challenges that prohibit diplomats from traveling frequently and openly outside embassy and consulate compounds, including Asmara, Eritrea (hostile government), and Peshawar, Pakistan (security concerns). I asked my respondents: why should the United States maintain a presence in places where our diplomats cannot get out and engage with people? Why is a facility needed in such a space? Their collective answer was simple: despite the challenges, any little bit helps. One interviewee noted his attempts to engage with foreign officials in a particularly unreceptive Foreign Ministry:

> You typically… don't overlap with your predecessor so he or she will leave you a note. And my predecessor left me a note; it had 6 [officials who would talk] … And so it was a different way to work but it was changing when I got there. When I left, I probably left 17 names for my successor… [T]he foreign ministry became open. We still couldn't get in except with great difficulty… but we could do… [the] defense ministry, think tanks, things like that, and [host government officials] became much more open.

He notes here the challenges of trying to engage with closed governments but also the rewards of making a small dent in that hostility, in this case increasing the number of contacts who would meet with a U.S. embassy representative. And every opportunity, however narrow, to communicate the U.S. government's position on a particular issue was seen as a net positive. Many of my respondents served as ambassadors in high-profile states with tenuous relationships to the United States. They talked of failures to build relationships with key influencers and the long-lasting implication of these failures. One respondent spoke generally of the Department's exposure to Iraqi officials in our conversation:

> Respondent: Abadi we missed. Maliki we missed. Jafari we didn't miss… The last two prime ministers we did miss; we gave them no attention until suddenly they were prime minister.
>
> Author: And you could see a consequence of that? You didn't have [their ear]?
>
> Respondent: More with Maliki than with Abadi, but I would say [yes]… Maliki was the more crucial one and as he had less exposure to the West. If we had spent more time with him earlier… it would have made a difference.

The ability to influence and persuade key individuals across all aspects of society was identified by my respondents as one of the most fundamental aspects of U.S. diplomatic tradecraft and an essential component of the work done everyday at an embassy. This entails both identifying and cultivating host nationals who stand to achieve positions of power and influence as well as to encourage broad social support for a particular U.S. government position. Both of these tasks require longstanding, permanent diplomatic presence in country to build relationships and trust, especially given that most U.S. diplomats move assignments after a posting of only three or four years.

Commitment, reciprocity, and precedence

> Once you establish an embassy… and we've had them since these countries became independent from France or England… If you take it away, it's seen as a political statement. And there's no way you're [going to] make it seem like a budgetary [issue] because then they'll say, 'Well why didn't you close Juba instead of [Lomé]? You [could] cover [South Sudan] out of Khartoum or Nairobi.' … We can't, our hands are tied from closing existing places.

A concern for how states, host governments, and the public at large would react should the United States ever decide to pull back from its commitment to universality emerged as a secondary theme throughout several interviews. One respondent referred to the powerful pull of "continuity of presence," the idea that a longstanding commitment to a particular state, in the form of a permanent diplomatic mission, cements the foundation of the bilateral relationship. Closing a diplomatic facility, by contrast, would be perceived as the sender state losing faith in the host government (see, e.g. Bell & Molloy 2013). Interviewees noted the very important symbolic aspect of a longstanding facility in a country emblazoned with the U.S. seal and flag (see also Loeffler 1998). Another interviewee noted the role of status, image, and perception in the diplomatic relationship:

> And the definition of status in the world: there are a couple of them, one is a seat at the United Nations and the other is an American embassy. Having recognition, having… formal relations with the United States, having your own ambassador in Washington who can claim to meet the president if only once to present her or his credentials. And vice versa, to have an American show up at your president's or king's or prince's palace

> and be photographed… shows the United States knows you exist and cares.

Yet another respondent noted the "reservoir of good" those embassy personnel might draw on should they ever need an appointment with a host country official or an aircraft clearance at a moment's notice. Others added this goodwill is reciprocal; diplomacy is about *quid pro quos*: "They want a presidential visit? They want a picture of the president to put up on their mantle? Okay."

Or consider this exchange in response to the Department's decision to name a U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, despite the fact that the U.S. does not maintain an official embassy presence in Mogadishu at present:

> Author: So when they talk about naming an ambassador, it's just the symbolism-
>
> Respondent: -Well it's the symbolism. In the ideal world, the ambassador will move to Mogadishu at some point in time. But initially the person is going to Nairobi.
>
> Author: I wonder why they do that before they're ready to put the facility back 'online'.
>
> Respondent: Well it's sending a message. It's trying to underscore support for the Somali government. And it's a little bit of a charade; we've had a special envoy for Somalia, also resident in Nairobi for a long time. And this upgrades the title, but beyond that it doesn't really change much.

Following Senate confirmation, Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Blinken swore in U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Stephen Schwartz on June 27, 2016. In his remarks, Blinken notes:

> [T]he importance of the step forward we're taking today… *to support a functioning central government*, defeat a deadly terrorist threat, rebuild a shattered economy, and pave the way for Somalis to claim an inclusive and democratic future (emphasis added).

Near the end of his remarks, Blinken references the last flag to fly over the functioning U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu before the facility was abandoned in 1991. He says, "While we work to transition or [sic] mission from Kenya back to Somalia, it is our sincere hope, Steve, that you will have the opportunity to raise this flag in Mogadishu once again" (ibid).

The representational aspect is significant then, even in the absence of a physical facility as the Mogadishu case demonstrates. It is significant precisely because Department operatives seek to stress the commitment of the United States to a particular state, government, and people. And, as others noted, this commitment is tangible in the form of security assistance and foreign aid but a longstanding, permanent embassy or consulate node may be considered just as measurable. One particularly colorful ambassador noted the very real sense of insecurity in many national governments around the world:

> These people have—partially for their own fault, partially because of the world they live in—put much of their security in our hands. And so you *abandon* Nepal or you *abandon* Vietnam, they're wondering whether you're going to *abandon* [Germany] or Iraq or Afghanistan or India or what you're going to *abandon* next… So therefore our principle has been we don't *abandon* anybody. We're all in this together—one for all, all for one—even stupid, little, useless countries with absolutely horrid leadership (emphasis added, see below).

However impolitic and offensive, note his use of the verb 'abandon'--a word, along with 'evacuate,' carefully avoided by the Department during 'draw down' events (i.e. when USG personnel are ordered to leave the country for security concerns). He used this word intentionally to speak to the damage post closure incurs on the bilateral relationship, notably the souring of relationships to interlocutors and thus a break in on-site information-gathering activities and political and economic reporting.

In addition to commitment and reciprocity, precedence was a final recurring theme. I regularly asked participants, apart from consular needs, why physical, permanent, and large-staffed embassy facilities are necessary in the ‘Parises’ and ‘Londons’ and ‘Ottawas’ of the world—capital cities of democratic, advanced-industrial states with longstanding, positive bilateral relationships with the United States. One ambassador shared an interesting anecdote, noting that he had argued (“partly in jest”) to close the entire U.S. mission to Canada at one point—the embassy in Ottawa and five additional consulates; “It costs $200,000-300,000 a year to keep people in Ottawa.” Instead, he argued, why not fly personnel out of Washington’s Reagan National airport each morning? Another respondent argued the Department could potentially staff the Ottawa facility from Albany, New York, saving millions on housing and other amenities entitled to FSOs while serving abroad (though that is still a significant distance). Of course, as participants acknowledged, these suggestions would never be taken seriously. The United States underscores its commitment to its northern neighbor through extensive diplomatic representation, and to turn away from that posture and the precedent set would do significant damage to the bilateral relationship even services remained the same, albeit at a distance or through a smaller downgraded diplomatic platform.

Many respondents further used as an example Secretary of State James Baker’s 1992 order, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, to “stand up” embassy facilities in all of the former Soviet Socialist Republics during a 90-day window (Hastings 2012). While it is remarkable that the Department, with its immense bureaucracy, was able to meet Baker’s seemingly short deadline, the fast-paced establishment of these facilities illustrates the seriousness with which high-level officials treat diplomatic presence. (To be fair, there were a number of small consular facilities in place at the time of Baker's ultimatum not fully staffed but fulfilling the mandate still required a tremendous amount of work, unlike the Cuba example at the start of the paper.) Speaking of Baker's mandate, one ambassador remarked, "[The United States is] a great power… [W]e basically have a physical presence in almost every recognized country in the world; *it would be odd not to do it*" (emphasis added).

The Force-full U.S. Diplomatic Assemblage

Diplomatic presence is valued far beyond ceremony. The U.S. diplomatic network and its constituent posts support the broader U.S. foreign policy assemblage in powerful ways, notably through information-gathering, influencing foreign actors, and demonstrating a real and material commitment to stand alongside peoples around the world. These three activities, made possible by an amalgamation of diplomatic bodies and more-than-human things in diplomatic facilities, are highly valued by policymakers, as evidenced in my interviews with elite U.S. diplomatic practitioners. More importantly, the practices I have called attention to in this article suggest the endurance of the universal diplomatic posture, and a networked infrastructure that allows information, peoples, and goods to travel between Post and Washington. I asked all interview participants whether the Department could theoretically pursue the same goals with a smaller diplomatic network. The following are exemplary responses from four ambassadors:

> My motto is 'United States is a superpower and we should act like one'. … We shouldn't find ways to cut our presence overseas; we should find ways to enhance it.

> I'm a strong believer in universal diplomatic presence for the United States. I mean, as the truly global power, uh, we should have the contacts, the knowledge, that comes from having professionals on the ground.
>
> [With voice rising] Of course we should be everywhere. As long as this American moment continues and we are *primus inter pares* in the world, the most powerful nation economically, politically, militarily, sociologically, of course we should. That's how you connect with people. The question actually I would flip and say, 'Are we dispersed widely enough?
>
> [L]et me put it this way, in a budget-cutting exercise, one of the last things I would cut would be our representatives in as many countries as I would reasonably put them around the world.

And while some of my respondents contended that there are limits to U.S. power abroad ("Our goal should not be to be everywhere at once to piss people off"), most, as shown by the above statements, were resolutely committed to universality as a way of ensuring U.S. global primacy, a running theme throughout the interviews. By way of example, consider this inspired monologue (the same individual from the third quotation above):

> And, you know, my answer to that is, are we the United States of America or not? Do we or do we not have three million people overseas? Are we or are we not living in a globalized world? Are we or are we not the, you know, *primus inter pares* state in the world? We not only founded or fund the UN system more than any other nation, we host it! Here in the United States. *There's a reason for that.* [Continues with an impassioned tone] We're the United States of America. We're of the world. We are the most powerful nation in the world. We have a set of principles second to none. We're the oldest continuously functioning republic on this globe!

A near-universal diplomatic assemblage is so powerful, so important to policymakers, that diplomatic practitioners are unable to consider a different posture; they have never been asked to imagine what an innovative, economical, or mobile diplomatic network might look like.

As the above excerpts illustrate, the question has become not whether the United States ought to preserve universality, that is a given, but in what form each discrete embassy and consulate facility should take (e.g. site, design, architecture, security conditions). One respondent noted the enormous implications for such questions on politics:

> Given that [the] United States' adheres to the principle of universality, we're gonna keep an embassy in the capital of every country… That normally is in and of itself not controversial… but the issue of where the embassy should be, how big the embassy should be, how ostentatious the embassy should be, eh, the issue of how obvious the security of the embassy. These are all important political as well as administrative issues.

Further, this respondent is careful to note that the decision to place a new embassy or consulate facility is not merely ceremonial or administrative. The constitutive power of these "big things" (Jacobs 2006) is generated not principally through the flag, as many would lead us to believe, but rather through myriad processes that do not begin and end on the premises of the facility, processes I have described throughout this piece. Drawing on the archival data collected over the course of this research project, Table 2 details the "functional areas of responsibility" of the State Department (and by extension embassies) as outlined in a 1961 letter (Hays 1961). This table well illustrates the slew of diplomatic practices (all of which remain important to this day) that operate through U.S. posts to support the broader foreign policy establishment. In failing to call attention to this assemblage, we fail to grasp the true power of each diplomatic node, each working to sustain the bigger whole.

Conclusion

Diplomatic processes cannot be fully understood without attention to the sites and spaces through which they play out. The United States remains committed to a widespread diplomatic footprint just as many other countries have made drastic changes to their diplomatic networks. Many European states, for example, have closed less strategic posts and co-located several missions within larger facilities with ambassadors-at-large accredited to multiple nearby states. The Scandinavian countries have consolidated their respective diplomatic missions into one regional mission in many parts of the world, including Washington, DC. While security concerns continue to dominate the discourse on U.S. diplomatic infrastructure, particularly in the wake of the most recent large-scale evacuation of a U.S. embassy in Tripoli, Libya, in July 2014, these discussions do not appear to be turning the tide towards the European posture in favor of a smaller and more maneuverable diplomatic corps. Instead, the Department continues to function under the assumption that a permanent diplomatic mission is essential in every state to maintain the United States' primacy in global politics, a narrative that has been constructed and reinforced by policymakers over time and that remains the primary driving force in crafting foreign policy, requisitioning funds, and designing new or renovated facilities.

To fully comprehend the United States' unwavering commitment to universality, we have to understand how the network works together as a whole; it is not enough to study one or two facilities. Nor can we only look to the work human subjects do in furthering diplomatic aims. Contrary to how U.S. embassies and consulates appear in contemporary urban landscapes—"big things" (Jacobs 2006) with large, impenetrable perimeter walls, fortress-like façades, and barbed-wire-adorned guard posts—they are not stand-alone facilities, however imposing they may look. Nor are they just representative of U.S. power abroad, as symbolized by the waved flag atop each facility (Billig 1995).

Embassy and consulate properties do tangible, measurable work on behalf of the Department towards particular foreign policy goals (e.g. Table 6).

We often fail to consider the day-to-day, mundane practices, objects, bodies, and discourses at work to maintain the diplomatic apparatus and, as a result, the United States' countless diplomatic relationships to peoples, states, informal bodies, and multilateral organizations, but they have enormous geopolitical consequences. The high-level negotiations which led to the restoration of the U.S.-Cuban bilateral relationship and the "re-opening" of the U.S. Embassy in Havana did not happen overnight. On the U.S. end, the talks were the result of the tireless work of dozens of diplomats across the Department's hierarchy and officials across the U.S. government apparatus. Thousands of e-mails were sent from State and other agencies in Washington to the Interests Section in Havana. 'Action Memos' had to be prepared for the attention of high-level decision makers as well as briefing binders for the negotiating delegation and press releases for public dissemination. The existing diplomatic facility in Havana was instrumental during this process, as were its links to the people and things and sites that constitute the broader diplomatic network. As this paper has detailed, an in-depth study of the contours of the diplomatic network, nested assemblages linking and empowering peoples, things, ideas, and practices, lends insight into why facilities continue to exist and be valued by policymakers. Drawing on the assemblage as a conceptual model further illuminates the concrete *work* facilities support, enable, and empower to secure diplomatic objectives.

FIGURE 10. Cuban Embassy, July 20, 2015. *Source: author.*

FIGURE 11. U.S. Department of State facilities, 2014. *Source: U.S. Department of State*.



TABLE 5. The largest non-immigrant-visa-processing (NIVs) posts by volume (with over 100,000 NIVs issued) during fiscal year 2015. No post in Africa exhibited a volume over 100,000 NIVs; as such, Lagos represents the largest post by NIV volume in the region. Shaded posts represent stand-alone consulate facilities (Bureau of Consular Affairs 2016).

Region	City	NIVs issued
Africa	Lagos	88,994
East Asia	Beijing	655,788
	Chengdu	112,524
	Guangzhou	929,362
	Shanghai	648,611
	Shenyang	100,632
	Manila	162,871
Europe	London	137,144
	Moscow	114,982
Near East	Tel Aviv	143,416
South-Central Asia	Chennai	252,521
	Hyderabad	153,559
	Mumbai	253,515
	New Delhi	160,291
Western Hemisphere	Buenos Aires	249,293
	Brasilia	111,136
	Rio de Janeiro	237,530
	Sao Paolo	493,936
	Bogota	357,435
	Kingston	101,831
	Ciudad Juarez	173,176
	Guadalajara	193,168
	Mexico City	332,482
	Monterrey	334,513
	Tijuana	128,012
	Lima	109,330
	Caracas	239,772

TABLE 6. The State Department's "Broad Functional Areas of Responsibility," 1961. Table mimics, as close as possible, the formatting of the original document (Hays 1961).

Economic	**Political**
a. Promotion of U.S. economic foreign policies. b. Participation in negotiations for furtherance of U.S. economic objectives. c. Observing, analyzing, and reporting on economic and commercial matters. d. Promotional activities on behalf of U.S. trade. e. Planning, advising on, and revising economic activities and policies.	a. Political representation of U.S. policy. b. Participation in negotiations for furtherance of U.S. political objectives. c. Observing, analyzing, and reporting on political development of internal and international significance. d. Planning, advising on, and reviewing political activities and policies.
Consular	**Administrative**
a. Visa services. b. Citizenship and passport services. c. Protection and welfare services for American citizens, property, and interest. d. Notarials, public documents, and quasi-legal services. e. Services for ships, seamen, and airmen. f. Special services for other Federal and State agencies. g. Planning advising on, and reviewing consular activities.	a. Administrative management of the post. b. Budget preparation and allocation of funds. c. Centralized fiscal operations, personnel, security, and general administrative services. d. Negotiation with foreign government officials on problems of imports and exports and personnel accreditation. e. Arrangements for visits of Congressional groups and U.S. Government officials and other important visitors.

CHAPTER V

REGIONAL BUREAUS AND THE PRIVILEGING OF THE STATE IN THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT

Introduction

Taken together, the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the State Department's second Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), also published in 2015, describe a world confronting growing security concerns.[16] President Obama's cover letter to the NSS cites, "violent extremism and an evolving terrorist threat[,]… escalating challenges to cybersecurity…, the accelerating impacts of climate change, and the outbreak of infectious diseases" among the greatest threats facing U.S. national security (NSS 2015). Amid a list of goals the administration hopes to tackle, the President highlights the global campaign to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the economic opportunities of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the importance of foreign direct investment to Africa. Similarly, State's QDDR outlines four grand strategic priorities: 'countering violent extremism,' 'open democratic societies,' 'inclusive economic growth,' and 'climate change' (QDDR 2015). Even a hurried reading of these two broad foreign policy manifestos signals the extent to which regional and global patterns have eclipsed traditional state-centric developments as the dominant forces shaping the contemporary global arena. By way of example, President's Obama's remarks at the beginning of the NSS mention only seven states—Iraq, Afghanistan, Russia, China, Syria, Cuba, and Iran—emphasizing instead regional patterns and trends,

[16] The QDDR process was initiated during Hillary Clinton's tenure as Secretary of State and modeled after the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review.

whereas President Clinton's cover letter for his administration's final NSS in 2000 mentions 15 distinct countries in conflict.[17]

As the NSS and QDDR demonstrate, many of the threats facing U.S. national security are not neatly reducible to the map of states. People, communities, and networks are increasingly knit together in ways that are difficult to explain through the prism of the modern state system. Yet, given the amount of attention U.S. policymakers give to pan-regional and global issues—agenda items like climate change, violent extremism, and migration—large-scale (read: meta-, macro-, meso-scale) policymaking and programming efforts have long been stymied by the bureaucratic system itself. In this paper, I call attention to the entrenched territorial norms within the U.S. Department of State, where broad, sweeping issues are more often than not framed through the lens of the modern state system. This is epitomized in the internal organizational structure of the Department, where geographic regions and functional operations are delineated by "bureau." The Department's longstanding bureau organizational model includes six "regional bureaus," made up of collections of countries—African Affairs, Western Hemisphere Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, South and Central Asian Affairs, and East Asian and Pacific Affairs—and forty "functional bureaus," which serve functional-thematic roles (see Figures 12 and 13 for the Department's organizational model and regional bureau map respectively). Regional and functional bureaus work in tandem to design policy and manage the United States' relationships abroad, but I suggest regional bureaus are far more powerful within the Department than their functional counterparts. The longtime privileging of regional

[17] Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Russia, China, Taiwan, Greece, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Northern Ireland (UK), Peru, Ecuador, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.

bureaus over functional bureaus, and indeed the use of regional-geographic containers in the first place, confines policymakers' treatment of complex geographic phenomena across space and scale, leading officials to approach macro-scale phenomena at the scale of state and, in the process, hampering their ability to craft innovative, and perhaps more effective, solutions.

This article concerns itself with the bureau system and, in particular, how the geographic extent of regional bureaus has come to be defined over time, by whom, and to what effect. In an effort to make sense of how this contemporary bureau system impacts the geopolitical imagination of policymakers and the United States' situation in the world more broadly, this paper draws on political geography's treatment of organizations as geopolitical actors. In particular, I heed Müller's call to, "[open] the black box of the organization" and "[lay] bare the manifold socio-material processes or ordering by which organizations are assembled and become more or less coherent entities" (2012: 379). This commitment to a critical geopolitical and organizational perspective allows me to approach the oft-debated concept of the region quite differently. Instead of "debating the analytical contribution of regionalism as a theoretical lens," I follow Ciută's (2008) suggestion for further study into, "the political use of regional framing" (2008: 122) as well as Murphy's (2013) call for geographers to engage more decisively on the widespread "grand regional narratives" that shape our world and way of knowing.

The first section of the paper explores geography's treatment of bureaucratic institutions and macro-regional formations. I next dive into a case study of the U.S. Department of State's bureau system to problematize the historic privileging of the regional bureau against the backdrop of contemporary efforts at building broad, issue-driven platforms. I highlight how the bureau system emerged, the impact of the system on how Department operatives make sense of the world, as well as the *implications* of the Department's ordering, reducing, and bounding the political world into meta-regional constructs. The concluding section argues for an overhaul in the Department's organizational structure. I seek to rectify the imbalance between regional and functional bureaus by empowering functional bureaus to take a larger policy role. The overarching goal of the paper is to contribute to the ongoing debate on how best to leverage U.S. diplomats and soft power resources in an ever-changing global environment.

The Power and Pull of the Bureaucracy

> A modern society is a bureaucratized society, and so the study of our time is bound up with the analysis of bureaucratic processes and institutions (Kuus 2015: 432).

> The inside lives of organizations exhibit a significant degree of messiness and are characterized by constant attempts to create temporary order out of chaos (Müller 2012: 382).

In her recent *Progress in Human Geography* piece, Merje Kuus (2015) calls attention to significant gaps in our understanding of bureaucratic processes, which she refers to as "studying the obvious" (ibid, see above quotation). She contends that while human geographers have been working on studies of bureaucracies and policy formation for some time, relatively few scholars have focused their empirical lens on bureaucratic institutions themselves. As such, we know much about the effects of bureaucratic processes on social life but very little about the formation of bureaucracies and the production of knowledge claims within them (ibid). Müller (2012) echoes this claim, noting that much contemporary scholarship neglects to consider bureaucracies' underlying processes and materialities, "a plethora of humans and things [that] need to be coordinated and brought together to make an organization capable of acting" (p. 379).

Far from being static and immobile, institutions are "precarious entities" that require constant attention and stabilization from a variety of sources. Their agency derives not from the state but from a complex, ever-changing assemblage of human and non-human elements that work together towards particular organizational objectives (ibid). These socio-material processes give life to, shape, and empower the institution. By equal measure, however, they handicap it. An organization is only as powerful as its constitutive elements that provide a framework to guide decision-making. As such, reform is difficult, particularly in unwieldy government bureaucracies where innovation is hindered by the "stickiness" of institutional values and ideas (Cox 2004). Per Hall and Taylor (1996: 940), "Institutions are resistant to redesign ultimately because they structure the very choices about reform that the individual is likely to make." In the context of the U.S. Department of State, the so-called "path dependent" nature of the longstanding bureau system makes it so that employees are often unable to think beyond the distinct regional spheres that constitute the Department's organizational model. As the empirical section of this paper details, these indelible regional constructs have become powerful forces in their own right, often dictating how the Department of State scripts the world and designs policy to address the fundamental challenges of our time.

Meta-Regional Constructs in a Territorial World

Geographers have long debated the usefulness of the 'region' to make sense of the world around them. While the concept has seen both widespread use and abandonment over the past century, it remains one of the "central objects of study" in our discipline (Allen et al. 1998, Derrick 2014). Initially employed by a cadre of scholars interested in delimiting spaces on Earth's surface according to observable phenomena, the region was used as a mechanism for organizing and bounding homogeneity. Rigorous academic debate in the last several decades notably has seen the rigidity of the regional concept unfurl as scholars embrace the idea of relational regionalism and critique popular regional narratives (Lewis & Wigen 1997, Pike 2007, Murphy 2013). Yet the concept of the region still resonates with much of society, and especially as a tool to order and describe the world around us. Indeed, the use of meso-regions abounds in the mainstream media, the political arena (particularly in this 2016 election with plans to defeat ISIS in the Middle East); popular culture; education; and governmental, corporate, and not-for-profit organizations. Many multinational corporations—for example, Intel—use "theaters of operations" to describe global activities, the U.S. military has distinct geographic "Combatant Commands" (which, it turns out, do not overlay neatly against the State Department's geographic bureaus), and regional studies departments are prominent in universities across the United States and beyond.

To the critical eye, such constructed regional framings perpetuate the trap of territoriality that pervades everyday life (Agnew 1994). While they differ to some degree in size and shape, the popular meso-regional constructs I identify above all make use of bounded, territorial space and are often treated as "given (statistical, administrative) unit[s],"—to use Paasi's (2010: 2297, see also 2002) turn of phrase. Such units frame geographic phenomena and "harmonize spatial thinking" (ibid) by, for example, reinforcing the idea that the 'Southern Cone' includes all of Argentina and Chile—also

Uruguay and sometimes Paraguay—but not Brazil, even though nearly a third of the country is situated at the same latitude as Chile's northern extent. At the same time, they rely on underlying social constructions that affix regional administrative units onto the earth's surface (see, e.g. Lewis and Wigen on continents). In limiting the scope of spatial thinking to particular groupings of states, bounded into immovable regional units, we limit how we think about the processes and phenomena that transect space.

That is not to say that commonly understood regions, as in regional groupings of states, aren't useful or have no place in public debate. In fact, metageographical formations and meso-regions can be important tools, as in the Department's bureau system. However, they also potentially frame and structure how we look at, analyze, and ultimately understand global processes (Said 1987, Murphy 2013). Against that backdrop, this paper analyzes and critiques the U.S. Department of State's bureau system and what I see as the systematic privileging of geographic-regional bureaus over thematic-functional bureaus among the organizational hierarchy. I argue that such privileging too often frames global processes within regional containers at the scale of the state and at the expense of a more nuanced understanding of a particular issue. I ask: (a) why and how did the Department's contemporary regional-geographic areas come to be defined, (b) how has regional bureau expertise eclipsed that of the seemingly lower-order functional bureaus, and (c) what are the potentially consequences of privileging regional bureaus. The next section addresses the first concern. It draws almost exclusively on a Departmental history curated by Department of State's Office of the Historian to outline the emergence of the bureau system and reform efforts over time. While there is a comprehensive secondary literature on the State Department's history (see, e.g., Kissinger 1994, Loeffler 1998, Plischke 1999), much of this literature focuses on Department personalities, events, and policies with far less attention paid to Departmental organization and hierarchy.

Constructing the Department's Meso-Regional World

With newly vested powers under the amended Constitution of 1789, the United States Congress established the Department of State at the request of James Madison.[18] Thomas Jefferson, serving as the first Secretary of State under the Constitution, managed the newly established Department and a $56,600 budget with a five-person team consisting of a chief clerk in charge of diplomatic correspondence, three other clerks, a translator, and a messenger. While the Department maintained only five diplomatic missions at the time—in England, France, Holland, Spain, and Portugal—that number was to grow considerably in the coming years as was the domestic staff and budget to manage foreign affairs. An overworked Secretary of State John Quincy Adams ordered the first reorganization of the Department in 1818. As he wrote to his wife, "Unless everything is disposed of just as it occurs, it escapes from the memory and runs into the account of arrears" (Office of the Historian ND) By Executive Order, Secretary Adams soon oversaw a bureaucratic system with a Chief Clerk who operated directly under him and as many as ten clerks with discrete duties and subject areas who reported upward to the Chief Clerk (ibid).

Despite concerted efforts to manage the growth of what was quickly becoming a far-flung and robust bureaucracy, a new problem emerged in the form of a cadre of lazy,

[18] The Department was initially to house both "foreign" and "home" affairs, hence the 'Department of State' vice 'Department of Foreign Affairs' as Madison had proposed (Ibid.).

unprofessional, disdainful, and amateurish diplomats (Office of the Historian ND). (In one amusing, though likely apocryphal, tale, John Randolph of Virginia addressed the Russian Tsar in 1830, "Howya, Emperor? And how's the madam?") Overworked and exasperated by the "emphatically useless"[19] diplomatic corps, President Jackson's two secretaries of state introduced the "bureau system" in a departmental reorganization. From 1833 to 1836, Secretaries Louis McLane and John Forsyth oversaw a restructuring of Department personnel into the following six bureaus, organized by functional duties: (1) diplomatic matters; (2) consular matters; (3) domestic and administrative matters, archives, laws, and commissions; (4) domestic correspondence, Presidential parsons, remissions, and copyrights; (5) disbursing and superintending; and (6) translating and other miscellaneous tasks (in support of the diplomatic and consular bureaus). Of the six bureaus, the diplomatic and consular bureaus were by far the most important according to the Office of the Historian. Both were structured similarly, with three clerks managing overseas correspondence. One clerk oversaw England, France, Russia, and the Netherlands while the other was responsible for the rest of the world: the Mediterranean, Asia, Africa, the Americas, and the rest of Europe. With the support of this new bureaucratic structure, the number of overseas missions increased to 33 in 1860, with the majority of them located in Europe and Latin America (Office of the Historian ND).

The Department was not shuffled again until the 1870s, when Secretary of State Hamilton Fish led a reorganization of the bureau system to cope with a rapidly changing world. Fish created two diplomatic bureaus and two consular bureaus, each with geographic areas of concern delineated by state boundaries. The First Diplomatic Bureau

[19] Representative Benjamin W. Stanton of Ohio's 1859 opinion of the diplomatic corps (Office of the Historian ND)

and First Consular Bureau were concerned with the major European States, as well as Japan and China, while the second pair of bureaus had geographic responsibilities for the rest of the world including Latin America, the Mediterranean, Russia, Hawaii, and Liberia. In addition, several functional bureaus were created or renamed: the Law Bureau, Bureaus of Accounts, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, the Statistical Bureau, Bureau of Pardons and Commissions, the Passport Bureau, and the Domestic Records Bureau. By 1909, following sizeable increases in personnel and expenditures, further restructuring was necessary.[20] Reforms included increasing leadership positions and re-organizing the bureaus into distinct geographic regions: Western Europe, the Near East, the Far East, Latin America. Additional bureaus were established for trade relations and information management. As necessity warranted over time, and particularly in the post-World War I period, this 1909 bureau system would be amended to support the burgeoning organization. In 1938, for example, reforms led to the emergence of new entities for international communications and cultural relations (Office of the Historian ND).

In 1944, Secretary Edward Stettinius led what would be the final robust reorganization of the Department. Stettinius looked to empower the war-weary Department and augment its relevancy alongside the increasingly powerful Department of Defense. His efforts broadened the institutional hierarchy and paved the way for the contemporary bureau system (Office of the Historian ND). Archival research in the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration's State Department Central Files revealed that regional divisions at this time tended to mirror colonial arrangements; the Europe

[20]Between the period of 1898 and 1910, the Department's employee roster grew from 82 to 234. The annual budget for expenditures both domestically and abroad increased from $3.4 million in 1900 to $4.9 million in 1910 (Office of the Historian ND).

bureau included the entire British dominion for instance and Central Asia's Soviet Socialist Republics were long grouped under the Europe (and Eurasia) bureau alongside the USSR (Division of European Affairs 1942, U.S. Embassy Paris 1952, Chadbourne 1961). Headquarters infrastructure in Washington, too, came to reflect Stettinius' expanded hierarchical structure. A new Department facility was completed in early 1961, the building the Department continues to occupy today in the Foggy Bottom neighborhood of northwest Washington. The seven-floor structure was four times as large as the previous War building and was designed theoretically as a pyramid: "the higher the job, the higher the office" with Assistant Secretaries occupying their bureaus' "front offices" on the sixth floor and the Secretary of State's suite above on the seventh. While the contemporary arrangement of offices in the building doesn't follow the pyramid to a tee, we see most bureaus still have their Assistant Secretaries on the sixth floor (see Table 7, note the privileged location of regional bureau front offices, Office of the Historian ND).

The final bureau, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, emerged in late 1992 following a six-year-long push. (Table 8 provides a summary of this concise history, noting the ways in which the regional formations were framed over time.) Prior to that, the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs existed as a much larger regional entity. It was not until 2006 that the bureau absorbed the Office of Central Asian Affairs from the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, which led to it being the smallest of all the geographic-regional bureaus with a portfolio of just thirteen states (Office of the Historian ND, see Figure 14).

Deconstructing the Meso-Regional World

> The advent of the American Century made management of global geography an increasingly vital endeavor, and over the decades the U.S. government built an elaborate if inchoate bureaucracy for the task… Yet the very success of this American globalism, built in no small part upon powerful geographical intelligence, has spawned a quite contradictory public reality, namely the eclipse of geography as a discourse of global power… Geography here survives as nostalgia (Smith 2003: 3).

The contemporary bureau system, with its emphasis on regional differentiation, highlights a particularly interesting paradox. On the one hand, the ordering of the world into discrete units is essential to organizational efficiency, especially as a means to administer an institution as robust and far-reaching as the Department of State. On the other hand, that very organizational scheme, rooted and sustained over decades, often limits policymakers' ability to see beyond its entrenched meta-geographical divisions. Neil Smith, in the passage quoted above, goes farther; he argues that the very collection and organization of geographical knowledge over time has led to a discourse of spaceless-ness and unevenness, which obscures fundamental realities about the world. Calling attention to this paradox and "the eclipse of geography as a discourse of global power," as Smith contends, points to the need to consider the forces that reify the Department's bureau system and problematize the regional boundaries that it delimits.

This section works to deconstruct the bureau system by calling attention to mundane practices that reinforce the bureau structure and, in particular, the divide between regional and functional bureaus. A series of vignettes are explored to examine the role of individuals in maintaining the status quo while others follow the flow of knowledge-claims throughout the Department (Kuus 2011). Despite the usefulness of regional formations in organizing the everyday work of the U.S. diplomatic corps, it is worth considering how such formations impact, and potentially constrain, banal processes. If today's highly connected and stratified world is best explained through relationships and flows, mobility and fluidity, unevenness and inequality (Jones 2009), how can American policymakers possibly make sense of the most pressing issues under the existing bureau system with its regional containers?

Before I begin, a brief word about methods is needed. The following draws primarily on informal ethnographic data gleaned from several years of experience (on and off since late 2007) working in the Department as a civil servant in two offices: the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs' Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs (i.e. the Cuba desk) and the Executive Secretariat's Operations Center. My positionality as an insider-outsider has contributed significantly to this research, particularly with respect to the nuances of Department culture and shifting attitudes of Department operatives. From my work on the Cuba desk I was privy to the internal organization of a regional bureau, while the Operations Center, a more top-down-focused office, exposed me to flows of information at the highest levels of the Department. Most of the findings below then relate to informal observations over the last several years and reflect on the daily, lived experiences of those working within the Department to support U.S. foreign policy.

Privileging the regional bureau

As the story goes, Colin Powell, during his tenure as Secretary of State under President George W. Bush, would routinely call down to desk officers to ask for details, context, and analysis of pressing issues, jumping the immense hierarchy between the

Secretary's suite and the desk officer's cube. Should Powell have reached out to the Liberia desk officer for nuance into that country's violent political crisis of 2003, by way of example, he would have circumvented four rungs of the institutional ladder: the Director of the Office of West African Affairs (AF/W), the desk officer's immediate supervisor; the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, whose portfolio includes AF/W; the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs; and finally the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the high-ranking umbrella office under which all the regional bureaus are gathered. Apart from the surprising and unconventional act of a Secretary calling a desk officer (to my knowledge Secretaries Rice, Clinton, and Kerry have not acted similarly), note *who* Powell was calling: not the officer in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor with the west Africa portfolio nor her colleagues in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs or the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

The country desk officer is, albeit informally, in a privileged position within the Department of State.[21] It is therefore useful to analyze the work, portfolio, and responsibilities of desk officers to understand the ways they contribute to and reinforce the Department's organizational structure and its meta-regional divisions. While desk officer jobs are held by both Foreign and Civil Service Officers, the Foreign Service makes up the majority of the desk officers in regional bureaus, whereas most of the positions in functional bureaus are held by the Civil Service.[22] And while desk officers may work odd hours given the time change between Washington and their area of

[21] I use country desk officer here to refer to an individual responsible solely for one state, as is most often the case. However, regional bureaus maintain entire offices (on average 10-20 individuals) for a smattering of more high-profile and/or geopolitically significant states. Examples of these include China, Russia, Cuba, Mexico, Canada, and Korea (for both the ROK and DPRK). In addition, many country desks have more than one officer to manage the portfolio with a Senior Desk Officer and a Junior Desk Officer.
[22] The divisive relationship between the Foreign and Civil services complicates and potentially enhances the divide between regional and functional bureaus. Nevertheless, I elected to leave a lengthier discussion of that relationship aside in order to streamline the argument.

responsibility, they also regularly work exceedingly long hours during crises or in the lead up to large policy announcements or high-profile visits (either from the host country to the United States or vice versa). This workload is largely a product of their job descriptions; country desk officers function predominantly as synthesizers. Their principal responsibility is managing the relationship between their designated country and Washington. This implies a near constant stream of communication between the desk and the U.S. mission abroad—an embassy and perhaps consulates as well—as well as between the desk and the state's respective diplomatic mission to the United States. The desk officer further serves as the point of contact for reporting and analysis from the interagency process (NSC, intelligence community, etc.), as well as the myriad functional bureaus within the Department. The desk officer drafts interdepartmental memos, press releases, and responses to public and Congressional inquiries, and must "clear" material drafted by other bureaus that reference the state.

The 'Emergency Message' provides a useful window into a desk officer's life. The Bureau of Consular Affairs uses the message to alert U.S. citizens traveling or living abroad to exercise caution while traveling around in particular places. They are most often released in advance of elections, mass demonstrations, and inclement weather as e-mail to a listserv of registered Americans as well as part of a wider press announcement. In constructing the message, the Bureau of Consular Affairs (or the Operations Center's Crisis Management Services after-hours) works with the desk and Post abroad to draft, clear, and release the message. No other bureaus are consulted and a unique message is typically distributed for each individual state (although worldwide emergency messages are not uncommon for warnings of large-scale terrorist activity).

Country desk officers then serve predominantly as collectors and connectors. They maintain relationships and networks within the Department, interagency, and diplomatic community that tend to outweigh those of functional officers, whose relationships are more often confined to their specific bureau and the regional bureau corresponding to their portfolio. In my experience, the privileging of regional bureau expertise holds even at the Assistant Secretary level, the highest position in a bureau. While the Secretary of State, or a proxy, hosts near daily staff meetings with most bureaus in attendance, outside of these meetings the Secretary maintains relationships and communicates far more readily with regional rather than functional Assistant Secretaries. This practice arguably stems from the Secretary's concern with high-profile activities that potentially make or break their legacy (e.g., "peace in the Middle East" or the recent breakthroughs with Iran and Cuba). These sorts of global political issues occupy the time and attention of the Secretary as well as that of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs who oversees the regional bureaus. If you were familiar with any Department official besides the Secretary, it would be the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who often leads U.S. delegations or accompanies the Secretary at high-profile bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

The Secretary is in routine communication with the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and a smattering of other Under Secretaries and regional Assistant Secretaries (though personalities and existing relationships are certainly a factor). That the Secretary maintains routine communication with regional Assistant Secretaries more than functional Assistant Secretaries is likely due to the fact that regional Assistant Secretaries occupy a more visible and powerful position in the global arena. While all Assistant

Secretaries travel extensively, more often than not it is regional Assistant Secretaries who work alongside the Secretary on his or her trips, rather than their functional counterparts. Consider the following press release from Secretary Kerry's recent trip to Europe for a series of ministerial meetings:

> "Secretary Kerry is on travel to Munich, Germany. He is accompanied by Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Anne Patterson, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs John Kirby, U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Michael Ratney, Special Envoy for Libya and Senior Advisor for MEK Resettlement Jonathan Winer, Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf Region, National Security Council Robert Malley, National Security Council Advisor Ahmed Salman, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Admiral Frank Pandolfe, and Chief of Staff Jon Finer."

It is, of course, no surprise that the Secretary of State travels with an extensive team of advisers, subject-matter experts, and aides. (The Secretary always travels with the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs as well as NSC and JCS personnel.) Apart from Under Secretary Gottemoeller, who accompanied the Secretary to discuss weapons conventions issues in Syria, the other high-level travelers were regional Assistant Secretaries or Special Envoys and Representatives (more on this later).

Another way to highlight the privileging of regional bureaus is to consider how information flows upward in the Department. Information finds its way into the Department from myriad sources, most notably embassy and consulate posts abroad (cables, e-mails, teleconferences), the interagency process (reports, intelligence briefs, memos), and media sources (news coverage, public commentary). I call attention here to two processes of organizing, distilling, and moving information up in the hierarchical chain to decision makers. The first is the Assistant Secretary's Daily Activity Report

(ASDAR) and the second is the Secretary's Overnight and Afternoon Briefs. By examining the flow of knowledge claims throughout the Department, it is possible to trace the way regional bureau containers dictate who has access to information and who does not, as well as what types of information are funneled up for the attention of key decision makers.

Most bureaus have some ASDAR process, though perhaps under a different name, whereby the Assistant Secretary is delivered a concise report in bite-sized (typically ordered by state) chunks. The process calls for front office bureau staffers to collect a series of short blurbs by the end of the day from all bureau offices to include in a one- or two-page brief for the attention of the A/S. Some nuggets of this information are then shared with the wider senior staff during the following morning meeting chaired by the Secretary. ASDAR submissions are typically to-the-point and hit on some new development. Against that backdrop, temporally and spatially broad trends often are ignored in favor of tangible and discrete developments (e.g. the sacking of a minister or an NGO report announcing updated refugee numbers). Further, what actually makes the ASDAR cut at the end of the day is at the discretion of both the office director, who may choose not to submit particular items sent forward by their desk officers, and the front officer staffers and perhaps Deputy Assistant Secretaries who see all the material.

The Briefs, on the other hand, are the result of a hectic, eight-hour process whereby Watchstanders in the Operations Center, the so-called 'nerve center' of the Department, reach out to embassies, consulates, and desks (depending on the time of day) for nuance and insight into the newest political and economic developments around the world, the same threshold of noteworthy items as in the ASDAR. The Briefs, again a strict one- or two-"pager," are released at 5:30 in the morning and 3:00 in the afternoon wherever the Secretary is in the world (i.e. 'S time') via extensive e-mail listserv to the Department and interagency with printed copies for the Secretary and other senior personnel. The material is again presented in brief, bite-sized chunks and organized by country and region. In fact, as a rule, the title of each individual brief piece must include a state and/or international organization.

From even my own limited experience I can see how critical information and information gathering are to the day-to-day activities of the Department and, more broadly, to the conduct of United States diplomacy. In an effort to manage the onslaught of information flowing through the Department at all hours of the day, a complex process exists, as in every institution, whereby material is hacked and sawed and repackaged into palatable synopses that then move up the chain to key policymakers. If Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretaries receive abbreviated notes on the latest happenings around the world, what ends up on the Secretary's desk is distilled further still. As a word of caution, I am not implying that long-term strategic thinking and analysis does not make its way to the desk of the Secretary and other upper-level officials—quite the contrary—but it is fair to say that the majority of information that flows upward is condensed and filtered through a system that places the state and region above other classifiers. And while it is important to recognize that condensing data is part and parcel to the Information Age, funneling data *in this way*—predominantly through state-centric regional bureaus—often leads to a disconnect between thematic relationships and processes that transcend meso-regional boundaries. These processes therefore sustain and empower the dominant statist and regional narratives that underlie the Department's bureaucratic structure. This all-too-brief focus on human resources and information flow details the extent to which the bureau system, far from opening new spaces through which Department operatives communicate and share knowledge, actually limits the exchange of resources both horizontally and vertically within the organization.

The 'square peg-round hole' problem

There are significant limitations to affixing a regional pattern onto the diverse, complex global map, however useful that structure might be as an organizing scheme. This section highlights the implications of relying on the contemporary bureau model—with its emphasis on macro-scale regional constructs—for complex problem solving at multiple scales. I refer to this as the 'square peg-round hole' problem, whereby the Department cordons off Earth's surface into tidy (square peg) containers that often do not neatly address the cross-cutting, global issues (round hole) that occupy policymakers' time and attention. In an effort to probe deeper, I ask what ideas and assumptions are both hidden and revealed through the prism of this containerized geopolitical imaginary. I use the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) as a narrower case study to explore the implications of the bureau system and regional bureaus on Department cohesion. Recall that the SCA bureau emerged in the early 1990s, pulling states from the bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) and European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR). Today, SCA is the smallest regional bureau with just thirteen states, but it arguably manages the United States' most geopolitically significant relationships (again, see Figures 13 and 15). This brief case study points to SCA's marginalization under the Department's bureau system, despite the fact that the territory framed by SCA is among the most geostrategic spaces on earth's surface (i.e. Mackinder's Heartland-Pivot thesis) and one that has been jockeyed over by Great Powers for centuries.

Perhaps most significantly, an emphasis on meso-regional constructs potentially limits officers' ranges of understanding of holistic, global processes. It is easier under the bureau system and its regional configurations to lose sight of historical political patterns and geographic complexity. One way of looking at this problem is to examine colonial relationships against the backdrop of this regional framework. A first glance at the bureau map (Figure 13), with its stark contrasts between regions, each denoted by a distinct color, might generate false assumptions. For example, one could assume that Latin America and Africa each developed under unique, independent political-geographic conditions. Indeed, the bureau system (the map of which illustrates this problem well) too often obscures important political, historical, cultural and economic pathways between contemporary states in these regions and their colonial occupiers. The former Soviet Socialist Republics in Central Asia present perhaps the best example here, where the longstanding, historic ties between the 'Stans' and Russia has been diminished as a result of the partitioning of the five states within SCA's umbrella, as opposed to EUR. Despite the fact that significant economic resources—labor, migrants, oil and gas resources to name but a few—continue to flow between Central Asia and Russia (or Central Asia and China for that matter) or that Russian is still widely spoken and taught in several Central Asian states, the inclusion of the 'Stans' in SCA tends to hide those important connections. Other significant processes may be ignored or underscored in analyses of global patterns through the prism of the Department's regional divisions, including the vitally important economic pathways—for goods and unskilled labor—connecting the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia and to the Gulf states.

The regional divisions also end up privileging flows, patterns, networks, and relationships *within* regional constructs, as opposed to those *between* different world-regions and *across* regional divides. In the context of SCA, this type of insular thinking has led bureau officials towards a preoccupation with higher profile India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan at the expense of the on-goings in the ten other SCA states. From January to March 2016, for example, the bureau published 16 press releases, almost all related to upcoming trips to the region of high-level U.S. government officials. Eleven of the 16 releases are concerned with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Three others relate to ISIL, extremist terrorism, and religious freedom across the region more generally. Of the last two, one involves a phone call to the Nepali prime minister and one is on U.S.-Uzbekistan annual bilateral consultations.

These regional-geographic divides are further entrenched in Department culture. It is common, for instance, to hear employees speak of themselves as an "NEA-hand," that is, an individual who works in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs or serves primarily in posts in the Middle East. While the Department in recent decades has encouraged personnel to specialize in multiple regions, most officers still maintain a degree of loyalty to a region. And even while FSOs are encouraged to develop a "major" and a "minor" with respect to their regional expertise, most civil servants are employed in regional bureaus for longer periods of time—thus contributing to bureaus' institutional memory and potentially enhancing regional divisions. Many employees refer to their bureau as a family unit, the "EUR family" for instance. Bureau affiliations are enhanced through holiday celebrations and awards ceremonies (NEA and WHA are known to have the best parties). As such, a profound cultural barrier exists in the Department between different geographic bureaus (and functional bureaus as well), though some officers are better than others at navigating those divides.

Returning to SCA again, which as a relatively new bureau does not maintain a longstanding "family" culture, the bureau is often disadvantaged by policymakers' preoccupation with the well-established, flashier, and more inwardly focused regional neighbors. To the north SCA is bordered by EUR, a bureau preoccupied with a Europe that is still reeling from Cold War divisions. To the west, NEA is fixated predominantly on combatting instability in the Arab world. EAP, on the other side of SCA, is much more pivoted towards the east, with large offices for Chinese, Japanese, and Korean affairs. And EUR, NEA, and EAP were included in the earliest incarnations of the Department's bureau system. It is no surprise then that SCA often gets lost in the shuffle amid these larger regions with powerful states and important bilateral relationships between them.

SCA's regional cohesion has been further destabilized through the designation of powerful Special Envoys, appointed by the Secretary of State, and Special Representatives, appointed by the President, notably the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP). Special Envoys and Representatives are intended to be stopgaps on the one hand, further enhancing U.S. understanding and coverage of a particular issue by bringing stakeholders to the table, and symbols on the other, showing a commitment on the part of the United States to a particular region and/or state. At the end of the day, however, these designations further compartmentalize an already entangled bureaucracy. Far from being synthesizers, Special Envoys and Representatives often widen the divide between offices and personnel with a country portfolio and those working on thematic matters. And SRAP is arguably the most important Special Envoy or Special Representative in the Department, closely followed by the Special Envoy to the Middle East Peace Process. In my experience, the physical disconnect, uneven power dynamics, and, at that time, personality clashes between SCA's Pakistan desk and SRAP lowered morale and further entangled an already convoluted bureaucratic system.

'Right-Sizing' the Bureau System

It is clear the world has changed dramatically from the one into which the bureau system was introduced in the nineteenth century. Global political developments are now regularly manifested at the local scale and a vast telecommunications infrastructure has enabled peoples around the world to engage with one another in real time. Moreover, broad global issues like climate change and extremist terror have brought peoples more closely together than every before. Against this backdrop, it is worth considering whether the State Department must reform to remain relevant. The QDDR, in fact, was an attempt to do just that. However, few changes were made to the bureau structure or its regional/functional divide. Further, there are signs other U.S. government agencies are thinking more critically about reforming their geographic organizational schema. Harman (2015) noted CIA Director John Brennan's "ambitious" plans for "a wholesale reorganization of the agency, one that would combine operational and analytical divisions into 'hybrid units' dedicated to specific regions and threats" (p. 99).

A Department of State without dominant regional bureaus is difficult to imagine. In my opinion, however, eventual right-sizing efforts ought to dismantle the longstanding power arrangements that pit functional bureaus as lower order offices in the general Department hierarchy. I envision a bureau system with prominent *functional* bureaus charged with designing policy to address broad-scale topical issues, and lower-order regional bureaus to handle policy roll out, continued implementation, and the day-to-day administrative functions necessary to manage bilateral and multilateral relationships. A system that prioritizes topical/thematic issues could potentially alter how the Department acknowledges and gives attention to global problems. It would further do work to dismantle the territorial tropes reinforced by the existing bureau system. Hypothetically, a more powerful functional bureau contingent might encourage the Department to speak out more harshly against human rights violations, the plight of refugees, or environmental conditions in different parts of the world, where now diplomatic spats and geopolitical sensitivities often get in the way and temper U.S. rebukes of world leaders and their policies.

Conclusion

It is natural and inevitable for humans to want to order the world around them. One manifestation of this tendency towards geographical organization, and a powerful one, is the U.S. Department of State's bureau system, which divides the world into discrete, meso-scale regional containers. I use this paper to critique this system, and, in particular, the privileging of regional bureaus at the expense of more topically-oriented functional bureaus. Two key findings have emerged from this study. First, the contemporary bureau system and its emphasis on meso-regional constructions is reinforced and sustained through mundane, institutionalized practices. I highlight processes of communication and information management to this end. Second, the 'cordoning off' of meso-regions potentially favors insular, statist thinking within regional bureaus at the expense of broad-based functional expertise of networks and flows across space and scale. I believe the hasty examination of the SCA bureau does well to show how entrenched this partitioning could become. That is not to say regional bureaus have no place in the twenty-first-century U.S. Department of State. Rather, this paper seeks to begin a conversation on the extent to which regional bureaus should be privileged over their functional counterparts. I believe any future overhaul of the Department's bureau system should limit the extent to which regional bureaus serve as decision makers and bring more analysis and information from functional bureau offices towards decision-making and policy-planning efforts. A re-emphasis on functional bureaus might be perceived abroad as a broader commitment to democracy, human rights, and multilateral cooperation in line with the priorities laid out in the 2016 NSS and QDDR.

Lastly, it is imperative to consider why the Department's organizational structure has not been subject to much study in the past. This is likely due to the fact that we rarely find cause to question the macro-regional narratives that drive understanding of broad, global processes, narratives that exist far beyond the confines of the State Department (see, e.g. Murphy 2013). From the Department of Defense's entrenched Combatant Command divisions to corporations' Theaters of Operation, vast meso-scale regions operate all around us in a complex, overlapping web. From studies of continents in primary school to area studies majors at universities, the world is divided up into macro-regional units all around us. Yet we spend so little time actually considering how, why, and by whom these regional systems emerged, or what they actually *do* to our understanding of political, social, and economic processes across space and scale.

This analysis of the Department's bureau system and its state-centric regional bureaus represents one small effort to critically evaluate and consider the role of such macro-regional narratives on broader political processes. The regional bureau system might mimic how Department operatives make sense of the world, but how much does this understanding rely on the assumptions of a pre-determined regional systematic? The contemporary regional breakdown is useful, but if we stop at that we're missing some key points.

FIGURE 12: Department organization (U.S. Department of State 2014).



FIGURE 13: Official U.S. Department of State map, 2014. Map reflects regional bureau configurations, all Department diplomatic posts, and time zones. This map hangs in nearly every office within the Department and at diplomatic posts abroad (Global Publishing Solutions 2014).

United States Department of State Facilities and Areas of Jurisdiction, December 2014



TABLE 7: The location of bureau front offices in Main State (Global Information Services 2016).

7th floor	DRL, INL, H
6th floor	A, **AF**, CA, DS, **EAP**, **EUR**, HR, DGHR, IRM, INR, IO, L, **NEA**, PM, PA*, PRM, **SCA**, **WHA**
5th floor	F, AVC
4th floor	EB, ENR
3rd floor	ISN, OES
2nd floor	BP, CT, PA*
Annexes	CGFS, CSO, ECA, FSI, IIP, MED, OBO

*The Bureau of Public Affairs (PA) has an office for dual-hatted Assistant Secretary/Spokesperson John Kirby on both the 6th and 2nd floors. The second floor office reflects his role as spokesperson as members of the press corps have limited access to the building.

TABLE 8: The Department's regional bureau system and geographic responsibilities over time (Office of the Historian ND).

Era	Geographic responsibilities, by bureau
1830s	(1) England, France, Russia, and the Netherlands, (2) rest of Europe, Mediterranean, Asia, Africa, Americas
1870s	(1) Major European states, China, Japan, (2) Latin America, Mediterranean, Russia, Hawaii, Liberia
1910s	(1) Western Europe, (2) The Near East, (3) The Far East, (4) Latin America.
1960s	(1) Inter-America, (2) Europe and Eurasia, (3) The Near East, (4) The Far East, (5) Africa
2000s	(1) Europe and Eurasia, (2) The Near East and Northern Africa, (3) rest of Africa, (4) East Asia and the Pacific, (5) South-Central Asia, (6) Western Hemisphere)

FIGURE 14: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs ND).

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has sought to contribute to an understanding of why the United States continues to prioritize a widespread and nearly universal diplomatic footprint, the largest of any state, even as diplomatic processes are becoming leaner and more mobile against the backdrop of twenty-first-century technological advancements. Towards that end, the preceding chapters have focused on how a complex assortment of discourses, objects, bodies, networks, and power arrangements have together worked to mutually reinforce U.S. diplomatic norms. These norms structure the very foundation of the U.S. diplomatic establishment and account for the way practitioners and policymakers make sense of the world, understand America's role in it, and frame the organizational structure of the Department of State and its satellite installations.

Each discrete article of this dissertation has worked to pick apart some aspect of the broader U.S. diplomatic assemblage. The first article identified and examined the powerful universality principle, what I found to be the driving force behind the United States' entrenched commitment to this network of 285 embassies, consulates, and exceptional diplomatic facilities. The dogma of universality has its roots in geo-political and geo-economic conditions and the linked neocolonial ambitions that guided U.S. foreign policy maneuvers over the course of the last 250 years. As the Department of State moved away from hundreds of small consulates and towards grandiose embassy structures (in line with America's larger role in the global arena), the idea that the United States should have representatives in as many sites as possible endured.

The second article moved the narrative to the present day, exploring the continued influence of universality on the contemporary diplomatic posture. In probing what reasons policymakers give for diplomatic representation, the paper provides a window into not only why embassies and consulates exist but into what the facilities themselves actually do to support foreign policy endeavors. Conceptually, this paper suggests a treatment of the diplomatic network as an assemblage lends more nuance to an understanding of how the networked infrastructure of objects, bodies, and discourses work to reinforce the universal diplomatic footprint.

The third and final article shifts the focus of the dissertation back to Washington, DC, where I suggest the longstanding bureau system in place to organize Department of State functions limits the ability of practitioners to craft innovative policy solutions in an increasingly dynamic world. I critique the geographical assumptions that empower regional bureaus at the expense of lower order functional bureaus. Such assumptions work in tandem with the universality principle to guide Department behavior and institutional reform.

Key Findings

Three dominant findings emerged from this study. The first, hinted at above, concerns the universality principle. Even as I found that universality has dictated the 'siting' of U.S. diplomatic infrastructure for some time, the concept itself is surprisingly absent from the academic literature, archival material, and present-day records and documentation. Instead, the idea endures in the minds of policymakers and practitioners, several of whom I interviewed over the course of this research. Phantom it may be, but universality, as I said in the introduction, "is built into the very fabric of the U.S. diplomatic institution." Over the course of the last 250 years, the Department routinely augmented its diplomatic footprint around the world and was loathe to consider closing embassy and consulate properties, only doing so when prompted by austerity measures or concerns about the safety of employees.

On a deeper level, the universality principle is intrinsically linked to U.S. foreign relations history. The ideas of widespread diplomatic representation first emerged as lone consuls sought to secure U.S. access to (and later control) markets around the world. As the isolationist era gave way to an increasingly active foreign policy, the United States moved to install legations, and later embassies, in foreign capitals. In the Cold War era, ideological warfare led the United States to swiftly place new embassies in newly emerging states. Today, the deeply entrenched notion of universality is evidenced by high-level practitioners' inability to imagine a world in which the United States did not have a presence in nearly every capital and large urban population center.

The second key finding to emerge throughout the course of this study is closely connected to the first. As I have documented in the above articles, attention to diplomatic representation is critical to any study of diplomatic processes, behavior, and objectives. In the case of the United States, it is impossible to understand U.S. ambitions in the global arena without noting the value policymakers place on maintaining well-staffed embassy and consulate compounds in 169 countries. These facilities render the globe legible to decision makers and become active, force-full participants in negotiating diplomatic outcomes and mediating geopolitical disputes.

Thirdly, this dissertation calls attention to the multiplicity of diplomacies that exist at any one moment. It is my hope that this paper will contribute theoretically to erasing the boundaries between what are alternately considered formal and informal diplomatic practices, actors, and spaces. Over the course of this research, I found that while the path-dependent nature of rusty state diplomatic institutions make reform efforts difficult, new tools, technologies, and partnerships may potentially alter how diplomacy is practiced in the years to come. Innovation comes in many shapes and sizes, and I hope to see the Department of State take advantage of opportunities to create a more mobile diplomatic corps that crafts policy solutions at different scales and in different places. In fact, I seek to be part of this change and will make every effort to enhance and encourage the cross-fertilization of ideas between the Academy and diplomatic practitioners by publishing this research.

Moving Forward

As noted in the introduction, this dissertation idea emerged from my experiences working in the Department of State's Operations Center at the time of the Benghazi mission attack. What began as an inquiry into where the United States was placing diplomatic facilities in the urban landscape, subsequently evolved into a study of why the Department continues to prioritize the near-universal diplomatic network. Over the course of this transition, I realized that it wasn't enough to study three or four discrete embassy sites around the world. I would not be satisfied, for example, asking why the heavily fortified U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, was located on the outskirts of the city (incidentally next door to the Russian embassy). I first had to generate a historical understanding of the placement of embassies and consulates around the world. Only then could I capture why the United States would rather have an imposing, costly, ill-suited, and out-of-the-way facility in Dushanbe than nothing at all.

Attending to this broader institutional picture meant that many more circumscribed questions were left answered. However, my hope is that this project will pave the way for stronger and more transformative research at the intersection of political geography and diplomacy studies, notably related to diplomatic representation. In fact, a number of future research directions emerge from this study. One might want to examine the myriad themes related to how diplomatic facilities blend in to (or stick out of) the urban system. Another potential project could look comparatively at other states' diplomatic networks. As attention to diplomatic processes has broadened in recent years across a number of disciplines, including geography, there are growing opportunities to explore diplomatic themes as they relate to political geographic processes.

Universality Revisited

In this final subsection, I find it imperative to revisit the universality principle and my critique of it throughout this dissertation. All three articles comment on, in one way or another, how the United States' longstanding diplomatic posture premised on universality has enabled policymakers to pursue an increasingly expansive and interventionist foreign policy platform, which has been widely criticized at home and abroad. The value of this dissertation has been to shed light on the myriad ways the U.S. diplomatic landscape serves to promote this particular geopolitical strategy characterized by U.S. efforts to coerce and control foreign governments and economic markets, an argument I laid out in the first article. Far from being a static landscape upon which diplomatic processes play out, I have conceptualized the collection of U.S. facilities throughout this study as a force-full enterprise: a networked assemblage where nodal embassy and consulate facilities empower the enmeshed peoples, thing-objects, and ideas that are embedded within them. Through this theoretical lens, diplomatic installations serve as essential components of promoting and reinforcing the U.S.-led world order. In failing to recognize the central assumptions embedded within universality, namely that the United States ought to have as widespread and robust a network as possible, policymakers will likely equally fail to probe for new ideas related to the diplomatic posture. Innovation could dramatically alter not just how the United States places, designs, and maintains embassies and consulates but also the policies and worldviews that emanate beyond this networked architecture to alter everyday political, economic, and cultural currents across space and scale in arguably adverse ways.

As I mentioned in Chapter IV, most interviewees were unable to imagine the United States moving away from the contemporary network and "pulling back" from the front lines of global affairs. Doing so, they argued, would signal to host governments around the world that the United States no longer had faith in the country's role as a dominant international actor. States would further assume that the United States would no longer be willing to provide the type of aid and other resources that has been the norm over the past generation. And, as a result of reciprocity, a hallmark of diplomatic representation, if the United States were to close embassy and consulate installations, host government states might well pull back from their own diplomatic positions in Washington and other U.S. cities. Thus, the symbolism alone would do significant damage to bilateral relationships. Further, drawing on Chapter IV again, closing embassy and consulate positions would likely hinder the ability of the United States to have an ear on the ground in as many sites as possible, a professed goal of the contemporary U.S. diplomatic footprint.

Of course it is possible to imagine a world in which the United States maintained far fewer compounds and many more multi-accredited ambassadors (say, an ambassador accredited to all Balkan states). As I have mentioned in several places throughout this dissertation, other states and some U.S. policymakers have considered alternate conceptions of diplomatic representation, attempting to imagine a leaner and more mobile institution taking advantage of technological advances. It is possible, for instance, to conduct multilateral meetings over secure video telecommunications platforms and collect information from a wide swath of intelligence sources. Although not insurmountable, consular operations present the largest roadblock when considering an alternate diplomatic posture. In the case of the United States, a foreign national who wants a non-immigrant visa (NIV) to visit the United States (by far the bulk of U.S. consular work) must fill out forms online, make an appointment to visit their local consulate, and appear for an in-person interview with a Foreign Service Officer. Consular officers regularly conduct 60 to 80 such interviews a day. Efforts have been made to streamline the consular process; Australia's NIV program, for example, is conducted entirely online. And one colleague told me a story of current U.S. Ambassador to the UK Matthew Barzun, who, when serving as the U.S. Ambassador to Sweden, outfitted a van with a mobile consular platform to test out offering local visa services around the country. Such inroads, however, have attracted very little interest from high-level U.S. policymakers and practitioners who, as this research illuminated, value on-the-ground insight and face-to-face contact above all else.

While it certainly is possible to design a smaller, less present diplomatic posture, at the end of the day diplomacy is about people-to-people contact. Sending envoys abroad to represent the interests of the state is a mainstay of the modern state system and will exist, in some form or another, as long as the state remains the dominant form of political-territorial organization. Contemporary embassies and consulates and the seemingly banal processes that occur within them are simply the latest manifestation of this longstanding practice of formal diplomatic representation. Whatever the financial burden, the United States will likely maintain as robust a diplomatic footprint as possible in the foreseeable future, making only minor adjustments to the size and internal structure of these facilities. Longstanding, permanent diplomatic representation is ingrained in the U.S. foreign policy establishment; it would take a significant ideological shift and much time to break away from the legacy and endurance of universality. If this were possible, drawing on this research, the ideal representational posture would see the maintenance of only hub-like diplomatic facilities in key geostrategic locations (perhaps twenty to thirty), with smaller, temporary pop-up sites as needed in the lead up to significant elections (for monitoring and reporting purposes), mass events (i.e. World Cup, Olympic Games), natural disasters, and other crises. Briefly, in this scenario, Main State headquarters in Washington, DC, would absorb much of the functionality of a present-day embassy or consulate with most processes shifting to web-based platforms, principally visa processing. Key officials and country officers would still be expected to maintain working, positive relationships with local government officials and civil society leaders in country through periodic travel and making greater use of telecommunications systems. A leaner, more mobile footprint would have the advantage of allowing the United States to rebrand its global reputation by, to employ a favorite phrase of the Obama administration, "leading from behind" while also assuaging contemporary concerns for the security and safety of Department of State personnel and cost of maintaining the broad diplomatic apparatus. Lastly, such a radical departure from the representational norm would need to occur as part of a total policy re-orientation to protect existing bilateral relationships.

The "hub" proposal is just one way the Department might more fully and efficiently harness its capabilities to reposition itself in a more positive way around the world. Others will emerge as universality comes under further critique, beginning with the findings presented in this study. This dissertation has sought to call attention to the prevailing norms and powerful ideas that support and reinforce the U.S. diplomatic apparatus. Although the contemporary diplomatic footprint and organizational structure of the Department of State will prove difficult to dismantle and reform, particularly given the advantages of the current system, there are better ways to use the existing network to confront the issues of the day. A critical analysis of the diplomatic network yields insight into myriad ways the Department might enhance efficiencies and reduce redundancies. Policymakers should more fully harness technological advances and take advantage of right-sizing measures to streamline operations both abroad and at Main State headquarters. Reforms efforts ought to include empowering functional bureaus to take a larger policy and planning role, revamping the unwieldy cable and reporting system, moving consular operations to online platforms, broadening social media opportunities, and evaluating human resources. Further, Department operatives must work better to balance security mandates and the needs of a diplomatic mission. Even if the United States remains committed to an embassy in every country, the Department should no longer be in the business of building imposing, compound-like embassy and consulate facilities.

The world has changed dramatically since the first U.S. envoys were sent abroad in the eighteenth century. The contemporary diplomatic network with its nearly universal reach is a product of an outdated understanding of global political and economic processes. If the United States wishes to remain a global leader and relevant moving forward, the Department of State needs to make itself and its installations more effective to confront twenty-first century realities and the global challenges that work against the norms of the territorial system.

APPENDIX A: GEODATABASE.

Publicly available georeferenced data on U.S. diplomatic posts (n=230) organized in a ".csv" format for easy importing ease into ArcMap cartography software. Data are organized by region in the following format: Post name (city name), type (embassy, consulate, etc.), address, and MGRS (military grid reference system). Information culled from public/open sources.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Buenos Aires, Embassy, 4300 C1425GMN Av. Colombia CABA Argentina, 21HUB6980073000

Nassau, Embassy, Queen St Nassau Bahamas, 18RTN6320075500

Bridgetown, Embassy, U.S. Embassy Rd Bridgetown 14006 Barbados, 21PTQ1960048800

Belmopan, Embassy, Belmopan Belize, 16QCE1140008800

Hamilton, Consulate, Crown Hill 16 Middle Rd DV 03 Bermuda, 20SLA3350074500

La Paz, Embassy, Cordero La Paz Bolivia, 19KEB9370074000

Brasilia, Embassy, Av. Das Nações Quadra 801 Lote 03, s/n – Asa Sul Brasília – DF 70403-900 Brazil, 23LJC9220050500

Rio De Janiero, Consulate, Av. Pres. Wilson 147 – Castelo Rio de Janeiro – RJ 20030-020 Brazil, 23KPQ8720065100

Recife, Consulate, R. Gonçalves Maia 163 – Boa Vista, Recife – PE 50070-060 Brazil, 25LBM9130008800

Sao Paolo, Consulate, Rua Henri Dunant 500 Chácara Santo Antônio São Paulo- SP 04709-110, 23KLP2680085700

Ottawa, Embassy, 490 Sussex Dr Ottawa ON K1N 1G8 Canada, 18TVR4550030700

Calgary, Consulate, 615 Macleod Trail SE Calgary AB T2G 4T8 Canada, 11UQS0610059100

Halifax, Consulate, 1969 Upper Water St #904 Halifax NS B3J 3R7 Canada, 20TMQ5440044400

Montreal, Consulate, 1155 Rue St-Alexandre Montréal QC H3B 3Z1 Canada, 18TXR1200040000

Quebec, Consulate, 2 rue de la Terrasse Dufferin Ville de Québec QC G1R 4T9 Canada, 19TCM3170086400

Toronto, Embassy, 360 University Ave Toronto ON M5G 1S4 Canada, 17TPJ3000034500

Vancouver, Consulate, 19 1095 W Pender St Vancouver BC V6E 2M6 Canada, 10UDV9130059400

Winnipeg, Embassy, 201 Portage Ave Winnipeg MB R3B 3K6 Canada, 14UPA3360028600

Santiago, Embassy, Avenida Andres Bello 2800 Santiago Las Condes Región Metropolitana Chile, 19HCD5080001800

Bogota, Embassy, Avenida Calle 26 Bogotá Colombia, 18NXL0030012500

San Jose, Embassy, Vía 104 Calle 98 San José Costa Rica, 16PHS1530000400

Santo Domingo, Embassy, Av. República de Colombia 57 Santo Domingo Dominican Republic, 19QCA9820046800

Quito, Embassy, y De los Guayacanes Quito EC170124 Ecuador, 17MQV8180084600

Guayaquil, Consulate, Av Rodriguez Bonin Guayaquil 090616 Ecuador, 17MPT1790057700

San Salvador, Embassy, Residencial Santa Elena El Salvador, 16PBA5580011700
Guatemala City, Embassy, Zona 10 Guatemala, 15PYS6770016300

Port-au-Prince, Embassy, Boulevard du 15 Octobre Port-au-Prince Haiti, 18QYF9030054800

Tegucigalpa, Consulate, Colonia San Carlos Tegucigalpa Honduras, 16PDA7940059100

Kingston, Embassy, 142 Old Hope Road Kingston 6 Jamaica, 18QUE1310093100

Mexico City, Embassy, Paseo de la Reforma 305 Cuauhtémoc 06500 Ciudad de México D.F. Mexico, 14QMG8350048100

Ciudad Juarez, Embassy, Paseo de la Victoria 3650 Col. Fraccionamiento Partido Senecú 32543 Cd Juárez Chih. Mexico, 13RCR6680006700

Guadalajara, Consulate, Libertad 1920 Americana 44160 Guadalajara Jal Mexico, 13QFC7010086800

Hermosillo, Consulate, Av Monterrey 141 Esqueda El Centenario 83260 Hermosillo Son Mexico, 12RWT0390016600

Matamoros, Embassy, Calle Primera 2002 Jardín 87330 Matamoros Tamps Mexico, 14RPP5030064200

Merida, Consulate, Calle 60 No 338-K x 29 y 31 Alcala Martin Alcalá Martín 97050 Mérida YUC Mexico, 16QBJ2760023100

Monterrey, Consulate, Av Venustiano Carranza 2076 Interior 41 Polanco Burocratas 78220 San Luis S.L.P. Mexico, 14QKK9290050600

Nogales, Consulate, El Greco 84000 Nogales Son. Mexico, 12RWV0570061500

Nuevo Laredo, Consulate, Av Allende 3330 Jardín 88260 Nuevo Laredo Tamps. Mexico, 14RMR4940038300

Puerto Vallarta, Consulate, Libertad 1920 Americana 44160 Guadalajara Jal. Mexico, 13QFC7010086800

Tijuana, Consulate, Paseo De Las Culturas S/N Bosque de las Araucarias Mesa de Otay 22425 Tijuana B.C. Mexico, 11SNR0440098400

Curacao, Consulate, Schottegatweg Zuid Willemstad Curaçao, 19PEP0800038500

Managua, Embassy, Barrio Batahola Sur Managua Nicaragua, 16PEU7510041100

Panama City, Embassy, Cardenas Panama City Panama, 17PPK5820095000

Lima, Embassy, La Encalada Santiago de Surco 15023 Peru, 18LTM8570061500

Paramaribo, Embassy, Dr. Sophie Redmond Straat 129 Paramaribo Suriname, 21NYG0270044400

Port of Spain, Embassy, 15 Queen’s Park W Port of Spain Trinidad & Tobago, 20PPS6220079400

Montevideo, Embassy, Embajada de los Estados Unidos Dr. Lauro Müller 1776 Montevideo 11200 Uruguay, 21HWB7520036200

Caracas, Embassy, F Caracas 1080 Venezuela, 19PGM3290059000

EUROPE

Tirana, Embassy, Elbasan Street Albania, 34TDL0180074900

Yerevan, Embassy, 1 American Avenue Yerevan 0082 Armenia, 38TMK5580046200

Vienna, Embassy, 1010 Parkring 12A 1010 Wien Austria, 33UXP0230039900

Baku, Embassy, 111 Azadlıq prospekti Bakı AZ1007 Azerbaijan, 39TVE0180071300

Minsk, Embassy, Staravilyenskaya Vulitsa 46 Minsk Belarus, 35UNV3660073900

Brussels, Embassy, Boulevard du Régent 27 1000 Bruxelles Belgium, 31UES9620033400

Sarejevo, Embassy, Roberta C. Frasurea 1 Sarajevo 71000 Bosnia & Herzegovina, 34TBP9100059200

Sofia, Embassy, ul. “Kozyak” 16 1407 Sofia Bulgaria, 34TFN8950026400

Zagreb, Embassy, Ul. Thomasa Jeffersona 2 10000 Zagreb Croatia, 33TWL7800065900

Prague, Embassy, Tržiště 366/13 118 00 Praha 1-Malá Strana Czech Republic, 33UVR5710048400

Tallinn, Embassy, Kentmanni 20 10116 Tallinn Estonia, 35VLF7240090100

Helsinki, Embassy, Itäinen Puistotie 14 A 00140 Helsinki Finland, 35VLG8680070600

Paris, Embassy, 4 Avenue Gabriel 75008 Paris France, 31UDQ5010012900

Bordeaux, Consulate, 89 Quai des Chartrons 33000 Bordeaux France, 30TXQ9220069600

Lyon, Embassy, 1 Quai Jules Courmont 69002 Lyon France, 31TFL4290069300

Rennes, Embassy, 30 Quai Duguay Trouin 35000 Renne France, 30UWU9790029300

Toulouse, Consulate, 25 Allée Jean Jaurès 31000 Toulouse France, 31TCJ7480029300

Marseille, Consulate, 12 Boulevard Paul Peytral 13006 Marseille France, 31TFH9300095800

Strasbourg, Consulate, 15 Avenue d’Alsace 67000 Strasbourg France, 32UMU0860082200

Tbilisi, Embassy, 11 George Balanchini St Tbilisi Georgia, 38TMM8130026300

Berlin, Embassy, Pariser Platz 2 10117 Berlin Germany, 33UUU8990019600

Dusseldorf, Consulate, Düsseldorf-Oberbilk 40227 Düsseldorf Germany, 32ULB4600076400

Frankfurt, Consulate, Gießener Str. 30 60435 Frankfurt am Main Germany, 32UMA7810054400

Hamburg, Consulate, 20354 Hamburg Germany, 32UNE6600035200

Leipzig, Consulate, Wilhelm-Seyfferth-Straße 4 04107 Leipzig Germany, 33UUS1660090200

Munich, Consulate, Königinstraße 5 80539 München Germany, 32UPU9210035600

Athens, Embassy, Βασ. Σοφίας 91 Αθήνα 10160 Αθήνα 115 21 Greece, 34SGH4200007400

Budapest, Embassy, Budapest Szabadság tér 12 1054 Hungary, 34TCT5320063000

Reykjavik, Embassy, 21 101 Reykjavík Iceland, 27WVM5430013300

Dublin, Embassy, 42 Elgin Rd Dublin 4 Ireland, 29UPV8420012500

Rome, Embassy, Via Vittorio Veneto 121 00187 Roma Italy, 33TTG9180042400

Florence, Consulate, Lungarno Amerigo Vespucci 38 50123 Firenze Italy, 32TPP8030049100

Milan, Consulate, Via Principe Amedeo 2/10 20121 Milano Italy, 32TNR1510035700

Naples, Consulate, Piazza della Repubblica 80122 Napoli Italy, 33TVF3470020300

Pristina, Embassy, Ahmet Krasniqi Prishtinë 10000, 34TEN1230023200

Riga, Embassy, Samnera Velsa iela 1 Zemgales priekšpilsēta Rīga LV-1046 Latvia, 35VLD1920013500

Vilnius, Embassy, Akmenų g. 6 Vilnius 03106 Lithuania, 35ULA8850061000

Luxembourg, Embassy, 22 Boulevard Emmanuel Servais 2535 Luxembourg, 32UKA9260000200

Skopje, Embassy, U.S. Embassy – Embassy Samoilova 21 Skopje 1000 Macedonia (FYROM), 34TEM3500050000

Valletta, Embassy, Attard Malta, 33SVV4820071900

Chisinau, Embassy, Strada Alexei Mateevici 103 Chișinău 2009 Moldova, 35TPN3820009100

Podgorica, Embassy, 12 Vaka Đurovića Podgorica 81000 Montenegro, 34TCN5700000000

The Hague, Embassy, Lange Voorhout 102 2514 EJ Den Haag Netherlands, 31UET9010071000

Amsterdam, Consulate, Museumplein 19 1071 DJ Amsterdam Netherlands, 31UFU2810002300

Oslo, Embassy, Henrik Ibsens gate 48 0244 Oslo Norway, 32VNM9630043200

Warsaw, Embassy, Aleje Ujazdowskie 29-31 Warszawa Poland, 34UEC0150086000

Krakow, Consulate, Stolarska 9 Kraków Poland, 34UDA2400045800

Lisbon, Embassy, Av. Das Forças Armadas 1600-081 Lisboa Portugal, 29SMC8580088300

Bucharest, Embassy, Bulevardul Dr. Liviu Librescu 4-6 București 015118 Romania, 35TMK2740029300

Moscow, Embassy, Bolshoy Devyatinskiy pereulok 8 Moscow Russia 121099, 37UDB1080079800

St. Petersburg, Consulate, Фурштатская ул. 15 Санкт-Петербург Ленинградская область Russia 191028, 36VUM5220048200

Vladivostok, Consulate, Vladivostok Primorsky Krai Russia 690001, 52TGN3660077700

Yekaterinburg, Consulate, ul. Gogolya, 15 Yekaterinburg Sverdlovsk Oblast Russia 620075, 41VLD5410001400

Belgrade, Embassy, Bulevar kneza Aleksandra Karađorđevića 92 Beograd Serbia, 34TDQ5670057800

Bratislava, Embassy, Hviezdoslavovo námestie 811 02 Bratislava-Staré Mesto Slovakia, 33UXP5680034100

Ljublkana, Embassy, 1000 Prešernova cesta 31 1000 Ljubljana Slovenia, 33TVM0000000000

Madrid, Embassy, Calle de Serrano 75 28006 Madrid Spain, 30TVK4170076200

Barcelona, Consulate, Passeig de la Reina Elisenda de Montcada 23 08034 Barcelona Spain, 31TDF2620083200

Bern, Embassy, Sulgeneckstrasse 19 3007 Bern Switzerland, 32TLT8110000000

Stockholm, Embassy, Dag Hammarskjölds väg 31 115 89 Stockholm Sweden, 34VCL3530080700

Ankara, Embassy, Remzi Oğuz Arık 06540 Çankaya/Ankara Turkey, 36SVK8760017600

Adana, Consulate, Dede Korkut Girne Bulv. No:212 01285 Yüreğir/Adana Turkey, 36SYF1000095900

Istanbul, Embassy, İstinye No:2 34460 Sarıyer/Istanbul – Europe Turkey, 35TPF7170053900

Kiev, Embassy, Sikorskoho St 4 Kiev Ukraine, 36UUA1770093500

London, Embassy, 24 Grosvenor Square Mayfair London W1A 2LQ, 30UXC9750010500

Belfast, Embassy, 223 Stranmillis Rd Belfast County Antrim BT9 5GR, 30UUF0980050900

Edinburgh, Consulate, 3 Regent Terrace Edinburgh EH7 5BW, 30UVH8880001000

MIDDLE EAST

Algiers, Embassy, 05 Chemin Cheikh Bachir El Ibrahim El Biar 16030 Algeria, 31SEA0340067700

Manama, Embassy, Bu Ghazal Manama Bahrain, 39RVJ5710098400

Cairo, Consulate, 5 Tawfik Diab Street Garden City Qasr Ad Dobarah Qasr an Nile Cairo Governorate Egypt, 36RUU2960024700

Baghdaad, Embassy, Al-Kindi Street Baghdad 217 Iraq, 38SMB4370084500

Basrah, Embassy, Basrah Iraq, 38RQU7440077000

Tel Aviv, Embassy, Ha-Yarkon St 71 Tel Aviv-Yafo 63903 Israel, 36SXA6670050200

Amman, Embassy, Al Hidab Amman Jordan, 36RYA7220037900

Kuwait City, Embassy, Masjid Al Aqsa St Kuwait City Kuwait, 39RTN1310043900

Beirut, Embassy, El Metn Lebanon, 36SYC4010057900

Rabat, Embassy, Avenue Mohamed VI Rabat 10170 Morocco, 29SQT0100059300

Casablanca, Consulate, Boulevard Moulay Youssef Casablanca 20250 Morocco, 29SPT2740017600

Doha, Embassy, Doha Qatar, 39RWH4740098600

Riyadh, Embassy, Cir 8 As Safarat Riyadh 12523 Saudi Arabia, 38RPN6400030600

Dhahran, Consulate, US Consulate Driveway KFUPM Dhahran 34464 Saudi Arabia, 39RVK1550009600

Jeddah, Consulate, Falastin, Al-Hamra'a Jeddah 23323 Saudi Arabia, 37QED1690080400

Damascus, Embassy, Abo Jafaar Al Mansour Damascus Syria, 37SBT4740012400

Tunis, Embassy, La Goulette Tunisia, 32SPF1320079000

Abu Dhabi, Embassy, Airport Road at Rabdan (29th) Street Embassies District Plot 38 Sector W59-02 Street No. 4, 40RBN3980003600

Dubai, Consulate, Al Seef Road Unmmu Hurair 1 Bur Dubai, 40RCN2970094600

Sana'a, Embassy, Sana'a Yemen, 38PMB1730099700

AFRICA

Luanda, Embassy, Miramar Luanda Angola, 33LUL0700025600

Cotonou, Embassy, Rue 914 Cotonou Benin, 31NDH3380002000

Gaborone, Embassy, Mmaraka Extension 1 Gaborone Botswana, 35JLN8950072100

Ouagadougou, Embassy, Ouaga 2000 Ouagadougou Burkina Faso, 30PXU6340060700

Bujumbura, Embassy, Bujumbura Burundi, 35MQS6450027600

Praia, Embassy, R. Abílio Macedo Praia Cape Verde, 27PTS3030051100

Bangui, Embassy, Bangui Central African Republic, 34NBK3130082300

N’Djamena, Embassy, N’Djamena Chad, 33PWP0520037800

Kinshasa, Embassy, Avenue De l’Hotel Kinshasa Congo (DRC), 33MWR3470024600

Brazzaville, Embassy, Brazzaville Congo (Republic), 33MWR2840027400

Abidjan, Embassy, D 33 Abidjan Côte d’Ivoire, 30NUL9180089700

Malabo, Embassy, Malabo Equatorial Guinea, 32NMK7270014600

Asmara, Embassy, 179 Ala Street 179 171-9 St Asmara Eritrea, 37PDS9300094700

Addis Ababa, Embassy, Algeria St Addis Ababa Ethiopia, 37PDL7400001200

Libreville, Embassy, Libreville Gabon, 32NNF4390053400

Accra, Embassy, No. 24 Fourth Circular Rd Accra Ghana, 30NZM1350017400

Conakry, Embassy, Conakry Guinea, 28PFR4960060900

Maseru, Embassy, 254 Kingsway Maseru Lesotho, 35JNH4540057900

Monrovia, Embassy, 502 Benson St Monrovia Liberia, 29NKG9930098500

Antananarivo, Embassy, 4 Antananarivo Madagascar, 38KQE6100013600

Lilongwe, Embassy, 16 Jomo Kenyatta Road, Lilongwe 3 Lilongwe Malawi Lilongwe Malawi, 36LWK8480056200

Bamako, Embassy, Rue 243 Porte 297 Bamako Mali, 29PPP0650096300

Nouakchott, Embassy, La Capitale Nouakchott Mauritania, 28QCF9700000800

Port Louis, Embassy, Rogers House 4th Floor P.O. Box 544 President John Kennedy St Port Louis Mauritius, 40KEC5230070500

Maputo, Embassy, Av. Kenneth Kaunda Maputo Mozambique, 36JVS5990028700

Windhoek, Embassy, 14 Lossen Street Ausspanplatz Windhoek Central Namibia Namibia Windhoek Namibia, 33KYR1450001900

Niamey, Embassy, Goudel Niamey Niger, 31PCQ9920095600

Abuja, Embassy, 1075 Diplomatic Dr Abuja Nigeria, 32PLQ3250099600

Kigali, Embassy, No 2756 Avenue de la Gendarmerie Kacyiru Kigali Rwanda Kigali

Rwanda, 36MSC7480085600

Dakar, Embassy, B.P. 49 Route des Almadies Dakar Senegal, 28PBB2790031600

Freetown, Embassy, Conakry Guinea, 28PFR4960060900

Pretoria, Embassy, 877 Pretorius St Pretoria 0083 South Africa, 35JPM2270051800

Juba, Embassy, Kololo Road adjacent to the European Union's compound Juba South Sudan, 36NUL4320036800

Khartoum, Embassy, Kilo 10 Soba Khartoum Sudan Khartoum Sudan, 36PVC4830024900

Dar es Salaam, Embassy, Msasani Dar es Salaam Tanzania, 37MEN2940051300

Banjul, Embassy, U.S. Embassy Kairaba Avenue P.M.B. 19 Kairaba Ave Banjul Gambia, 28PCV1730088800

Lome, Embassy, U.S. Embassy 4332, Blvd Eyadema Lome Togo BP 852 Lome Togo, 31NCG0240084000

Kampala, Embassy, Plot 1577 Ggaba Road Kampala Uganda Kampala Uganda, 36NVF5460033000

SOUTH-CENTRAL ASIA
Kabul, Embassy, Bibi Mahru Kabul Afghanistan, 42SWD1750021200

Dhaka, Embassy, Shahzadpur Dhaka Bangladesh, 46QBM3740034000

New Delhi, Embassy, E-3 Nyaya Marg Chanakyapuri Chanakyapuri New Delhi Delhi 110021 Malcha New Delhi Delhi 110021 India, 43RGM1370065300

Chennai, Consulate, Gemini Circle Gopalapuram Chennai Tamil Nadu 600006 India, 44PMV1880043000

Hyderabad, Consulate, 1-8-323 Paigah Palace Chiran Fort Lane Begumpet Indian Airlines Colony Patigadda Begumpet Secunderabad Telangana 500003 India, 44QKE3170030200

Calcutta, Consulate, 5/1, Ho Chi Minh Sarani Park Street area Kankaria Estates Park Street area Kolkata West Bengal 700071, 45QXE3890094000

Mumbai, Embassy, C-49 G-Block Bandra Kurla Complex Bandra East G Block BKC Bandra Kurla Complex Bandra East Mumbai Maharashtra 400051 India, 43QBB7560009300

Astana, Embassy, Almaty District Astana 010000 Kazakhstan, 42UXB7260067100

Almaty, Embassy, Almaty District Astana 010000 Kazakhstan, 42UXB7260067100

Bishkek, Embassy, Bishkek Kyrgyzstan, 43TDH6580041600

Kathmandu, Embassy, Maharajgunj Rd Kathmandu 44606 Nepal, 45RUL3600069300

Islamabad, Embassy, Diplomatic Enclave Islamabad 44000 Pakistan, August 15 1947, 43SCT2560033100

Karachi, Consulate, Plot 3 4 5 New TPX Area Mai Kolachi Road Karachi Mai Kolachi Bypass Karachi Pakistan, 42RTN9880048800

Lahore, Embassy, 50 Empress Road Lahore Pakistan, 43RDQ3700091800

Peshawar, Consulate, U.S. Consulate 11 General Bakht Khan Rd Peshawar Pakistan, 42SYC3420065700

Colombo, Embassy, No: 210 A2 Colombo 00300 Sri Lanka, 44NLN7280064200

Dushanbe, Embassy, M41 Dushanbe 734019 Tajikistan, 42SVH7490070100

Ashgabat, Embassy, Ashgabat Turkmenistan, 40SFH2190000200

Tashkent, Embassy, 3 Maykurgan Str. Тошкент 100093 Uzbekistan, 42TWL2270079500

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Canberra, Embassy, Moonah Pl Yarralumla ACT 2600 Australia, 55HFA9240090900

Melbourne, Consulate, 553 St Kilda Rd Melbourne VIC 3004 Australia, 55HCU2230009200

Perth, Consulate, 16 St Georges Terrace Perth WA 6000 Australia, 50JLK9260063700

Sydney, Embassy, Homemaker City Castlereagh St Sydney NSW 2000 Australia, 56HLH3430051000

Bandar Seri Begawab, Embassy, Jalan Kebangsaan Simpang 336-52-16-9 Bandar Seri Begawan Brunei, 50NKL7340044100

Rangoon, Embassy, 110 University Avenue Road Yangon Myanmar (Burma), 47QJU9560062400

Phnom Penh, Embassy, 1 Christopher Howes Phnom Penh Cambodia, 48PVT9130079500

Beijing, Embassy, 55 Anjialou Rd SanYuan Qiao Chaoyang Beijing China 100028, 50SMK5440022800

Chengdu, Consulate, 4 Linshiguan Rd Wuhou Chengdu Sichuan China 610041, 48RVU1070088300

Guangzhou, Consulate, Huajiu Rd Tianhe Guangzhou Guangdong China 510620, 49QGF3740058200

Shanghai, Consulate, Wulumuqi S Rd Xuhui Shanghai China 200031, 51RUQ5200053700

Shenyang, Consulate, 14th Latitude Rd Heping Shenyang Liaoning China 110003, 51TWG3540025800

Suvi, Embassy, 158 Princess Road Tamavua Suva Fiji, 60KXE5220096200

Hong Kong, Consulate, 26 Garden Rd Central Hong Kong, 50QKK0710066300

Jakarta, Embassy, No. 3-5 Jl. Medan Merdeka Sel. Gambir Kota Jakarta Pusat Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta 10110 Indonesia, 48MYU0250016300

Surabaya, Consulate, Jl. Citra Raya Niaga No.2 Sambikerep Kota SBY Jawa Timur 60217 Indonesia, 49MFM8190094500

Tokyo, Embassy, 〒107-8420 Tokyo Minato Akasaka 1 Chome−10, 54SUE8620047900

Fukuoka, Consulate, 〒810-0052 Fukuoka Prefecture Fukuoka Chūō-ku Ōhori 2 Chome−5, 52SFC2740017300

Nagoya, Consulate, 1 Chome-47-1 Nagono Nakamura Ward Nagoya Aichi Prefecture 450-0001 Japan, 53SPU7210093800

Osaka, Consulate, U.S. Consulate Osaka 7F 2-11-5 Nishitenman アメリカ 総領事 館 □合 案内 2 Chome-11 Nishitenma Kita-ku Osaka Kita-ku 530-8543 Japan, 53SNU4590039500

Sapporo, Consulate, 28 Chome-3-1 Kita 1 Jonishi Chuo Ward Sapporo Hokkaido Prefecture 064-0821 Japan, 54TWN2550067100

Naha, Consulate, Japan 〒901-2104 Okinawa Prefecture Urasoe Tōyama 2 Chome−1

当山２－１－１, 52RCQ7390004300

Seoul, Embassy, 188 Sejong-daero Sejongno Jongno-gu Seoul South Korea, 52SCG2140060300

Vientiane, Embassy, Rue Bartholonie Vientiane Laos, 48QTE4700087900

Kuala Lumpur, Embassy, 376 Jalan Tun Razak Taman U Thant 50400 Kuala Lumpur Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur Malaysia, 47NRD0260049100

Manila, Embassy, 1201 Roxas Blvd Ermita Manila 1000 Metro Manila Philippines, 51PTS8210012500

Ulaanbaatar, Embassy, Khoroo 7 Ulaanbaatar Mongolia, 48TXU4410010100

Wellington, Embassy, 29 Fitzherbert Terrace Thorndon Wellington 6011 New Zealand, 60GUV1390028500

Port Moresby, Embassy, U.S. Embassy c/o Cuthberston Street Douglas St Port Moresby 121 Papua New Guinea, 55LEK1620052100

Koror, Embassy, Airai Palau, 53NMJ5040013500

Manila, Embassy, 1201 Roxas Blvd Ermita Manila 1000 Metro Manila Philippines, 51PTS8210012500

Apia, Embassy, Apia Samoa, 2LMK1760070500

Bangkok, Embassy, 120-122 Wireless Rd Khwaeng Lumphini Khet Pathum Wan Krung Thep Maha Nakhon 10330 Thailand, 47PPR6700019100

Chiang Mai, Consulate, 387 Witchayanon Road Chang Moi 50300 Mueang Chiang Mai Chiang Mai Mueang Chiang Mai District Chiang Mai 50300 Thailand, 47QMA9980078000

Dili, Embassy, Díli Timor-Leste, 51LYL8070054300

Hanoi, Embassy, 7 Láng Hạ Thành Công Ba Đình Hà Nội Vietnam, 48QWJ8500024700

Ho Chi Minh City, Consulate, Bến Nghé District 1 Ho Chi Minh Vietnam, 48PXS8590092400

APPENDIX B: CRITERIA FOR OPENING NEW FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS.

March 20, 1958. The following is adapted from Tabs 1-3 of the "Criteria for Opening New Foreign Service Posts" forms prepared by the Committee for New Foreign Service Posts for the attention of the State Department's Regional Bureaus and Missions.

Reference: Campbell, H.K., Executive Secretary, Committee on New Foreign Service Posts, to Mr. Scott, Bureau of Administration, Mar. 20, 1958, file 120.2/3-2758, 1955-1959 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

***

I. AREA VITAL STATISTICS
   a. Country
      i. Population
      ii. Language
      iii. Climate
      iv. Political Status (independent, colony, protectorate, etc.)
   b. Post District
      i. State or provincial government or governments.
      ii. Population
      iii. Language
      iv. Climate
   c. City
      i. Population
      ii. Language
      iii. Climate
      iv. Nearest large city and/or capital
   d. Other comments.

II. PRECEDENTS
   a. History of previous American establishments in area, including reasons for opening or closing.
   b. Representation maintained by other governments in the locality, including number, rand and functions of such offices.
   c. Representation maintained by the host government in the United States, including number, rank and functions of such offices.
   d. Number of other U.S. Government posts in host country:
      i. Diplomatic
      ii. Consular
      iii. Number of separate USIS, ICA or other special offices (need not list).
   e. Other comments.

III. CONSULAR NEEDS

a. Estimated number of resident U.S. citizens.
b. Estimated number (annual) of transient U.S. citizens.
c. Anticipated annual visa load:
    i. Immigration
    ii. Non-Immigration
d. Anticipated trade which might affect A, B or C.
e. If port, estimated average number of U.S. flag ships calling (including naval visits).
f. Anticipated local public activity involving invoices, etc.
g. Presence of military bases (U.S.) in area, for which special consular services might be required.
h. Estimate number of U.S. veterans resident in district.
i. Other comments.

IV. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS (where possible to evaluate)

a. Orientation of country vis-à-vis United States.
b. Orientation of country vis-à-vis Communist Bloc.
c. Orientation of country vis-à-vis "Neutralist" countries.
d. Expressed interest of governing authority in the maintenance of U.S. representation in the locality.
e. Stability of government.
f. Disruptive Communist or other competitive activities in host country.
g. Need for following types of political reporting:
    i. Country's foreign relations.
    ii. Domestic politics.
    iii. Biographic.
    iv. Map and Procurement.
    v. Labor, legal, etc.
    vi. Peripheral reporting on neighboring countries.
h. Other comments. (Such as significance of proposed district in country's political, economic and schol scheme of things.)

V. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

a. Economic stability of country and its relationship to U.S. political and economic interests.
b. Main industries and their importance as markets for U.S. exports or as suppliers of U.S. imports.
c. Presence of strategic materials.
d. Other strategic economic considerations.
e. Economic defense requirements (East-West trade, etc.).
f. Need for following types of economic reporting:
    i. General reporting on conditions and trends
    ii. Commodity

iii. Industrial
iv. Banking and Finance
v. Govermental finance
vi. Progress of economic development
vii. Other
g. Other comments.

VI. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
a. General Economic Assistance Program
i. Now in existence
ii. Planned
b. Technical Assistance Program
i. Now in existence
ii. Planned
c. Military Assistance Program
i. Now in existence
ii. Planned
d. Other comments.

VII. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS
a. Extent of American capital investments.
b. Extent of American commercial interests; e.g., volume of trade with U.S.
c. Number of American firms with established branches or agents.
d. Trade and investment potential.
e. Competitive activities of other nations.
f. Need for following types of commercial reporting and services:
i. Trade lists
ii. WTDs
iii. Trade and investment opportunities
iv. Trade complaints
v. General reporting on trade and investment conditions
vi. Other
g. Other comments.

VIII. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

(The following questions to not relate to the possible existence of U.S. Military Assistance Programs or U.S. military bases in the area, but rather to conventional service attache type requirements.)

a. Attache type requirements
i. Reporting
1. Army
2. Navy
3. Air Force

ii. Other
1. Anticipated naval visits, if a port.
2. Amount of U.S. civil air traffic.
3. Other
b. Number and type of service attaches expected.
c. Other comments.

IX. INFORMATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE POTENTIAL

a. USIS Program
   i. Now in existence or planned by the United States Information Agency.
   ii. Desirability from State Department point of view.
   iii. Acceptability to host government.
   iv. Targets
      1. Approximate number of newspapers in district.
      2. Approximate number of radio stations.
      3. Estimated ratio of radio sets to population.
      4. Literacy of population in district.
      5. Approximate number of universities and colleges.
b. Exchange of Persons Program
   i. Now in existence o[r] planned by IES.
   ii. Desirability from State Department view.
   iii. Acceptability to host government.
c. Proposed size of USUS staff (including IES activities).
d. Other comments.

X. OTHER AGENCY REQUIREMENTS (Beyond those indicated in previous sections)

Expressed interest of the following agencies in the establishment or maintenance of an attache or representative at post; with staff size indicated: **

a. Department Agriculture
b. Department of Labor
c. Bureau of Mines (Department of Interior)
d. Fish and Wildlife Service
e. Atomic Energy Commission
f. [Blank]
g. [Blank]
h. Other
i. Other comments.

**(Note: - as may already be known to the Department or Mission. Agencies should <u>not</u> be solicited for views at this stage.)

XI. PERSONNEL

a. Estimated total number of non-State Department personnel (Officers, employees and locals).
b. Proposed number of State Department personnel. (For listing of positions, grades and salaries, see Section XIV.)
c. If hardship post, recommended percentage.
d. Cost of living class.
e. Privileges and immunities host government may be expected to extend to United States representative.
f. Availability of qualified locals.
g. If post demands unique language or other professional skills, expectation of finding suitable personnel (not to be answered by recommending post, but rather by regional bureau).
h. Other comments.

XII. BUILDING NEEDS

a. Attache report, or summary of report of site survey by nearest Administrative Officer or Bureau Officer, preferably accompanied by regional FBO representative. (Survey may be restricted if undesirable publicity might result.)

(Estimated costs for following items summarized in Section XIV.)

b. Office Space
    i. Number of buildings required (does USIS or other agency actually desire separate building.)
    ii. Terms for each
        1. Short-term lease
        2. Long-term lease
        3. Purchase
        4. United States Government construction required
    iii. Furniture to be acquired locally of United States supplied?
c. Housing
    i. Number of units required (principal officer, senior officers, staff)
    ii. Terms for each
        1. Short-term lease
        2. Long-term lease
        3. Purchase
        4. United States Government construction required
    iii. For each to be government furnished, furniture to be acquired locally or United States supplied?
d. Other comments

XIII. OPERATING FACILITIES

a. Attach report, or summary of report of location survey by nearest Administrative Officer or Bureau Officer (see Section XII).

(Estimated costs for following items summarized in Section XIV.)

b. Communications facilities available in city
    i. Access to existing courier route
    ii. Commercial telegraph facilities
    iii. Commercial telephone facilities
    iv. Local Postal facilities
c. Transportation facilities
    i. Commercial airlines
    ii. United States Military air service
    iii. Commercial shipping
    iv. United States Military transports
    v. Railroads
    vi. Buses
    vii. Highways
d. Medical facilities
    i. Nearest United States military hospital
    ii. Proficiency of local doctors and surgeons
    iii. Proficiency of local dentists
    iv. Conditions in local hospitals
    v. Municipal sanitation factors to be considered
e. Food
    i. Percentage which can be acquired locally
    ii. Approximate relationship to United States cost of living index
f. Recreational facilities
    i. Those immediately accessible
    ii. Available by travel within country or region
g. Supplies and equipment
    i. Number and type of vehicle required
    ii. Any unusual supply or equipment items, or quantities thereof
    iii. Percentage of supplies and equipment acquired locally

XIV. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL PLAN (Show State costs only)

[In chart form. Calculate "personnel services, "class," "salary," "cost (first FY, Field & Dept)," and "cost (succeeding FYs, Field & Depart) for each: "Americans," "Locals." Calculate "allowances," "travel," "ORA," "communications," “automotive,” “buildings operating expenses,” “contractual & miscellaneous,” “household furniture.” Total expenses.]

XV. COMMITTEE CHECKLIST […]

APPENDIX C: RANKING OF EUR CONSULAR POSTS BY INDISPENSABILITY VIA COEFFICIENT SCORE.

The following pages are scanned images of a May 13, 1960 memorandum (in full) titled "Status of Foreign Service Posts," which details how the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs ranked its consular posts according to indispensability using a coefficient score. The ranking was requested during a time of austerity when the Department was forced to close constituent posts. Note that Tab B, page 4 is missing.

Reference: Gallman, W.J., Director General of the Foreign Service, to Mr. Parsons, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, May 13, 1960, file 120/2/5-1360, 1960-1963 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

(21)

MEMORANDUM TO: O/FS - Mr. Gallman

FROM: EUR - Mr. Kohler

SUBJECT: Status of Foreign Service Posts

REF: Your memorandum of May 13, 1960

This Bureau regrets the delay in responding to your request for a listing of consular posts in order of their importance to the United States. While fully prepared to arrange such a list in accordance with the judgement of senior officers, we have considered that a greater contribution to the committee's task might be made by studying the possibility of substituting an arithmetic means of computing the value of consular posts.

The attached list (TAB A) ranks EUR consular posts as to indispensability on a formula basis, using only objective data available within the Department. While the results do not perhaps in every instance correspond with subjective opinion in the rankings of certain large posts, the Bureau is satisfied that the less essential ones are appropriately placed. If the closing of several offices is decided upon in Fiscal Year 1961 as necessary to conserve authorized positions, American staff, or operating funds, this mode of assessing the relative value of consular posts may be of interest to the committee in weighing justifications presented for posts appearing at the bottom of regional bureaus' lists. The administrative device by which this is done for EUR posts is explained in the memorandum at TAB B.

Should the need for stringent economy in Departmental current and future operations be thought to require the closing of posts, this Bureau would be prepared to discuss

the

120.2/5-1360

the relinquishment of offices the contribution of which--measured by this or any other formula computation--falls below a given level. Meanwhile, the requested data applicable to Aruba, Antwerp, Trieste, Saint John and Basel are submitted herewith, at TAB C. It should be emphasised that these posts are regarded by the Bureau as being well worth maintaining should fiscal conditions permit and we are fully prepared to provide further justification for them.

Attachments:

TAB A. Posts with Coefficient Score.

TAB B. Explanation of EUR Administrative Device for Determining Coefficient Score.

TAB C. Data Applicable to Five EUR Posts, as requested.

EUR/EX:CCAdams:mer 7/7/60

TAB A

POSTS WITH COEFFICIENT SCORE

Above 300

Toronto
Nassau
Vancouver
Munich
Milan
Kingston
Montreal
Winnipeg
Hamburg
Naples
Port-of-Spain
Frankfurt
Hamilton
Stuttgart
Ponta Delgada
Palermo

Above 100

Zagreb
Goteborg
Algiers
Bordeaux
Barcelona
Florence
Manchester
Marseille
Dusseldorf
Strasbourg
Seville
St. John's
Zurich
Bilbao
Georgetown
Halifax
Lyon

Above 50

TAB A (2)

Above 50		Below 50	
Venice	97.01	Quebec	47.78
Calgary	96.03	Paramaribo	47.59
Birmingham	86.37	Martinique	47.12
Turin	74.70	Edinburgh	45.23
Oporto	70.37	Geneva	44.65
Belfast	70.23	Rotterdam	42.42
Windsor	70.22	Valencia	40.16
Curacao	65.04	Cork	38.56
Amsterdam	62.69	Cardiff	37.95
Nice	60.65	Belize	33.41
Edmonton	60.27	Southampton	31.40
Glasgow	58.88	Liverpool	29.84
Valletta	58.30	Le Havre	29.53
Bremen	57.26	Genoa	28.65
Barbados	56.60	Aruba	24.08
Sarajevo	53.61	Antwerp	18.26
Salzburg	52.44	Trieste	15.56
Vigo	50.03	Saint John	15.39
		Basel	14.67

Poznan not listed

EUR/EX:CCAdams:mer 7/7/60

TAB B

EXPLANATION OF EUR ADMINISTRATIVE DEVICE FOR DETERMINING COEFFICIENT SCORE

I. Preliminary Remarks

An arithmetic device for assessing the comparative value of consular posts would, recognizably, be serviceable for the Department's administrative direction--both for scrutiny of budgeted requests for new posts and for determining what existing posts can most readily be relinquished in the interests of economy.

It seems safe to say that such an assessment has never been prominently attempted, the subjective element in decisions being emphatically dominant. Evidently, however, despite the weight of tradition, a systematic comparison of posts on the basis of subjective opinion is a logical impossibility.

Any Foreign Service career, no matter how loftily pursued, has a very confined experience in respect to the actualities of the posts extant. The quality of being truly informed as to current contributions needed from, or made by, constituent posts is found in any individual to apply only to one country, or, at the most, a congruent group such as France, Spain and Portugal. Accordingly, even if this expert, if fractionated, opinion is consulted, by what common cr teria is the advice of the various spokesmen to be weigh and compared?

Evolution of the Service over the past number of years has conduced to a notorious preference in individual employees for work of a substantive character, defining the word to exclude both consular and administrative work. By extension, consular posts, as well as missions, have tended to be rated as much by their potential interest as centers for political and economic reporting as by any importance in terms of consular activities. Frequently, posts at which officers have created reputations as perspicacious, active political reporters glow in a reflected light: to political and research offices, those posts seem important in the degree to which useful material is provided. Then, too, in various combinations of quasi-cultural bias, a post may come to be generally regarded as "important" for such reasons as the city's artistic aura, tourist trade, comfortable climate or other incidental characteristics.

II. Arithmetical

I. Arithmetical Expressions

It is impractical to devote time to a comparison of the relative importance of our bilateral relations with various countries. In every country with which we have diplomatic relations there is a United States mission-- for present purposes, at least, each as important as the other. As to constituent posts, that which is capable of measurement is:

(1) the likely contribution of each to its Embassy's responsibility for coverage of political and economic affairs, the Department's administrative arrangements for this purpose not being considered.

(2) the inconvenience caused persons with consular business in requiring them to go to the next adjacent post.

In both cases, the salient measurement is of distance as a function of communication.

A. Political Constant. For brevity, the elements of our thesis on constituent political reporting are outlined below:

(1) The utility of consular posts for reporting on political subjects appears to be diminished in any country in direct proportion to technological improvements in communication media, the rise of multilateral diplomatic negotiation, centralization of power in national governments, and the growth of the Department itself in respect to "horizontal" development in specialization.

(2) As a practical matter, there has always appeared to be some degree of artificiality in the delimitation of political affairs by the boundaries of the consular district, since obviously the Embassy has the country-wide responsibility. The zone of the consular post's real, rather than virtual, familiarity with the political scene confronting it tends to be much smaller than its district, partly because financial realities restrict the size of staff and travel which its members can undertake.

(3) Given

Given the Embassy's primacy in these matters and the considerable development of wire-service coverage of news, the constituent post's contributive reporting is, by and large, made up of two broad categories of subject: the sounding of an amorphous, local public opinion on current political issues and the emergence of a personality or movement likely to attain national prominence. Travel performed in the interests of developing information of this type is very apt to take on the character of random research.

(4) On the basis of the above, the formula axiom states: the value of the constituent post for political purposes is expressed by the quotient of: (a) the registered circulation of morning dailies published within a 50-mile radius of the post (or the district limits, whichever is the lesser), counting only papers with a circulation at least 15 percent of the average of the two leading metropolitan dailies; (b) the number of students attending universities situated within the 50-mile radius (or the consular district, whichever is smaller); (c) the percent of population within the consular district; and (d) the railroad miles separating post from Embassy up to 1,000.

EXCEPTION: For island communities or colonial territories separated by 500 miles of water from their central governments, the newspaper circulations are scored in thousands, rather than hundred-thousands. In no case is a post given less than 0.1, unless the 15 percent relationship to the metropolitan circulation is not achieved in the case of a mainland post.

Examples: The extrapolation for Italian posts is provided below:

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	Constant
Milan	890,000 or 8.9	26,400 or 26.4	14.12%	395 miles	
	(8.9 /	26.4) x	14.12 x	395 =	196.88

Naples

TAB B (5)

Examples:	GNP	≠	Growth
Dusseldorf	60.15		0.67
Valencia	8.27		3.20
Paramaribo	.046		2.50

(2) The sum is multiplied by the ratio of the district's non-agricultural labor to the country total. For insular posts, the ratio of non-agricultural to total labor force.

Dusseldorf (60.15 ≠ 0.67) x .3727

Valencia (8.27 ≠ 3.20) x .0652

Paramaribo (0.46 ≠ 2.50) x .1704*

*for Surinam only

(3) The simple total of World Trade Directory Reports (divided by 100) requested of the post is added to express specific orientation of American business interest.

(4) The resulting expression (GNP ≠ Growth x % Industrial Labor ≠ WTD Reports) is then multiplied by the population (as a logarithm) and the linear distance in miles (divided by 100) separating the post in question from its Embassy or the next adjacent post of size in the same national jurisdiction, whichever is the nearer.

$$\left[(\text{GNP} \neq \text{Growth}) \times \text{Ind.}^{\%}\ \text{Labor} \neq \frac{\text{WTD Rpt}}{100}\right] \left(\text{pop. log.} \times \frac{\text{dist}}{100}\right)$$

Dusseldorf [(60.15 ≠ 0.67) x .3727 ≠ 3.44] (2.14737 x .44)

Valencia [(8.27 ≠ 3.20) x .0652 ≠ .13] (1.57159 x 2.85)

Paramaribo [(.046 ≠ 2.5) x .1704 ≠ .21] (.34830 x 6.00)

(5) To reflect

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND949654

Examples:	GNP	+	Growth
Dusseldorf	60.15		0.67
Valencia	8.27		3.20
Paramaribo	.046		2.50

(2) The sum is multiplied by the ratio of the district's non-agricultural labor to the country total. For insular posts, the ratio of non-agricultural to total labor force.

Dusseldorf (60.15 + 0.67) x .3727

Valencia (8.27 + 3.20) x .0652

Paramaribo (0.46 + 2.50) x .1704*

*for Surinam only

(3) The simple total of World Trade Directory Reports (divided by 100) requested of the post is added to express specific orientation of American business interest.

(4) The resulting expression (GNP + Growth x % Industrial Labor + WTD Reports) is then multiplied by the population (as a logarithm) and the linear distance in miles (divided by 100) separating the post in question from its Embassy or the next adjacent post of size in the same national jurisdiction, whichever is the nearer.

$$[(\text{GNP} + \text{Growth}) \times \%\ \text{Ind. Labor} + \frac{\text{WTD Rpt}}{100}]\ (\text{pop. log.} \times \frac{\text{dist}}{100})$$

Dusseldorf [(60.15 + 0.67) x .3727 + 3.44] (2.14737 x .44)

Valencia [(8.27 + 3.20) x .0652 + .131] (1.57159 x 2.85)

Paramaribo [(.046 + 2.5) x .1704 + .21] (.34830 x 6.00)

(5) To reflect

(5) To reflect the localized activity of the post in conducting commercial intelligence work, the WTD Report factor (divided by 10) is again taken by the distance to the adjacent post (divided by 100). In the examples, this produces:

Dusseldorf	24.66 ≠ (34.4 x .44) = 39.80
Valencia	3.85 ≠ (1.3 x 2.85) = 7.56
Paramaribo	1.34 ≠ (2.1 x 6.00) = 13.94

(6) Of EUR posts, only Belize, Paramaribo, and those in Spain and Yugoslavia are benefitted by a final element in the economic constant: a figure representing the specific interest shown by both United States and Soviet economic aid policy. In the present EUR listing, this value is computed as:

$(\text{Aid} \neq \frac{\text{Aid}}{\text{GNP}})$ % population in consular district, the Aid term being taken in millions of dollars.

Within EUR reference, these results are satisfactory. For application elsewhere, however, the first number must be expressed as a logarithm because of the very sizeable dollar figure for aid furnished to the United Arab Republic, for instance. Confirmation of this term in the formula--of little immediate consequence to the European Bureau--has been held pending provision of data for total United States aid.

C. Consular Constant.

(1) The reckoning here is based on a simple addition of services performed at posts during the last complete fiscal year, counting citizenship cases, non-immigrant visas, notarials and protection and welfare work but excluding immigrant visas and shipping services. The intent is to measure services of direct consequence to American

citizens

citizens or American interests: the belief is postulated that no post is maintained exclusively to issue immigration visas. As to shipping, such services seem highly optional so far as the ship is concerned (no post at port, no depositing of papers) and to some extent a vestige of consular functions in another era.

Were VO able to furnish the data by post, a more sophisticated total of services would exclude non-immigrant visa issuance other than the B-1 category (visiting businessmen) and include M-1 and M-2 non-immigrant visas (spouses, relatives of American citizens) and all preference visas. Provisionally, Consular Operations Reports figures without this nuance have been used.

(2) Assuming an even distribution of consular clientele throughout the consular district, the inconvenience to the public of visiting an office (Post B) at some remove from Post A in question can be stated as varying with the location of the latter within its consular district in accordance with five geometric patterns.

Examples: employing the Italian posts.

	Total Services x	Dist. ÷ 10 =	Measure of Remove ≠	Services Constant	Total
Naples	19,852 or 19.852	11.6	230.08	19.85	249.93

(The location of the city closer to Rome than 3/4 of its district suggests that the inconvenience suffered by 19,852 persons may be measured by the mean average of 116 additional miles they would have to travel to the adjacent post of reference, or Rome.)

Florence	6.458	10.3	66.51	6.46	72.97
Genoa	2.579	6.4	16.51	2.58	19.09

Milan

	[illegible] Services	x Dist. ÷ 10	= Measure of Remove	+ Services Constant	Total
Milan	9.533	6.0	57.20	9.53	66.73
Palermo	8.410	24.4	205.20	8.41	213.61
Trieste	1.645	3.8	6.25	1.64	7.90
Turin	2.356	4.6	10.84	2.35	13.20
Venice	4.425	8.0	35.40	4.42	39.82
Other examples:					
Saint John	.736	16.0	11.78	0.74	12.52
Algiers	.558	88.3	49.26	0.56	49.82
Georgetown	2.103	38.4	80.75	2.10	82.85

III. Supplementary Observations

A. The method employed in erecting the formula under discussion has been emphatically empirical. The use of the several factors can be defended as to logic and validity. The arbitrary manner of manipulating them arithmetically has been adopted simply to procure results which, within the EUR area, seem to coincide with subjective opinion. As an administrative tool, the formula is, of course, capable of revision and development. In its present form, the requisite data are as available to the Department's administrative direction as they are to regional bureaus.

B. Three different measurements of distance are employed: in the Political Constant, actual rail miles between post and Embassy; for the Economic, linear miles, as measured from maps by caliper, between post and next adjacent one of size in the same national jurisdiction; in the Consular, linear miles from post to the district boundary and thence to the adjacent post whether or not within the same country.

Where any distance is measured over water, it is multiplied by the factor 1.92 to reflect--in terms of additional cost of air travel versus rail--the relative difficulty of access. (In international commercial aviation, the average fare per mile is 1.92 times the cost per mile to the first-class passenger on United States railroads in 1959.)

C. It is

C. It is assumed that in a time of fiscal stringency, priority is properly placed on the maintenance and establishment of posts with a substantial consular measurement. Otherwise put, the primary political or economic function alleged for any post should not, by itself, warrant the post's retention unless reinforced by a consular workload, unless its purpose is demonstratably related to first-hand observation of the Communist bloc. Accordingly, while there is no "weighting" of any sort, the arithmetic is shaped so as to procure a mean average composition of approximately 25 percent for political and economic constants against the 50 percent for consular.

D. The political measurement rests on the assertion that the value of contributive reporting can be estimated by the extent that political dogma (regionalism, factionalism, irredentism, minority creeds) of provident interest to the Department and the United States must have a voice and an audience, of both relative and absolute significance. Obviously, there are areas of the world where illiteracy and poverty tend to depress the measurement of audience by newspaper circulation and university enrollment. To compensate, a factor to represent focal political interest in the Cold War can be inserted in the formula. Only limitations in time and delay in the provision of data by Voice of American have prevented the preparation of an element in the Political Constant--in any case waived for EUR posts--to reflect VOA and Radio Moscow hours of broadcast to specific countries.

IV. Possible Applications

Once accepted as valid for administrative purposes, a device for computing the value of consular posts around the world on a coherent and objective basis could be used to supplement substantive recommendations from regional bureaus in respect to (a) closing posts, (b) establishing new ones, (c) designation of offices as Consulates General, and (d) the location of consular agencies.

V. Data and Sources

Political:
1. Population of country and of consular districts.
2. Circulation of news organs published within 50-mile radius of consular posts, counting only those with at least 15 percent of metropolitan (Embassy location) average of two leading papers.

3. Enrollment

3. Enrollment at recognized universities within 50-mile radius.
4. Railway distance from Embassy, or air-track miles if over water.

Economic:
1. Gross National Product, in dollars.
2. Rate of annual growth.
3. Industrial (non-agricultural) labor force of country and consular districts.
4. Number of WTD Reports requested of consular posts by Department in one previous year.
5. Linear distances between posts in country.
6. Item No. 1 under Political, above.

Consular:
1. Total of consular services in previous year, excluding immigration visas, shipping services.
2. Linear distances between consular districts according to geometric patterns to be explained elsewhere.

These data have been obtained by EUR from the following sources:

Railway and air-track miles - IRC/GE: Mr. Hodgson.

Populations - Rand McNally Cosmopolitan Atlas.

Consular Districts - I FSM I.

Newspaper Circulations - Editor & Publisher Year Book, 1958

University Enrollment - International Handbook of Universities, 1959.

Consular Workload Data - Consular Operations Reports from field.

All Economic Data - INR/REU, except WTD Reports count from A/REP.

Addendum:

-fco

Addendum:

EUR has scored by the formula above explained two posts closed in the recent past. The results are, as follows:

	Political	Economic	Consular	Total
Niagara Falls	0.34	1.07	5.76	6.84
Cherbourg	11.25	5.87	.32	17.80

The formula calculation for Niagara Falls clearly bears out the validity of the subjective judgement, or, otherwise stated, the formula seems in this test to have sufficient sensitivity as to reflect the practical nature of valid judgements. The total score for Cherbourg does not appear to do this; however, reference to paragraph C, Part III Supplementary Observations, above, provides ample substantiation of the reasons for abolishing the post.

Utilization of the arithmetic device for calculating the putative value of posts can not, at the moment, be successfully demonstrated here for the reason that the WTD Report count applicable to the proposed Krakow and Bratislava consular districts would have to be obtained from the respective Embassies, as would the consular workload data applicable. Nevertheless, the Political Constant for these two proposed new posts is sufficiently sizeable by itself to support the Bureau's request for them: Krakow 139.21, Bratislava 98.02.

EUR/EX:Charles C. Adams:mer 7/7/60

REFERENCES CITED

Chapter I. Introduction

al Jazeera. 2012, Sep. 21. Timeline: Protest over anti-Islam video. Accessed at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/09/201291720158465768.html>.

Applebaum, A. 2012, October 17. Ambassador Steven's death shouldn't create bunker mentality. *The Washington Post.* Accessed at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/anne-applebaum-ambassador-stevenss-death-shouldnt-create-bunker-mentality/2012/10/17/c0cc853e-1876-11e2-9855-71f2b202721b_story.html>.

Avery, G.; Howorth, J.; Rijks, D.; Duke, S.; Adebahr, C.; Lieb, J.; Missiroli, A.; Le Gloannec, A.-M.; Whitman, R.; Keukeleire, S.; revi, G.; and Maurer, A. 2007. The EU Foreign Service: how to build a more effective common policy, EPC Working Paper No. 28. *EU Integration and Citizenship: Europe in the World.* Accessed at: <http://www.efsps.eu/docs/470EuropeanForeignService_WP.pdf#page=34>.

Abdelaziz, K. 2012, September 14. Three killed as Sudanese storm U.S., German embassies. *Reuters*. Accessed at: < http://www.reuters.com/article/us-protest-sudan-idUSBRE88D1HW20120914>.

Bakker, K. 2005. Neoliberalizing water? Market environmentalism in water supply in England and Wales. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95(3): 542-565.

Batty, M. 2007. *Cities and Complexity: Understanding Cities with Cellular Automata, Agent-Based Models, and Fractals*. Boston: MIT Press.

Benen, S. 2014, July 29. Wanted: U.S. ambassadors. *MSNBC.* Accessed at <http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/wanted-us-ambassadors>.

Berridge, G. R. 1995. *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. London: Palgrave.

Boddy, T. 2008. Architecture Emblematic: Hardened Sites and Softened Symbols. In M. Sorkin (Ed.), *Indefensible Space: The Architecture of the National Insecurity State*. New York: Routledge.

Bradsher, K., Buckley, C., and Herszenhorn, D. H. 2014, July 23. Phone diplomacy in Ukraine crisis lifts Malaysian leader's standing. *The New York Times.* Accessed at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/world/asia/prime-minister-najib-razaks-intervention-on-flight-17-pays-off.html?_r=0>.

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2012a, September 14. Seven dead as anti-Islam film protests widen. Accessed at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19602177>.

BBC. 2012b, September 21. Pakistan film protests: 19 die in Karachi and Peshawar. Accessed at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19678412>.

Caddell Construction. ND. U.S. Embassy Yaonde, Cameroon. Accessed at: <http://www.caddell.com/international/cameroon.aspx>.

Cadman, L. 2009. Nonrepresentational theory/nonrepresentational geographies. In Kitchin, R. and Thrift, N. (Eds.), *The International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, volume 7*, pp. 456-463. Oxford: Elsevier.

CBS News. 2012, September 11. Egypt protesters scale U.S. Embassy wall, take flag. Accessed at: < http://www.cbsnews.com/news/egypt-protesters-scale-us-embassy-wall-take-flag/>.
Coaffee, J. 2010. Protecting vulnerable cities: the UK's resilience response to defending everyday urban infrastructure. *International Affairs* 86(4): 939-954.
Constantinou, C.M. 1996. *On the Way to Diplomacy*. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Cornago, N. 2010. On the normalization of sub-state diplomacy. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*. 5(1): 11-26.
Crittenden, A. 1981, October 19. Huge U.S. presence in Cairo evokes memories of Tehran. *The New York Times.* Accessed at < http://www.nytimes.com/1981/10/19/world/huge-us-presence-in-cairo-evokes-memories-of-teheran.html?scp=7&sq=u.s.+embassy+constructed+cairo&st=nyt>.
Dale, K. 2005. Building a social materiality: spatial and embodied politics in organizational control. *Organization* 12(5): 649-678.
Davis, S. 2011. The US military base network and contemporary colonialism: Power projection, resistance, and the quest for operational unilateralism. *Political Geography* 30(4): 215-224.
Duchacek, I. D. 1990. Perforated sovereignties: towards a typology of new actors in international relations. In H. J. Michelmann and P. Soldatos (Eds.), *Federalism and International Relations.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Editorial Board. 2015, Feb. 15. The Pentagon's excess space. *The New York Times.* Accessed at: < http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/opinion/sunday/the-pentagons-excess-space.html>.
Federal Foreign Office. 2014. The German missions abroad. Accessed at <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/AAmt/Auslandsvertretungen/Uebersicht_node.html>
Friedman, T. 2003, Dec. 21. Where birds don't fly. *The New York Times*. Accessed at <www.nytimes.com/2003/12/21/opinion/where-birds-don-t-fly.html>.
Friedman, U. 2013, Dec. 20. Behold: the world's first digitally signed international agreement. *The Atlantic.* Accessed at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/behold-the-worlds-first-digitally-signed-international-agreement/282582/>.
Ghobari, M. 2012, September 13. Yemeni protesters storm U.S. embassy compound in Sanaa. *Reuters*. Accessed at: < http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-usa-embassy-idUSBRE88C0AM20120913>.
Gillem, M. L. 2007. *America town: building the outposts of empire.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Grabar, H. 2012, September 17. Fortress America: how the U.S. designs its embassies. *City Lab*. Accessed at <http://www.citylab.com/politics/2012/09/fortress-america-how-us-designs-embassies/3289/>.
Graham, S. 2010. *Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism*. London: Verso.
Graham, S. and Marvin, S. 2001. *Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructure, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition*. New York: Routledge.

Gregory, D. 2010. War and peace. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 35(2): 154-186.
Hocking, B. 1993. *Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy.* London: Macmillan.
Karaian, J. 2014, July 22. Six months of world leaders' phone calls to Putin about the crisis in Ukraine, charted. *Quartz*. Accessed at <http://qz.com/238512/six-months-of-world-leaders-phone-calls-to-putin-about-the-crisis-in-ukraine-charted/>.
Kennedy, P.F. 2011, July 27. Fulfilling Our Treaty Obligations and Protecting Americans Abroad. *Statement Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.* Washington, DC. Accessed at <http://www.state.gov/m/rls/remarks/2011/169182.htm>.
Kincaid, J. 2002. Foreign relations of sub-national units: constituent diplomacies in federal systems. In R. Blindenbacher and A. Keller (Eds.), *Federalism in a Changing World: Learning from Each Other,* pp. 74-96. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.
Kirkpatrick, D. D. and Santora, M. 2012, September 15. After days of unrest in Muslim world, a fragile calm takes hold. *The New York Times.* Accessed at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/world/middleeast/anti-american-protests-subside-in-middle-east.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FThe%20&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=70&pgtype=collection>.
Langewiesche, W. 2007, November. The mega-bunker of Baghdad. *Vanity Fair.* Accessed at: <http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/11/langewiesche200711>.
Loeffler, J. 1998a. *The Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America's Embassies.* New York: Princeton Architectural Press.
____. 1998b. Diplomacy doesn't belong in bunkers. *The Washington Post.* Accessed at: < https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1998/08/23/diplomacy-doesnt-belong-in-bunkers/5aa8345a-f148-4125-82e3-27f3d03cf14b/?utm_term=.6ed87f6f49a4>.
____. 2005, September. Embassy design: security versus openness. *The Foreign Service Journal,* pp. 44-51.
Lorimer, H. 2005. *Cultural* geography: the busyness of being 'more-than-representational'. *Progress in Human Geography* 29(1): 83-94.
McConnell, F., Moreau, T. and Dittmer, J. 2012. Mimicking state diplomacy: the legitimizing strategies of unofficial diplomacies. *Geoforum* 43(4): 804-814.
McFarlane, C. 2008. Urban shadows: materiality, the 'Southern city' and urban theory. *Geography Compass* 2(2): 340-358.
____. 2011. Assemblage and critical urbanism. *Area* 15(2): 204-224.
Meehan, K. 2013. Tool-power: water infrastructure as wellsprings of state power. *Geoforum* 57(1): 215-224.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. 2015. Diplomatic and consular missions of Russia. Accessed at < http://www.mid.ru/zu_r.nsf/strawebeng>.
Mitchell, T. 1991. The limits of the state: beyond statist approaches and their critics. *The American Political Science Review* 85(1): 77-96.

Monstadt, J. 2009. Conceptualizing the political ecology of urban infrastructures: insights from technology and urban studies. *Environment and Planning A* 41: 1924-1942.
Mountz, A. 2002. Feminist politics, immigration, and academic identities. *Gender, Place and Culture* 9(2): 187-194.
____. 2003. Human smugglings, the transnational imaginary, and everyday geographies of the nation-state. *Antipode* 35(3): 622-644.
Murray, S. 2008. Consolidating the gains made in diplomacy studies: A taxonomy. *International Studies Perspectives* 9(1): 22-39.
Murray, S., Sharp, P., Wiseman, G., Criekemans, D., and Melissen, J. 2011. The present and future of diplomacy and diplomatic studies. *International Studies Review* 13(4): 709-728.
Müller, M. 2012. Opening the black box of the organization: socio-material practices of geopolitical ordering. *Political Geography* 31: 379-388.
Neumann, I. 2012. *At Home with the Diplomats: Inside A European Foreign Ministry*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Nicolson, H. G. 1954. *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method.* London: Constable.
OIG [Office of the Inspector General], U.S. Department of State. 2009b. Report of Inspection: Embassy Zagreb, Croatia, no. ISP-I-09-54A. *U.S. Department of State.* Accessed at <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/129781.pdf>.
Oliver, A. 2016, Mar. 14. The irrelevant diplomat: Do we even need embassies anymore? *Foreign Affairs.* Accessed at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2016-03-14/irrelevant-diplomat>.
Ouroussoff, N. 2010, February 23. Architecture Review: A new fort, er, embassy, for London. *The New York Times*. Accessed at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/arts/design/24embassy.html?_r=2&adxnnl=1&ref=arts&adxnnlx=1348778016-uQPBDEoIgTide3lYtOm4Xw&>.
Painter, J. 1995. *Politics, Geography, and Political Geography: A Critical Perspective.* London: Arnold.
Satow, S. E. [1917] 1979. *Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice,* 5. London: Longman.
Shaw, I. G. R. and Meehan, K. 2013. Force-full: power, politics, and object-oriented philosophy. *Area* 45(2): 216-22.
Smith, A., Stirling, A., Berkhout, F. 2005. The governance of sustainable socio-technical transitions. *Research Policy* 34(10): 1491-1510.
Smith, Z. 2013. The embassy of Cambodia. *The New Yorker.* Accessed at: <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/02/11/the-embassy-of-cambodia>.
Spencer, R. 2012, September 17. American embassy staff withdraw from Tunisia and Sudan. *The Telegraph.* Accessed at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/9546840/American-embassy-staff-withdraw-from-Tunisia-and-Sudan.html>.
STRATFOR. 2012, September 14. Tunisian protesters set American school on fire. Accessed at: < https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/tunisian-protesters-set-american-school-fire>.
Sydow, C. 2012, September 12. Violent protests in Egypt and Libya: deadly attack evokes uncomfortably memories. *Spiegel Online*. Accessed at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/muhammad-film-triggers-violent-protests-in-cairo-and-benghazi-a-855484.html>.

Thrift, N. 2000. Afterwords. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 18: 213-255.

U.S. House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 2008, January 23. *Fortress America Abroad*, Hearing (Serial No. 110-129). Washington: Government Printing Office, 2009. Accessed at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg47996/html/CHRG-110hhrg47996.htm>.

Walt, S. 2010, February 24. Fortress America? *Foreign Policy.* Accessed at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/24/fortress_america>.

Whatmore, S. 2006. Materialist returns: practicing cultural geography in and for a more-than-human world. *Cultural Geographies* 13(4): 600-609.

Woodward, 2005. From military geography to militarism's geographies: disciplinary engagements with the geographies of militarism and military activities. *Progress in Human Geography*, 6: 718-740.

Worth, R.M. 2012, November 14. Can American diplomacy ever come out of its bunker? *The New York Times Magazine.* Accessed at <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/magazine/christopher-stevens-and-the-problem-of-american-diplomacy.html?pagewanted=all>.

Ybarra, M. 2015, Feb. 10. U.S. embassy in Yemen closing amid violence. *The Washington Times.* Accessed at: < http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/10/us-embassy-yemen-closing-amid-violence/>.

Chapter II. Methodology

Aberbach, J. D. and Rockman, B. A. 2002. Conducting and coding elite interviews. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 34(4): 673-676.

Allison, G. T. 1971. *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.* Boston: Little Brown.

Baker, A. R. H. 1997. The dead don't answer questionnaires: researching and writing historical geography. *Journal of Geography in Higher Education* 21(2): 231-243.

Baxter, J. & Eyles, J. 1997. Evaluating qualitative research in social geography: establishing 'rigour' in interview analysis. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 22(4): 505-525.

Black, I. 2006. Analysing historical and archival sources. In N. Clifford & G. Valentine (Eds.), *Key Methods in Geography,* pp. 477-500. London: Sage.

Bradshaw, M. and Williams, S. 1999. Scales, lines and minor geographies: Whither King Island? *Australian Geographical Studies* 37(3): 248-267.

Brower, R. S. and Abolafia, M. Y. 1997. Bureaucratic politics: the view from below. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 7(2): 305-331.

Butz, D. 2010. Autoethnography as sensibility. In DeLyser *et al.* (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Geography,* pp. 138-155.

Charmaz, K. 2008. Grounded theory as an emergent method. In S. N. Hesse-Biber & P. Leavy (Eds.), *Handbook of Emergent Methods* (pp. 155-172). New York: The Guilford Press.

Cope, M. 2010. Coding qualitative data. In I. Hay (Ed.), *Qualitative research methods in human geography,* pp. 281-294. Ontario: Oxford University Press.

Crang, M. 2005. Qualitative methods: there is nothing outside the text? *Progress in Human Geography* 29(2): 225-233.

Criekemans, D. 2011. Exploring the relationship between geopolitics, foreign policy, and diplomacy. In S. Murray (Ed.), The present and future of diplomacy and diplomatic studies. *International Studies Review* 13(4): 709-728.

Del Casino Jr., V.J.; Grimes, A.J.; Hanna, S.P.; and Jones III, J.P. 2000. Methodological frameworks for the geography of organizations. *Geoforum* 31: 523-538.

Dwyer, S. C. & Buckle, J. L. 2009. The space between: on being an insider-outsider in qualitative research. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 8(1): 54-63.

Elwood, S. A. & Martin, D. G. 2000. "Placing" interviews: location and scales of power in qualitative research. *The Professional Geographer* 52(4): 649-657.

Foden, G. 2002. *Zanzibar*. London: Faber & Faber.

Glaser, B. G. & Strauss, A. L. 1967. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory.* Chicago: Adline.

Heyman, J. M. and Smart, A. (Eds.). 1999. *States and Illegal Practices.* New York: Berg.

Kuus, M. 2013. Foreign policy and ethnography: a sceptical intervention. *Geopolitics* 18(1): 115-131.

Neumann, I. 2012. *At Home with the Diplomats: Inside A European Foreign Ministry*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Mayhew, R. 2003. Researching historical geography. In A. Rogers & H. Viles (Eds.), *The Student's Companion to Geography, 2nd edition,* pp. 260-265. Oxford: Blackwell.

Meehan, K. 2013. Tool-power: water infrastructure as wellsprings of state power. *Geoforum* 57(1): 215-224.
Moore, A.W. and Perdue, N. 2014. Imagining a critical geopolitical cartography. *Geography Compass* 8(2): 892-901.
Mountz, A. 2002. Feminist politics, immigration, and academic identities. *Gender, Place and Culture* 9(2): 187-194.
____. 2004. Embodying the nation-state: Canada's response to human smuggling. *Political Geography* 23(3): 323-345.
Müller, M. 2012. Opening the black box of the organization: socio-material practices of geopolitical ordering. *Political Geography* 31: 379-388.
____. 2015. Assemblages and actor-networks: rethinking socio-material power, politics and space. Forthcoming in *Geography Compass.*
Robinson, P. A. 2014. *A political ecology of bovine tuberculosis eradication in Northern Ireland*. Durham theses, Durham University. Accessed at < http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/10796/>.
Roche, M. 2010. Historical Research and Archival Sources. In Hay, I. (Ed.), Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography, 3rd edition, pp. 173-190. Ontario: Oxford University Press.
Sin, C. H. 2003. Interviewing in 'place': the socio-spatial construction of new interview data. *Area* 35(3): 305-312.
Smith, Z. 2013. The embassy of Cambodia. *The New Yorker.* Accessed at: <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/02/11/the-embassy-of-cambodia>.
Taber, N. 2010. Institutional ethnography, autoethnography, and narrative: an argument for incorporating multiple methodologies. *Qualitative Research* 10(1): 5-25.
Weisiger, M. Undated. How to analyze a primary source. *University of Oregon, Department of History.*

Chapter III. Towards a Historical Geography of the United States' Diplomatic Footprint

Billig, M. 1995. *Banal Nationalism.* London: Sage.
Bryan, W.J., Secretary of State, to H.D. Flood, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Aug. 21, 1914, file 120.1/48A, 1910-1929 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.
Campbell, H.K., Executive Secretary, Committee on New Foreign Service Posts, to Mr. Scott, Bureau of Administration, Mar. 20, 1958, file 120.2/3-2758, 1955-1959 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.
Carr, W., Assistant Secretary, Nov. 5, 1925, file 120.1/88, 1910-1929 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.
Committee on New Foreign Service Posts to L. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Mar. 27, 1957, file 21.00/3-2757, 1955-1959 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.
Committee on New Foreign Service Posts to L. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Dec. 2, 1957, file 121.00/12-257, 1955-1959 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.
Constantinou, C. M. 1996. *On the Way to Diplomacy.* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Davis, N.P., Chief, Division of Foreign Service Administration, to T.D. Toberty, Staffer, U.S. House of Representatives, Apr. 29, 1939, file 120/286A, 1930-1939 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.
Dean, R. D. 1998. Masculinity as ideology: John F. Kennedy and the domestic politics of foreign policy. *Diplomatic History* 22(1): 29-62.
Der Derian, J. 1987. *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Dictionary.com. ND. Universality. Accessed at: <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/universality>.
Federal Foreign Office. 2014. The German missions abroad. Accessed at <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/AAmt/Auslandsvertretungen/Uebersicht_node.html>.
Gallman, W.J., Director General of the Foreign Service, to Mr. Parsons, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, May 13, 1960, file 120/2/5-1360, 1960-1963 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.
Gilboa, E. 2002. Real-time diplomacy: myth and reality. In I. Potter (Ed.), *Cyber-diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century,* pp. 83-109. Montreal: McGill-Queen University Press.

Gournay, I. and Loeffler, J.C. 2002. Ottawa and Washington: A tale of two embassies. *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 61(4): 480-507.

Hipwell, D. 2012, September 21. US embassy move is 'investment magnet.' *The Times.* Accessed at: < http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/construction-property/article3544987.ece>.

Hull, S., Secretary of State, telegram, Feb. 22, 1943, file 124/68A, 1940-1944 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

Isenstadt, S. 1997. "Faith in a better future:" Josep Lluis Sert's American Embassy in Baghdad. *Journal of Architectural Education* 50(3): 172-188.

Johnson, N.T., Assistant Secretary, to George W. Stimpson, Assistant Editor, The Pathfinder Publishing Company, Inc., Aug. 3, 1928, file 124/12, 1910-1929 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

Kendall, N.B., Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, to P.C. Knox, Secretary of State, Jan. 18, 1913, file 124.01/116, 1910-1929 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

Krowley, H., Minister, American Legation in La Paz, to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 37, May 1, 1911, file 124.01/12, 1910-1929 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

Loeffler, J. 1998. *The Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America's Embassies.* New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

Marsden, M.; Ibanez-Tirado, D.; and Heinig, D. 2016. Everyday diplomacy: Introduction to the special issue. *The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology* 34(2): in press.

McConnell, F., Moreau, T. and Dittmer, J. 2012. Mimicking state diplomacy: the legitimizing strategies of unofficial diplomacies. *Geoforum* 43(4): 804-814.

MacRae, M. 1989. London's standing in international diplomacy. *International Affairs* 65: 501-512.

Messersmith, G.S., Consul General, American Consulate General in Berlin, to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 1076, Dec. 20, 1932, file 120.2/222, 1930-1939 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. ND. China embassies. Accessed at: < http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/2490_665344/>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. 2015. Diplomatic and consular missions of Russia. Accessed at < http://www.mid.ru/zu_r.nsf/strawebeng>.

Neumayer, E. 2008. Distance, power and ideology: diplomatic representation in a spatial, unequal and divided world. *Area* 40(2): 228-236.

Nordbeck, T.M., OLI, to Mr. Howe, Bureau of Resources, memorandum, June 8, 1953, file 122/6-853, 1950-1955 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of State, Telegram, May 16, 1924, file 111/204A, 1910-1929 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

____. Press release, Apr. 8, 1932, file 113/536, 1930-1939 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

____. Telegram, No. A-271, to American Embassy Paris, Mar. 29, 1945, file 120.1/3-2945, 1945-1949 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

Pouliot, V. 2016. *International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Resource Management, Bureau of. 2006, November. Women
in diplomacy, FY 2006 Performance and Accountability Report. *U.S. Department of State.* Accessed at: <
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfrpt/2006/html/76553.htm>.

Rijks, D. and Whitman, R. 2007, Nov. European diplomatic representation in third countries: Trends and options. In EPC Working Paper No. 28: The EU Foreign Service: How to build a more effective common policy, pp. 34-47. *European Policy Centre.* Accessed at: <http://www.efsps.eu/docs/470EuropeanForeignService_WP.pdf#page=34>.

Robertson, W. S. 1915. The first legations of the United States in Latin America. *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 2(2): 183-212.

Russell, M., Minister, American Legation in Teheran [sic], to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 373, Dec. 30, 1912, file 120.1/37, 1910-1929 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

Sharp, P. 1999. For diplomacy: representation and the study of international relations. *International Studies Review* 1(1): 33-57.

Shimazu, N. 2012. Guest editorial: places in diplomacy. *Political Geography* 31: 335-336.

Sofer, S. 1997. The diplomat as a stranger. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 8(3): 179-186.

Smith, N. 2003. After the American *lebensraum*: 'Empire', empire, and globalization. *Interventions* 5(2): 249-270.

____. 2004. *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Smith, Z. 2013. The embassy of Cambodia. *The New Yorker.* Accessed at <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/02/11/the-embassy-of-cambodia>.

Trager, R.F. 2016. The diplomacy of war and peace. *Annual Review of Political Science* 19: 205-228.

U.S. Department of State, Instruction No. 1328, Apr. 14, 1958, file 120.2/4-1438, 1955-1959 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

van der Wusten, H. and Mamadouh, V. 2010. The geography of diplomacy. In R.A. Denemark (Ed.), *The International Studies Encyclopedia, vol. 5,* pp. 2884-2902. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

____. 2016. The traditional diplomatic network and its adaptation to European integration and new media. In J. Dittmer and F. McConnell (Eds.), *Diplomatic Cultures and International Politics: Translations, Spaces and Alternatives*, pp. 93-112. New York: Routledge.

Vogeler, I. 1995. Cold war geopolitics: embassy locations. *Journal of Geography* 94: 323-329.

Washington, G. 1796, September 17. Farewell address. Accessed at <http://www.earlyamerica.com/milestone-events/george-washingtons-farewell-address-full-text/>.

Xierali, I.M. and Liu, L. 2006. Explaining foreign diplomatic presence in the U.S. with spatial models: A liberal spatial perspective. *GeoJournal* 67: 85-101.

Chapter IV. Rethinking the U.S. Diplomatic Assemblage: Representation, Institutional Processes, and the Impacts of Universality

Aberbach, J.D. and Rockman, B.A. 2002. Conducting and coding elite interviews. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 34(4): 673-676.

Acuto, M. and Curtis, S. (Eds.). 2014. *Reassembling International Theory: Assemblage Thinking and International Relations.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Armstrong, D. 1998. Globalization and the social state. *Review of International Studies* 24(4): 461-478.

Bakker, K. 2005. Neoliberalizing water? Market environmentalism in water supply in England and Wales. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95(3): 542-565.

Bell, M. and M. J. Molloy. 2013. Crisis decision-making in Canadian foreign policy: diplomatic representation in the Levant, 1984-1986. *International Journal* 68(2): 378-394.

Benen, S. 2014, July 29. Wanted: U.S. ambassadors. *MSNBC.* Accessed at <http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/wanted-us-ambassadors>.

Bicchi, F. 2014. Information exchanges, diplomatic networks and the construction of European knowledge in European Union foreign policy. *Cooperation and Conflict* 49(2): 239-259.

Billig, M. 1995. *Banal Nationalism.* London: Sage.

Blinken, A. 2016, June 27. Swearing-in or Stephen M. Schwartz as Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Somalia. *U.S. Department of State.* Accessed at: <http://www.state.gov/s/d/2016d/259123.htm>.

Boddy, T. 2008. Architecture Emblematic: Hardened Sites and Softened Symbols. In M. Sorkin (Ed.), *Indefensible Space: The Architecture of the National Insecurity State*. New York: Routledge.

Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State. 2016. Report of the Visa Office 2015. Accessed at: < https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-and-policy/statistics/annual-reports/report-of-the-visa-office-2015.html>.

Cadman, L. 2009. Nonrepresentational theory/nonrepresentational geographies. In Kitchin, R. and Thrift, N. (Eds.), *The International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, volume 7*, pp. 456-463. Oxford: Elsevier.

Constantinou, C. M. 2013. Between statecraft and humanism: diplomacy and its forms of knowledge. *International Studies Review* 15(2): 141-162.

Contreras, M. 2016, Feb 18. Renewed US embassy in Havana shines 54 years after closing. *Latin Post.* Accessed at < http://www.latinpost.com/articles/115720/20160218/the-renewed-u-s-embassy-in-havanna-cuba-shines-after-it-reopens-54-years-later.htm>.

Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. 1987. *A Thousand Plateaus.* London: Continuum.

Dittmer, J. 2013. Humour at the Model United Nations: The role of laughter in constituting geopolitical assemblages. Geopolitics 18(3): 493-513.

____. 2014. Geopolitical assemblages and complexity. *Progress in Human Geography* 38(3): 385-401.

____. 2015. Everyday diplomacy: UKUSA intelligence cooperation and geopolitical assemblages. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 105(3): 604-619.

Dittmer, J. and F. McConnell (Eds.). 2016. *Diplomatic Cultures and International Politics: Translations, Spaces and Alternatives.* New York: Routledge.

Gutman, H. 2015, Jul 16. The ambassador's tale: lessons I learned about success and scandal. *The Washington Post.* Accessed at < https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/the-ambassadors-tale-lessons-i-learned-about-success-and-scandal/2015/07/13/6f0bd038-bb76-11e4-bdfa-b8e8f594e6ee_story.html>.

Hastings, D. 2012, July/August. Twenty years later: staff recalls opening Embassy Yerevan at Cold War's end. *State Magazine.* Accessed at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/195572.pdf>.

Hays, B. Mar. 24, 1961, file 120/3-261, 1960-1963 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

Isenstadt, S. 1997. "Faith in a better future": Josep Lluis Sert's American Embassy in Baghdad. *Journal of Architectural Education* 50(3): 172-188.

Jacobs, J.M. 2006. A geography of big things. *Cultural Geographies* 13(1): 1-27.

Kennedy, P.F. 2011, July 27. Fulfilling Our Treaty Obligations and Protecting Americans Abroad. *Statement Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.* Washington, DC. Accessed at <http://www.state.gov/m/rls/remarks/2011/169182.htm>.

Kinne, B. J. Dependent diplomacy: signaling, strategy, and prestige in the diplomatic network. *International Studies Quarterly* 58: 247-259.

Kuus, M. 2015. Symbolic power in diplomatic practice: matters of style in Brussels. *Cooperation and Conflict* 50(3): 368-384.

Legg, S. 2011. Assemblage/apparatus: Using Deleuze and Foucault. *Area* 43(2): 128-133.

Loeffler, J. 1998. *The Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America's Embassies.* New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

Lorimer, H. 2005. Cultural geography: the busyness of being 'more-than-representational'. *Progress in Human Geography* 29(1): 83-94.

Lowy Institute for International Policy. 2016. Global Diplomacy Index. Accessed at: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/global-diplomacy-index/#>.

McFarlane, C. 2008. Urban shadows: materiality, the 'Southern city' and urban theory. *Geography Compass* 2(2): 340-358.

____. 2011. Assemblage and critical urbanism. *Area* 15(2): 204-224.

Meehan, K. 2013. Tool-power: water infrastructure as wellsprings of state power. *Geoforum* 57(1): 215-224.

Mitchell, T. 1991. The limits of the state: beyond statist approaches and their critics. *The American Political Science Review* 85(1): 77-96.

Mountz, A. 2002. Feminist politics, immigration, and academic identities. *Gender, Place and Culture* 9(2): 187-194.

____. 2003. Human smugglings, the transnational imaginary, and everyday geographies of the nation-state. *Antipode* 35(3): 622-644.

____. 2004. Embodying the nation-state: Canada's response to human smuggling. *Political Geography* 23(3): 323-345.

Müller, M. 2012. Opening the black box of the organization: socio-material practices of geopolitical ordering. *Political Geography* 31: 379-388.

____. 2015. Assemblages and actor-networks: rethinking socio-material power, politics and space. Forthcoming in *Geography Compass.*

Neumann, I. 2012. *At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Page, S. and Dittmer, J. 2015. Assembling political parties. *Geography Compass* 9(5): 251-261.

Painter, J. 1995. *Politics, Geography, and Political Geography: A Critical Perspective.* London: Arnold.

Robin, R. 1992. Enclaves of America: The Rhetoric of American Political Architecture Abroad, 1900-1965. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Shane, S. and Lehren, A. W. 2010, November 28. Leaked cables offer raw look at U.S. diplomacy. *The New York Times.* Accessed at: < http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29cables.html>.

Shaw, I. G. R. and Meehan, K. 2013. Force-full: power, politics, and object-oriented philosophy. *Area* 45(2): 216-22.

Thrift, N. 2000. Afterwords. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 18: 213-255.

U.S. Department of State. Undated. Mission. Accessed at: <https://careers.state.gov/learn/what-we-do/mission>.

Whatmore, S. 1997. Dissecting the autonomous self: Hybrid cartographies for a relational ethics. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 15: 37-53.

____. Materialist returns: practicing cultural geography in and for a more-than-human world. *Cultural Geographies* 13(4): 600-609.

Chapter V. Regional Bureaus and the Privileging of the State in the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment

Agnew, J. 1994. The territorial trap: The geographical assumptions of international relations theory. *Review of International Political Economy* 1(1): 53-80.

____. 1999. Regions on the mind does not equal regions of the mind. *Progress in Human Geography* 23(1): 91-96.

Allen, J., Massey, D. B., Cochrane, A., & J. Charlesworth (Eds.). 1998. *Rethinking the region.* London, UK: Routledge.

Barnes, T. J. and M. Farish. 2006. Between regions: science, militarism, and American geography from World War to Cold War. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 96(4): 807-826.

Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. ND. *U.S. Department of State.* Accessed at: <https://www.state.gov/p/sca/>.

Chadbourne, Mr., Office of Western European Affairs, Memorandum of Conversation, with Mr. E. L. C. Schiff, Dutch Embassy, Feb. 13, 1961, file 122.146M/2-1361, 1960-1963 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

Ciută, F. 2008. Region? Why region? Security, hermeneutics, and the making of the Black Sea region. *Geopolitics* 31(1): 120-147.

Cox, R. 2004. The path-dependency of an idea: Why Scandinavian welfare states remain distinct. *Social Policy & Administration* 38(2): 204-219.

Derrick, M. 2014. The State of Jefferson: beyond myth and mindset, toward enhanced conceptualization of a region. *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 36: 4-16.

Division of European Affairs, Memorandum, June 11, 1942, file 124/68 1/2, 1940-1944 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

Gilbert, A. 1988. The new regional geography in English and French-speaking countries. *Progress in Human Geography* 12: 208-228.

Global Information Services. 2016, Oct. 2. Telephone Directory. *U.S. Department of State.* Accessed at: < http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/112065.pdf>.

Global Publishing Solutions. 2014. *U.S. Department of State.* Accessed at: <https://careers.state.gov/uploads/09/f1/09f1ee5dd407a7e1be373d9f7865a855/Embassy-Post-Location-Map.gif>.

Harman, J. 2015. Disrupting the intelligence community: America's spy agencies need an upgrade. *Foreign Affairs* May/June 2015. Accessed at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-03-01/disrupting-intelligence-community>.

Hartshorne, R. 1939. *The nature of geography: a critical survey of current thought in the light of the past.* Washington, DC: The Association of American Geographers.

Jones, M. 2009. Phase space: geography, relational thinking and beyond. *Progress in Human Geography* 33(4): 487-506.

Kissinger, H. 1994. *Diplomacy.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Kuus, M. 2011. Bureaucracy and place: expertise in the European Quarter. *Global Networks* 11(4): 421-439.

Kuus, M. 2015. Transnational bureaucracies: how do we know what they know? Progress in Human Geography 39(4): 432-448.

Lewis, M.W. and Wigen, K.E. 1997. *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Loeffler, J. 1998. *The Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America's Embassies.* New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

MacLeod, G. 2001. The new regionalism reconsidered: globalization, regulation and the recasting of political economic space. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 25(4): 804-829.

Müller, M. 2012. Opening the black box of the organization: socio-material practices of geopolitical ordering. *Political Geography* 31: 379-388.

Murphy, A. 2013. Advancing geographical understanding: why engaging grand regional narratives matters. *Dialogues in Human Geography* 3(2): 131-149.

National Security Strategy [NSS]. 2015. Accessed at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf>.

Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. A short history of the Department. Accessed at < https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/>.

Paasi, A. 2002. Region and place: Regional worlds and words. *Progress in Human Geography* 26: 802-811.

____. 2010. Commentary: Regions are social constructs, but who or what *constructs* them? Agency in question. *Environment and Planning A* 42(10): 2296-2301.

Pike, A. 2007. Whither regional studies? *Regional Studies* 41(9): 1143-1148.

Plischke, E. 1999. *U.S. Department of State: A Reference History.* Westport, CN: Greenwood Press.

Smith, N. 2003. *American empire: Roosevelt's geographer and the prelude to globalization.* Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review [QDDR]. 2015. *The U.S. Department of State*. Accessed at < http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/>.

U.S. Embassy Paris, Memorandum, to Secretary of State, Mar. 4, 1952, file 120.251/3-752, 1950-1955 Central Decimal File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD.

U.S. Department of State. 2014. Department organization chart. Accessed at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/99494.htm>.